The Litigation State

The Litigation State

Author: Sean Farhang

Publisher:

Published: 2010

Total Pages: 302

ISBN-13: 9780691143811

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Examines how and why private plaintiff-driven litigation has become the dominant model for enforcing federal regulation.


Rights and Retrenchment

Rights and Retrenchment

Author: Stephen B. Burbank

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2017-04-18

Total Pages: 299

ISBN-13: 110818409X

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This groundbreaking book contributes to an emerging literature that examines responses to the rights revolution that unfolded in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s. Using original archival evidence and data, Stephen B. Burbank and Sean Farhang identify the origins of the counterrevolution against private enforcement of federal law in the first Reagan Administration. They then measure the counterrevolution's trajectory in the elected branches, court rulemaking, and the Supreme Court, evaluate its success in those different lawmaking sites, and test key elements of their argument. Finally, the authors leverage an institutional perspective to explain a striking variation in their results: although the counterrevolution largely failed in more democratic lawmaking sites, in a long series of cases little noticed by the public, an increasingly conservative and ideologically polarized Supreme Court has transformed federal law, making it less friendly, if not hostile, to the enforcement of rights through lawsuits.


The Litigation State

The Litigation State

Author: Sean Farhang

Publisher: Princeton University Press

Published: 2010-08-02

Total Pages: 321

ISBN-13: 1400836786

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Of the 1.65 million lawsuits enforcing federal laws over the past decade, 3 percent were prosecuted by the federal government, while 97 percent were litigated by private parties. When and why did private plaintiff-driven litigation become a dominant model for enforcing federal regulation? The Litigation State shows how government legislation created the nation's reliance upon private litigation, and investigates why Congress would choose to mobilize, through statutory design, private lawsuits to implement federal statutes. Sean Farhang argues that Congress deliberately cultivates such private lawsuits partly as a means of enforcing its will over the resistance of opposing presidents. Farhang reveals that private lawsuits, functioning as an enforcement resource, are a profoundly important component of American state capacity. He demonstrates how the distinctive institutional structure of the American state--particularly conflict between Congress and the president over control of the bureaucracy--encourages Congress to incentivize private lawsuits. Congress thereby achieves regulatory aims through a decentralized army of private lawyers, rather than by well-staffed bureaucracies under the president's influence. The historical development of ideological polarization between Congress and the president since the late 1960s has been a powerful cause of the explosion of private lawsuits enforcing federal law over the same period. Using data from many policy areas spanning the twentieth century, and historical analysis focused on civil rights, The Litigation State investigates how American political institutions shape the strategic design of legislation to mobilize private lawsuits for policy implementation.


Public Regulation Through Private Litigation

Public Regulation Through Private Litigation

Author:

Publisher:

Published: 2012

Total Pages:

ISBN-13:

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First, using a careful examination of agency and presidential archival materials, I specify the mechanisms by which agency actors promote private litigation and uncover the institutional and political conditions under which this legal enforcement strategy is employed over time. And then, from these archival observations, I construct original quantitative measures capturing the deployment of these legal enforcement strategies, and conduct statistical analyses to confirm the success of agency efforts to encourage private litigation over time. Ultimately, by reconsidering how to integrate informal mechanisms of enforcement, like agency-motivated private litigation, into theories of bureaucratic regulation, this research contributes to our practical understandings of day-to-day agency behavior and to our conceptions and assessments of state capacity, more broadly.


Regulation Versus Litigation

Regulation Versus Litigation

Author: Daniel P. Kessler

Publisher: University of Chicago Press

Published: 2011-02

Total Pages: 344

ISBN-13: 0226432181

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The efficacy of various political institutions is the subject of intense debate between proponents of broad legislative standards enforced through litigation and those who prefer regulation by administrative agencies. This book explores the trade-offs between litigation and regulation, the circumstances in which one approach may outperform the other, and the principles that affect the choice between addressing particular economic activities with one system or the other. Combining theoretical analysis with empirical investigation in a range of industries, including public health, financial markets, medical care, and workplace safety, Regulation versus Litigation sheds light on the costs and benefits of two important instruments of economic policy.


Regulation by Litigation

Regulation by Litigation

Author: Andrew P. Morriss

Publisher: Yale University Press

Published: 2009-01-01

Total Pages: 293

ISBN-13: 0300120028

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"Examines three major cases in which litigation was used to achieve regulatory ends: the EPA's suit against heavy duty diesel engine manufacturers; asbestos and silica dust litigation by private attorneys; and private and state lawsuits against cigarette manufacturers"--Provided by publisher.


Model Rules of Professional Conduct

Model Rules of Professional Conduct

Author: American Bar Association. House of Delegates

Publisher: American Bar Association

Published: 2007

Total Pages: 216

ISBN-13: 9781590318737

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The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides an up-to-date resource for information on legal ethics. Federal, state and local courts in all jurisdictions look to the Rules for guidance in solving lawyer malpractice cases, disciplinary actions, disqualification issues, sanctions questions and much more. In this volume, black-letter Rules of Professional Conduct are followed by numbered Comments that explain each Rule's purpose and provide suggestions for its practical application. The Rules will help you identify proper conduct in a variety of given situations, review those instances where discretionary action is possible, and define the nature of the relationship between you and your clients, colleagues and the courts.


In Praise of Litigation

In Praise of Litigation

Author: Alexandra Lahav

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Published: 2017-01-02

Total Pages: 233

ISBN-13: 0199380821

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While the right to have one's day in court is a cherished feature of the American democratic system, alarms that the United States is hopelessly litigious and awash in frivolous claims have become so commonplace that they are now a fixture in the popular imagination. According to this view, litigation wastes precious resources, stifles innovation and productivity, and corrodes our social fabric and the national character. Calls for reform have sought, often successfully, to limit people's access to the court system, most often by imposing technical barriers to bringing suit. Alexandra Lahav's In Praise of Litigation provides a much needed corrective to this flawed perspective, reminding us of the irreplaceable role of litigation in a well-functioning democracy and debunking many of the myths that cloud our understanding of this role. For example, the vast majority of lawsuits in the United States are based on contract claims, the median value of lawsuits is on a downward trend, and, on a per capita basis, many fewer lawsuits are filed today than were filed in the 19th century. Exploring cases involving freedom of speech, foodborne illness, defective cars, business competition, and more, the book shows that despite its inevitable limitations, litigation empowers citizens to challenge the most powerful public and private interests and hold them accountable for their actions. Lawsuits change behavior, provide information to consumers and citizens, promote deliberation, and express society's views on equality and its most treasured values. In Praise of Litigation shows how our court system protects our liberties and enables civil society to flourish, and serves as a powerful reminder of why we need to protect people's ability to use it. The tort reform movement has had some real successes in limiting what can reach the courts, but there have been victims too. As Alexandra Lahav shows, it has become increasingly difficult for ordinary people to enforce their rights. In the grand scale of lawsuits, actually crazy or bogus lawsuits constitute a tiny minority; in fact, most anecdotes turn out to be misrepresentations of what actually happened. In In Praise of Litigation, Lahav argues that critics are blinded to the many benefits of lawsuits. The majority of lawsuits promote equality before the law, transparency, and accountability. Our ability to go to court is a sign of our strength as a society and enables us to both participate in and reinforce the rule of law. In addition, joining lawsuits gives citizens direct access to governmental officials-judges-who can hear their arguments about issues central to our democracy, including the proper extent of police power and the ability of all people to vote. It is at least arguable that lawsuits have helped spur major social changes in arenas like race relations and marriage rights, as well as made products safer and forced wrongdoers to answer for their conduct. In this defense, Lahav does not ignore the obvious drawbacks to litigiousness. It is expensive, stressful, and time consuming. Certainly, sensible reforms could make the system better. However, many of the proposals that have been adopted and are currently on the table seek only to solve problems that do not exist or to make it harder for citizens to defend their rights and to enforce the law. This is not the answer. In Praise of Litigation offers a level-headed and law-based assessment of the state of litigation in America as well as a number of practical steps that can be taken to ensure citizens have the right to defend themselves against wrongs while not odiously infringing on the rights of others.


Public Regulation of Private Enforcement

Public Regulation of Private Enforcement

Author: David Freeman Engstrom

Publisher:

Published: 2014

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13:

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In recent years, a growing chorus of commentators has called on Congress to vest agencies with litigation “gatekeeper” authority across a range of regulatory areas, from civil rights and antitrust to financial and securities regulation. Agencies, it is said, can rationalize private enforcement regimes through the power to evaluate lawsuits on a case-by-case basis, blocking bad cases, aiding good ones, and otherwise husbanding private enforcement capacity in ways that conserve scarce public resources for other uses. Yet there exists strikingly little theory or evidence on how agency gatekeeper authority might work in practice. This Article begins to fill that gap by offering the first systematic study of an often invoked but little studied example: Department of Justice (DOJ) oversight of qui tam litigation brought pursuant to the False Claims Act (FCA). Using an original dataset encompassing some 4000 qui tam lawsuits filed between 1986 and 2011, this Article offers evidence on numerous issues that have occupied recent judicial, scholarly, and popular debate, including the extent to which DOJ utilizes its various oversight tools, the mix of factors that drives DOJ intervention decisions, and whether DOJ's seemingly powerful impact on case outcomes can be ascribed to its merits-screening or merits-making role. The analysis mostly rejects heated claims that DOJ decisionmaking has a partisan political cast or is unconnected to case merit. At the same time, however, it uncovers substantial evidence that DOJ makes case decisions strategically, separate and apart from pure merits considerations, in response to simple resource constraints, judicial threats to its ability to police collusive relator-defendant settlements, and the identity (and corporate power) of the defendant. These findings have important implications for judicial evaluation of qui tam suits as well as leading FCA reform proposals. More broadly, the analysis opens up new theoretical and empirical avenues for thinking about optimal regulatory design at the border of litigation and administration, with applications well beyond the FCA.


In Praise of Private Antitrust Litigation

In Praise of Private Antitrust Litigation

Author: Spencer Weber Waller

Publisher:

Published: 2019

Total Pages: 10

ISBN-13:

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In 2017, Professor Alexandra Lahav of the University of Connecticut School of Law published an impressive book entitled In Praise of Litigation. She argues that private civil litigation in the United States is an important tool for democracy. In the preface and introduction, she explains how private civil litigation promotes American democracy:Lawsuits enforce the law by forcing wrongdoers to answer for their conduct; they increase transparency by eliciting information from their adversaries that often benefits the public, and in doing so, they help people participate in self-government. All of this is possible when courts treat litigants as social equals before the law.She is not blind to the costs of the civil litigation system, but contends that those costs are often exaggerated, and the societal benefits usually underappreciated. She emphasizes that disputes about the institutions and procedure of litigation are often merely a proxy for disagreements about the proper types of regulation of potentially harmful conduct. Antitrust is only a minor aspect of Lahav's arguments and discussions. She focuses on the more general mix of civil litigation in state and federal court and showcases a variety of examples involving civil rights, employment discrimination, and tort cases. Professor Lahav's arguments are an excellent jumping off point for how private antitrust litigation has been systematically undervalued and how private claims contribute to the proper functioning of competition policy. In this essay, I argue that private treble damage litigation promotes the four values identified by Lahav: enforcement, transparency, participation, and equality before the law. I also argue that the preference for public over private antitrust enforcement cannot be justified in the text, history, or policy goals of antitrust objectives, with the rare exception of a case involving major structural relief or substantial harm to the foreign policy or the national interests of the United States. I end with a brief look at a likely future where private enforcement continues to be restricted and underserved in the United States, encouraged and nurtured abroad, and how we can do better.