In this account of an unusual episode in the Cold War, Audrey Kurth Cronin examines the negotiations over Austria and the Soviet Union's sudden and surprising decision to withdraw its troops and accept the country as a neutral Western state, after having rejected any settlement for eight years.
This book compares the various aspects ? political, military economic ? of Soviet occupation in Austria, Hungary and Romania. Using documents found in Austrian, Hungarian, Romanian and Russian archives the authors argue that the nature of Soviet foreign policy has been misunderstood. Existing literature has focused on the Soviet foreign policy from a political perspective; when and why Stalin made the decision to introduce Bolshevik political systems in the Soviet sphere of influence. This book will show that the Soviet conquest of East-Central Europe had an imperial dimension as well and allowed the Soviet Union to use the territory it occupied as military and economic space. The final dimension of the book details the tragically human experiences of Soviet occupation: atrocities, rape, plundering and deportations.
This is the first book to document, analyze, and interpret the history of the Warsaw Pact based on the archives of the alliance itself. As suggested by the title, the Soviet bloc military machine that held the West in awe for most of the Cold War does not appear from the inside as formidable as outsiders often believed, nor were its strengths and weaknesses the same at different times in its surprisingly long history, extending for almost half a century. The introductory study by Mastny assesses the controversial origins of the "superfluous" alliance, its subsequent search for a purpose, its crisis and consolidation despite congenital weaknesses, as well as its unexpected demise. Most of the 193 documents included in the book were top secret and have only recently been obtained from Eastern European archives by the PHP project. The majority of the documents were translated specifically for this volume and have never appeared in English before. The introductory remarks to individual documents by co-editor Byrne explain the particular significance of each item. A chronology of the main events in the history of the Warsaw Pact, a list of its leading officials, a selective multilingual bibliography, and an analytical index add to the importance of a publication that sets the new standard as a reference work on the subject and facilitate its use by both students and general readers.
At the midpoint of the “high” cold war, when most people in North America and Europe thought catastrophic nuclear onslaught was almost inevitable, an unprecedented and unrepeated event took place in Geneva in July 1955. The heads of state from the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France came together in an attempt at diplomatic dialogue, primarily over the questions of German unification, European security, and nuclear disarmament. Although the summit ended with no tangible results, its ramifications were extensive, and it provided the world with a brief repose from escalating East-West tension. In Cold War Respite twelve scholars writing from several national perspectives investigate in riveting detail how that event—examined only in passing until now—came about, why its “spirit” was so short-lived, and what its subsequent impact was on the development of the cold war. Making use of newly -declassified archives in the United States, France, Britain, and Russia, the authors provide some of the latest research and insights into early cold-war history as they track the crucial period from Stalin’s death in 1953 until the summit. They consider John Foster Dulles’s policy at Geneva and the meeting of the four foreign ministers that followed the summit. As the essayists attest, the psychological effects of the summit were of immense significance to the history of international relations and reveal the complexity and dynamism of foreign affairs during the decades following World War II. While some argue that the series of international crises beginning in 1958 and culminating in 1962 might have been averted if the Geneva conference had been pursued more eagerly, others argue that it is a credit to the summit that those events are studied today as examples of crisis management and not of nuclear war.
In American history the 1950s are remembered as an affluent and harmonious decade. Not so in Austria. That nation emerged out of World War II with tremendous war-related destruction and with a four-power occupation that would last for ten years until 1955. Massive American economic aid enabled the Austrian economy to start recovering in the 1950s and reorient it from East to West. Unlike the United States, however, general affluence did not set in until the 1960s and 1970s even though Austria's dramatic baby boom enabled it to recover from the demographic catastrophe resulting from manpower losses of World War II., This volume deals with these larger trends. Stephen E. Ambrose discusses American-European relations and sets the larger international context for the Austrian scene. Oilver Rathkolb retraces the changing importance of the Austrian question for the Eisenhower administration. Michael Gehler presents an in-depth analysis of the intriguing question of whether Austria's unification at the price of permanent neutrality might have been a model for Germany. Franz Mathis and Kurt Tweraser look at economic reconstruction and the roles played by both the Austrian public industrial sector and the American Marshall Plan. Karin Schmidlechner looks at the youth culture of the era. Franz Adlgasser shows how Herbert Hoover's food aid was instrumental in the containment of communism in Hungary. Beth Noveck analyzes Austrian political culture of the First Republic from the perspective of Hugo Bettauer. Rolf Steininger presents an insightful historical overview of how the Austro-Italian South Tyrol conflict was resolved after seventy-five years of tension.
This book examines Soviet agriculture in post-1945 Hungary. It demonstrates how the agrarian lobby, a development following the 1956 revolution, led to contact with the West which allowed for the creation of an effective agricultural system. The author argues that this ‘Hungarian agricultural miracle,’ a hybrid of American technology and Soviet structures, was fundamental to the success of Hungarian collectivization.
In the first Cold War (1945-55) the superpower struggle over the geostrategically vital and economically depressed Austria could have ended in a divided country (like in Germany), but due to shrewd Austrian diplomacy resulted in a unified and neutralized country.
