Poland is rapidly developing a reasonable legal framework to support its transition to a market economy. Yet legal practice lags behind. Precedent and expertise must be built through training and experience.
In Eastern Europe privatization is now a mass phenomenon. The authors propose a model of it by means of an illustration from the example of Poland, which envisages the free provision of shares in formerly public undertakings to employees and consumers, and the provision of corporate finance from foreign intermediaries. One danger that emerges is that of bureaucratization. On the broader canvas, mass privatization implies the reform of the whole system, the creation of a suitable economic infrastructure for a market economy and the institutions of corporate governance. The authors point out the need for a delicate balance between evolution - which may be too slow - and design - which brings the risk of more government involvement than it is able to manage. A chapter originating as a European Bank working paper explores the banking implications of setting up a totally new financial sector with interlocking classes of assets. The economic effects merge into politics as the role of the state is investigated. Teachers and graduate students of public/private sector economies, East European affairs; advisers to bankers or commercial companies with Eastern European interests.
A thriving financial market depends not only on a prudent regulatory regime but also on having enough creditworthy borrowers. Policies in the real sector- macroeconomic, public finance, and trade policies- that directly stimulate growth and stability should be pursued in concert with financial reform.
Financial indicators may be linked to growth through two "channels" in particular: the share of GDP allocated to investment and the efficiency with which resources are used. It is empirically important to identify which financial intermediaries are doing the intermediation and to whom the financial system is allocating credit rather than simply using proxies for the overall size of the financial system, as has been common in past studies.
Correlations across openness measures are sometimes weak, but openness does seem to be positively associated with GDP growth - the more open the economy, the higher the growth.
The costs of the present system of price stabilization of raw jute by Bangladesh's public sector do not yield the expected benefits. Price stabilization could be better handled by the private sector. In any case, the loss of welfare to jute growers from price fluctuations is small.
Do rules control power? Or apply power? Has the elaboration and application of GATT rules been an exercise in the application or the control of economic and political power?