Published posthumously in 1964, this volume contains a fantastic collection of essays by R. G. Collingwood on the subject of art and it's relationship with philosophy. Robin George Collingwood, FBA (1889 – 1943) was an English historian, philosopher, and archaeologist most famous for his philosophical works including “The Principles of Art” (1938) and the posthumously-published “The Idea of History” (1946). This fascinating volume will appeal to those with an interest in Collingwood's seminal work, and is not to be missed by students of philosophy and art. Contents include: “Ruskin not a Philosophical Writer”, “Ruskin's Attitude towards Philosophy”, “On the Philosophy of Non-Philosophers”, “Logicism and Historicism”, “Ruskin as Historicist”, “The Anti-Historicism of Ruskin's Contemporaries”, “The Unity of the Spirit: Corollaries and Illustrations”, “Ruskin and Browning”, etc. Many vintage books such as this are increasingly scarce and expensive. It is with this in mind that we are republishing this volume today in an affordable, modern edition complete with a specially-commissioned new biography of the author.
Robin George Collingwood (1889-1943) was one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century, with his work spanning theory of knowledge, metaphysics, philosophy of art, philosophy of history, and social and political philosophy. The full range and reach of Collingwood's philosophical thought is covered by Peter Skagestad in this study. Following Collingwood's education and his Oxford career, Skagestad considers his relationship with prominent Italian philosophers Croce and De Ruggiero and the British idealists. Taking Collingwood's publications in order, he explains under what circumstances they were produced and the reception of his work by his contemporaries and by posterity, from Religion and Philosophy (1916) and Speculum Mentis (1923) to the posthumously published The Idea of History (1946). Featuring full coverage of Collingwood's philosophy of art, Skagestad also considers his argument, in response to A. J. Ayer, that metaphysics is the historical study of absolute presuppositions. Most importantly, Skagestad reveals how relevant Collingwood is today, through his concept of barbarism as a perceptive diagnosis of totalitarianism and his prescient warning of the rise of populism in the 21st century.
Since its appearance in 1981, History as a Science by Jan van der Dussen has been welcomed as a coherent and comprehensive study of the many aspects of Collingwood’s philosophy of history, including its development and reception. The book was the first to pay attention to Collingwood’s unpublished manuscripts, and to his work as an archaeologist and historian, herewith opening up a new angle in Collingwood studies. The republication of this volume meets an increasing demand to make the book available for future Collingwood scholars, and people interested in Collingwood’s philosophy. The present edition of History as a Science includes updated references to the published manuscripts and an added preface.
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I do not think of aesthetic theory as an attempt to investigate and expound eternal verities concerning the nature of an eternal object called Art, but as an attempt to reach, by thinking, the solution of certain problems arising out of the situation in which artists find themselves here and now. Everything written in this book has been written in the belief that it has a practical bearing, direct or indirect, upon the condition of art in England in 1937, and in the hope that artists primarily, and secondarily persons whose interest in art is lively and sympathetic, will find it of some use to them. Hardly any space is devoted to criticizing other people’s aesthetic doctrines; not because I have not studied them, nor because I have dismissed them as not worth considering, but because I have something of my own to say, and think the best service I can do to a reader is to say it as clearly as I can. Of the three parts into which it is divided, Book I is chiefly concerned to say things which any one tolerably acquainted with artistic work knows already; the purpose of this being to clear up our minds as to the distinction between art proper, which is what aesthetic is about, and certain other things which are different from it but are often called by the same name. Many false aesthetic theories are fairly accurate accounts of these other things, and much bad artistic practice comes from confusing them with art proper. These errors in theory and practice should disappear when the distinctions in question are properly apprehended. In this way a preliminary account of art is reached; but a second difficulty is now encountered. This preliminary account, according to the schools of philosophy now most fashionable in our own country, cannot be true; for it traverses certain doctrines taught in those schools and therefore, according to them, is not so much false as nonsensical. Book II is therefore devoted to a philosophical exposition of the terms used in this preliminary account of art, and an attempt to show that the conceptions they express are justified in spite of the current prejudice against them; are indeed logically implied even in the philosophies that repudiate them. The preliminary account of art has by now been converted into a philosophy of art. But a third question remains. Is this so-called philosophy of art a mere intellectual exercise, or has it practical consequences bearing on the way in which we ought to approach the practice of art (whether as artists or as audience) and hence, because a philosophy of art is a theory as to the place of art in life as a whole, the practice of life? As I have already indicated, the alternative I accept is the second one. In Book III, therefore, I have tried to point out some of these practical consequences by suggesting what kinds of obligation the acceptance of this aesthetic theory would impose upon artists and audiences, and in what kinds of way they could be met. This book is organized as follows: I. Introduction Book I. Art and Not Art II. Art and Craft III. Art and Representation IV. Art as Magic V. Art as Amusement VI. Art Proper: (1) As Expression VII. Art Proper: (2) As Imagination Book II. The Theory of Imagination VIII. Thinking and Feeling IX. Sensation and Imagination X. Imagination and Consciousness XI. Language Book III. The Theory of Art XII. Art as Language XIII. Art and Truth XIV. The Artist and the Community XV. Conclusion
Best known today for his philosophies of history and art, Collingwood was also a historian, archaeologist, sailor, artist, and musician. A figure of enormous energy and ambition, he took as his subject nothing less than the whole of human endeavor, and he lived in the same way, seeking to experience the complete range of human passion. In this vivid and swiftly paced narrative, Fred Inglis tells the dramatic story of a remarkable life, from Collingwood's happy Lakeland childhood to his successes at Oxford, his archaeological digs as a renowned authority on Roman Britain, his solo sailing adventures in the English Channel, his long struggle with illness, and his sometimes turbulent romantic life. --from publisher description.
Robin George Collingwood, FBA (1889 – 1943) was an English historian, philosopher, and archaeologist most famous his philosophical works. Along with “The Principles of Art” (1938), Collingwood's “The Idea of History” was his best-known work, originally collated from numerous sources following his death by a student of his, T. M. Knox. It became a major inspiration for philosophy of history in the western world and is extensively cited to his day. This fascinating volume on history and its relationship to philosophy will appeal to students and collectors of vintage philosophical works alike. Contents include: “The Philosophy of History”, “History's Nature”, “Object”, “Method”, “Greco-Roman Histography”, “The Influence of Christianity”, “The Threshold of Scientific History”, “Scientific History”, “England”, “Germany”, “France”, “Italy”, etc. Many vintage books such as this are increasingly scarce and expensive. It is with this in mind that we are republishing this volume today in an affordable, high-quality, modern edition complete with a specially-commissioned new biography of the author.
Collingwood and Hegel R. G. Collingwood was a lonely thinker. Begrudgingly admired by some and bludgeoned by others, he failed to train a single disciple, just as he failed to communicate to the reading public his vision of the unity of experience. This failure stands in stark contrast to the success of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, who won many disciples to a very similar point-of-view and whose influence on subsequent thought, having been rediscovered since 1920, has not yet been adequately explored. Collingwood and Hegel share three fundamental similarities: both men held overwhelming admiration of the Greeks, both possessed uniquely broad knowledge of academic controversies of their day, and both were inalterably convinced that human experience consti tutes a single whole. If experts find Collingwood's vision of wholeness less satisfactory than Hegel's, much of the fault lies in the atmosphere in which Col lingwood labored. Oxford in the 1920'S and 1930's, sceptical and specialized, was not the enthusiastic Heidelberg and Berlin of 1816 to 183I. What is important in Collingwood is not that he fell short of Hegel but that working under adverse conditions he came so elose. Indeed those unfamiliar with Hegel will find in Collingwood's early works, especially in Speculum M entis, a useful introduction to the great German.
