In 1999, the Alliance mistakenly bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Around the same period, allegations were made regarding its involvement in human trafficking and forced prostitution in Bosnia-Herzegovina. A decade later, NATO airplanes hit a fuel truck causing significant civilian casualties in Kunduz, Afghanistan. After more than 60 years of existence and a track-record of more than 30 missions performed worldwide, it is surprising that there is still uncertainty on the scope and content of NATO’s responsibility for wrongful conduct during its military operations. This timely book deals with the international responsibility of NATO during military operations. It examines, the status of the Alliance, the existence of international obligations and conditions of attribution of conduct in NATO.
The emergence of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in the last two-thirds of the 1990s and continuing into the new century, has been a complex process intertwining politics, economics, national cultures, and numerous institutions. This book provides an essential background for understanding how security issues as between NATO and the European Union are being posed for the early part of the 21st century, including the new circumstances following the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. This study should be of interest to those interested in the evolution of U.S.-European relations, especially in, but not limited to, the security field; the development of institutional relationships; and key choices that lie ahead in regard to these critical arrangements.
This open access volume surveys the state of the field to examine whether a fifth wave of deterrence theory is emerging. Bringing together insights from world-leading experts from three continents, the volume identifies the most pressing strategic challenges, frames theoretical concepts, and describes new strategies. The use and utility of deterrence in today’s strategic environment is a topic of paramount concern to scholars, strategists and policymakers. Ours is a period of considerable strategic turbulence, which in recent years has featured a renewed emphasis on nuclear weapons used in defence postures across different theatres; a dramatic growth in the scale of military cyber capabilities and the frequency with which these are used; and rapid technological progress including the proliferation of long-range strike and unmanned systems. These military-strategic developments occur in a polarized international system, where cooperation between leading powers on arms control regimes is breaking down, states widely make use of hybrid conflict strategies, and the number of internationalized intrastate proxy conflicts has quintupled over the past two decades. Contemporary conflict actors exploit a wider gamut of coercive instruments, which they apply across a wider range of domains. The prevalence of multi-domain coercion across but also beyond traditional dimensions of armed conflict raises an important question: what does effective deterrence look like in the 21st century? Answering that question requires a re-appraisal of key theoretical concepts and dominant strategies of Western and non-Western actors in order to assess how they hold up in today’s world. Air Commodore Professor Dr. Frans Osinga is the Chair of the War Studies Department of the Netherlands Defence Academy and the Special Chair in War Studies at the University Leiden. Dr. Tim Sweijs is the Director of Research at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and a Research Fellow at the Faculty of Military Sciences of the Netherlands Defence Academy in Breda.
This book examines NATO's engagement with gender issues through its military structures. Drawing on newly declassified NATO documents, this volume provides the first comprehensive account of NATO’s long-established engagement with gender issues. These documents bring to the fore the stories of the NATO women and ‘gendermen’ who have organised within NATO across the decades to advocate on gender issues and highlights the continued challenges to pursuing transformative agendas within resistant institutions. The book argues that NATO is an institution of international hegemonic masculinity, with gender norms and values learned by member and partner states through socialisation and the engagement of a masculinist protection logic. It therefore provides an important context for NATO’s recent implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda encapsulated in UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and the seven follow-up resolutions. The volume interrogates how Women, Peace and Security has mapped on to NATO’s pre-existing concerns as a global security actor, providing impetus for further critical knowledge building of NATO which centres on gender. This book will be of interest to students and scholars of NATO, Critical Military Studies, Gender Studies, Critical Security Studies and IR in general.
The legal position of visiting forces transcends domestic and international law and is of growing importance in our increasingly globalized and insecure world. 'In area' and 'out of area' operations, both for the purpose of establishing and maintaining peace and in connection with the conduct of other military operations and training, are likely to become more frequent for a variety of reasons. Finding where the applicable law places the balance between the interests, sensitivities and needs of the host state and the requirements, often practical in nature, of the visiting force is a key objective in ensuring that the relationship between hosts and 'guests' is and remains harmonious. All of this must be achieved in an increasingly complex legal environment. This fully updated second edition of The Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces addresses the issues surrounding visiting forces and provides a full overview of the legal framework in which they operate. Through an analysis of jurisprudence and historical developments, it offers a comparative commentary to the UN, NATO, and other SOFA rules. The Handbook then continues its analysis through cases studies of visiting forces in key countries, including a fully updated chapter on Afghanistan that considers the various stages of the conflict, before offering conclusions on the current state of the law and its likely future development.
On March 17, 2011, a month after the beginning of the Libyan revolution, with up to dead 2,000 civilians, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) decided on backing a no-fly zone over Libya and authorized "all necessary measures" to protect civilians. While France, Great Britain, and the United States took immediate military action using air and missile strikes, considerations to hand over military actions to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) emerged within days of the operation. On March 22 2012, NATO agreed to enforce the arms embargo against Libya; 2 days later, it announced to take over all military aspects of the UNSC 1973. On March 31, 2012, Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP) began. OUP turned out to be one of NATO's shorter, and seemingly also less controversial, missions. Mandated by both the League of Arab States and the UN as the regime of Colonel Qaddafi was launching assaults on peacefully demonstrating citizens, its aim was to protect civilians from the air and sea. Described as a "war of choice" rather than a "war of necessity," NATO achieved its goals more by accident than by design, according to some critics. The lessons which can be drawn from OUP are both military and political in nature. The overestimation of air power as a result of "no boots on the ground" might be a dangerous conclusion for future cases; the lack of cultural advice very likely prolonged the mission, while the shortcomings in strategic communication gave input to improve an area that is still new to NATO. The operation also highlighted a strategic dimension the Alliance was not ready to perceive -- that the Mediterranean, and its Southern states, is likely to continue being a source of instability for NATO, particularly after the Arab Spring. In legal terms, the Alliance faced an important communication gap between its legal, and therefore military, mandate -- the legal interpretations of UNSCR 1973 made clear that the operation did not seek to topple Colonel Gaddafi's regime, let alone assassinate him. Its aim was solely the protection of civilians in a situation of internal conflict, and, therefore, it conformed to the norm of "Responsibility to Protect." On the political level, heads of NATO member states made contradictory remarks calling for Gaddafi's departure, thereby compromising the clarity of the mission. Last but not least, the aftermath of NATO's Libya operation was not planned at all as the Libyan National Transitional Council firmly rejected any military personnel on the ground, not even UN observers. As the regime's security forces had virtually imploded, Libya's security therefore fell into the hands of the multiple militias which continued to proliferate after the conflict had ended.
