This work is an extensive analysis of the 1915 British landing at Suvla Bay, one of the most mismanaged and ineffective operations of World War I. Chapters examine the events that led to the landings on the Gallipoli peninsula, provide a comprehensive report on the landings themselves, and analyze the events and decisions contributing to their failure. Appendices provide first-hand accounts of the landings from period news articles, military documents and personal correspondence.
The battle for Gallipoli was officially described as one of the world's classic tragedies, and in this book the participants tell the full story of this failed offensive. The bitter campaign against the Turks was ill-conceived, inadequately equipped and never likely to succeed.
Terrain has a profound effect upon the strategy and tactics of any military engagement and has consequently played an important role in determining history. In addition, the landscapes of battle, and the geology which underlies them, has helped shape the cultural iconography of battle certainly within the 20th century. In the last few years this has become a fertile topic of scientific and historical exploration and has given rise to a number of conferences and books. The current volume stems from the international Terrain in Military History conference held in association with the Imperial War Museum, London and the Royal Engineers Museum, Chatham, at the University of Greenwich in January 2000. This conference brought together historians, geologists, military enthusiasts and terrain analysts from military, academic and amateur backgrounds with the aim of exploring the application of modem tools of landscape visualisation to understanding historical battlefields. This theme was the subject of a Leverhulme Trust grant (F/345/E) awarded to the University of Greenwich and administered by us in 1998, which aimed to use the tools of modem landscape visualisation in understanding the influence of terrain in the First World War. This volume forms part of the output from this grant and is part of our wider exploration of the role of terrain in military history. Many individuals contributed to the organisation of the original conference and to the production of this volume.
Why was the Allied naval assault of February/March 1915 so unsuccessful? Did the Ottoman Turks have knowledge of the Allied landings of 25 April 1915? And did Sir Ian Hamilton, the overall commander of the Allied forces at Gallipoli, really make a mistake in his intervention at Suvla? These questions and the key issue of why the Ottoman Turks won the 1915 Gallipoli campaign, or why the Allies lost it, have never been satisfactorily answered. This new history of the Gallipoli campaign aims to answer them, while also telling the story of what actually happened through the voices of British, Australian and Turkish soldiers. In order to properly understand the bloody events of 1915, Tim Travers is the first historian of Gallipoli to use the general Staff Ottoman archives in Ankara to tell the other side of the story. Wide-ranging research in the Turkish archives as well as those in Australia, Britain, France and New Zealand, plus a significant newly discovered German source, has produced a startling new interpretation of the 1915 conflict. Moving from a study of the Western Front, Tim Travers has produced a challenging analysis of the enduring mysteries of the Gallipoli campaign.
Numbering over five million men, Britain's army in the First World War was the biggest in the country's history. Remarkably, nearly half those men who served in it were volunteers. 2,466,719 men enlisted between August 1914 and December 1915, many in response to the appeals of the Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener. How did Britain succeed in creating a mass army, almost from scratch, in the middle of a major war ? What compelled so many men to volunteer ' and what happened to them once they had taken the King's shilling ? Peter Simkins describes how Kitchener's New Armies were raised and reviews the main political, economic and social effects of the recruiting campaign. He examines the experiences and impressions of the officers and men who made up the New Armies. As well as analysing their motives for enlisting, he explores how they were fed, housed, equipped and trained before they set off for active service abroad. Drawing upon a wide variety of sources, ranging from government papers to the diaries and letters of individual soldiers, he questions long-held assumptions about the 'rush to the colours' and the nature of patriotism in 1914. The book will be of interest not only to those studying social, political and economic history, but also to general readers who wish to know more about the story of Britain's citizen soldiers in the Great War.
