With China/US relations deteriorating the Taiwan Relations Act is the cornerstone of Asian policy and the intent of Congress in drafting the act more than 40 years ago TRA is significant if we are to meet the current crisis. The book which contains highly secret classifed memcoms and congressional debate which lends substance to the ambiguity that the crafters intended .
With China/US relations deteriorating the Taiwan Relations Act is the cornerstone of Asian policy and the intent of Congress in drafting the act more than 40 years ago TRA is significant if we are to meet the current crisis. The book which contains highly secret classifed memcoms and congressional debate which lends substance to the ambiguity that the crafters intended .
Despite apparently consistent statements in 4 decades, the U.S. ¿one China¿ policy concerning Taiwan remains somewhat ambiguous and subject to different interpretations. Apart from questions about what the ¿one China¿ policy entails, issues have arisen about whether U.S. Presidents have stated clear positions and have changed or should change policy, affecting U.S. interests in security and democracy. Contents of this report: (1) U.S. Policy on ¿One China¿: Has U.S. Policy Changed?; Overview of Policy Issues; (2) Highlights of Key Statements by Washington, Beijing, and Taipei: Statements During the Admin. of Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Clinton, George W. Bush, Clinton, and Obama. A print on demand report.
This volume describes the central issues animating the dynamic U.S.-Taiwan-China relationship and the salient international and domestic legal issues shaping U.S. policy in the Asia Pacific region. Lung-Chu Chen gives particular attention Taiwan's status under international law and the role of the U.S. Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) in the formulation and execution of U.S. policy toward Taiwan.
This study examines the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, which defined U.S.-Taiwan relations after the United States' diplomatic recognition of China. It analyzes how President Carter's original legislation was shaped after extensive hearings, lengthy debates, and sharp disagreement in Congress and eventually achieved broad consensus.
Launched in 1991, the Asian Yearbook of International Law is a major internationally-refereed yearbook dedicated to international legal issues as seen primarily from an Asian perspective. It is published under the auspices of the Foundation for the Development of International Law in Asia (DILA) in collaboration with DILA-Korea, the Secretariat of DILA, in South Korea. When it was launched, the Yearbook was the first publication of its kind, edited by a team of leading international law scholars from across Asia. It provides a forum for the publication of articles in the field of international law and other Asian international legal topics. The objectives of the Yearbook are two-fold: First, to promote research, study and writing in the field of international law in Asia; and second, to provide an intellectual platform for the discussion and dissemination of Asian views and practices on contemporary international legal issues. Each volume of the Yearbook contains articles and shorter notes; a section on Asian state practice; an overview of the Asian states’ participation in multilateral treaties and succinct analysis of recent international legal developments in Asia; a bibliography that provides information on books, articles, notes, and other materials dealing with international law in Asia; as well as book reviews. This publication is important for anyone working on international law and in Asian studies. The 2017 edition of the Yearbook is a special volume that has articles highlighting current international legal issues facing particular Asian states.
As 1979 dawned, President Jimmy Carter extended diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China. upending longstanding U.S. foreign policy in Asia. For thirty years after the triumph of Mao’s revolution, the United States continued to recognize the claim of the Republic of China, based on Taiwan, to govern the entire country. Intricate economic and cultural relations existed between Washington and Taipei, backed by a Mutual Defense Treaty. While Carter withdrew from the treaty, satisfying a core Chinese condition for diplomatic relations, he presented Congress with legislation to allow other ties with Taiwan to continue unofficially. Many in Congress took issue with the President. Generally supportive of his policy to normalize relations with China, they worried about Taiwan’s future. Believing Carter’s legislation was incomplete, especially regarding Taiwan’s security, they held extensive hearings and lengthy debates, substantially strengthening the bill. The President ensured the measure comported with the terms of normalization. He negotiated with Congress to produce legislation he could sign and Beijing could at least tolerate. Although the final product enjoyed broad consensus in Congress, fights over amendments were fierce, and not always to the President’s advantage. Passage of the Taiwan Relations Act stabilized America’s position in Asia and its situation with Taipei, while allowing the new China to be properly launched. Now in its fourth decade, the Act remains highly impactful on the leading bilateral relationship in the world.The United States Constitution makes Congress the President’s partner in shaping American foreign policy. The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 vividly demonstrates how robust congressional engagement and inter-Branch cooperation leads to stronger and more durable policy outcomes, which enjoy a greater degree of public acceptance.
Taiwan "is becoming the most dangerous flash point in the world for a possible war that involves the United States, China, and probably other major powers," warn Robert D. Blackwill, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy, and Philip Zelikow, University of Virginia White Burkett Miller professor of history. In a new Council Special Report, The United States, China, and Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent War, the authors argue that the United States should change and clarify its strategy to prevent war over Taiwan. "The U.S. strategic objective regarding Taiwan should be to preserve its political and economic autonomy, its dynamism as a free society, and U.S.-allied deterrence-without triggering a Chinese attack on Taiwan." "We do not think it is politically or militarily realistic to count on a U.S. military defeat of various kinds of Chinese assaults on Taiwan, uncoordinated with allies. Nor is it realistic to presume that, after such a frustrating clash, the United States would or should simply escalate to some sort of wide-scale war against China with comprehensive blockades or strikes against targets on the Chinese mainland." "If U.S. campaign plans postulate such unrealistic scenarios," the authors add, "they will likely be rejected by an American president and by the U.S. Congress." But, they observe, "the resulting U.S. paralysis would not be the result of presidential weakness or timidity. It might arise because the most powerful country in the world did not have credible options prepared for the most dangerous military crisis looming in front of it." Proposing "a realistic strategic objective for Taiwan, and the associated policy prescriptions, to sustain the political balance that has kept the peace for the last fifty years," the authors urge the Joe Biden administration to affirm that it is not trying to change Taiwan's status; work with its allies, especially Japan, to prepare new plans that could challenge Chinese military moves against Taiwan and help Taiwan defend itself, yet put the burden of widening a war on China; and visibly plan, beforehand, for the disruption and mobilization that could follow a wider war, but without assuming that such a war would or should escalate to the Chinese, Japanese, or American homelands. "The horrendous global consequences of a war between the United States and China, most likely over Taiwan, should preoccupy the Biden team, beginning with the president," the authors conclude.
