The book aims to provide a comprehensive review of the evolution of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programmes covering technological developments, political underpinnings and non-proliferation policies. It also covers post 1998 developments to include articulation of doctrines, establishment of command and control systems and operationalization of the nuclear capabilities as well as safety and security concerns surrounding Pakistan's nuclear assets.
"In May 1998, India and Pakistan put to rest years of speculation about whether they possessed nuclear technology and openly tested their weapons. Some believed nuclearization would stabilize South Asia; others prophesized disaster. Authors of two of the most comprehensive books on South Asia's new nuclear era, Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, offer competing theories on the transformation of the region and what these patterns mean for the world's next proliferators." "With these two major interpretations, Ganguly and Kapur tackle all sides of an urgent issue that has profound regional and global consequences. Sure to spark discussion and debate, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb thoroughly maps the potential impact of nuclear proliferation."--Cubierta.
This book provides a comprehensive account of the mysterious story of Pakistan's attempt to develop nuclear weapons in the face of severe odds. Hassan Abbas profiles the politicians and scientists involved, and the role of China and Saudi Arabia in supporting Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure. Abbas also unravels the motivations behind the Pakistani nuclear physicist Dr A.Q. Khan's involvement in nuclear proliferation in Iran, Libya and North Korea, drawing on extensive interviews. He argues that the origins and evolution of the Khan network were tied to the domestic and international political motivations underlying Pakistan's nuclear weapons project, and that project's organization, oversight and management. The ties between the making of the Pakistani bomb and the proliferation that then ensued have not yet been fully illuminated or understood, and this book's disclosures have important lessons. The Khan proliferation breach remains of vital importance for understanding how to stop such transfers of sensitive technology in future. Finally, the book examines the prospects for nuclear safety in Pakistan, considering both Pakistan's nuclear control infrastructure and the threat posed by the Taliban and other extremist groups to the country's nuclear assets.
The history of Pakistan's nuclear program is the history of Pakistan. Fascinated with the new nuclear science, the young nation's leaders launched a nuclear energy program in 1956 and consciously interwove nuclear developments into the broader narrative of Pakistani nationalism. Then, impelled first by the 1965 and 1971 India-Pakistan Wars, and more urgently by India's first nuclear weapon test in 1974, Pakistani senior officials tapped into the country's pool of young nuclear scientists and engineers and molded them into a motivated cadre committed to building the 'ultimate weapon.' The tenacity of this group and the central place of its mission in Pakistan's national identity allowed the program to outlast the perennial political crises of the next 20 years, culminating in the test of a nuclear device in 1998. Written by a 30-year professional in the Pakistani Army who played a senior role formulating and advocating Pakistan's security policy on nuclear and conventional arms control, this book tells the compelling story of how and why Pakistan's government, scientists, and military, persevered in the face of a wide array of obstacles to acquire nuclear weapons. It lays out the conditions that sparked the shift from a peaceful quest to acquire nuclear energy into a full-fledged weapons program, details how the nuclear program was organized, reveals the role played by outside powers in nuclear decisions, and explains how Pakistani scientists overcome the many technical hurdles they encountered. Thanks to General Khan's unique insider perspective, it unveils and unravels the fascinating and turbulent interplay of personalities and organizations that took place and reveals how international opposition to the program only made it an even more significant issue of national resolve. Listen to a podcast of a related presentation by Feroz Khan at the Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation at cisac.stanford.edu/events/recording/7458/2/765.
As argued throughout this paper, in order to understand the complex reasons behind the lack of India–Pakistan NDS it is important to examine the causes of the enmity between them, the product of a historic rivalry largely based on territorial disputes. Whereas the United States and the former Soviet Union achieved relative stability at the nuclear level, their disdain for one another was channeled through proxy wars that increased instability at the sub-conventional level, as exemplified by the protracted Vietnam War. India and Pakistan, however, are locked into instability at the nuclear, conventional and sub-conventional levels, a situation made worse by their close geographical proximity and ongoing disputes over natural resources. In reality, the the small steps Delhi and Islamabad have taken over the last three decades – namely the half-hearted implementation of various confidence building measures (CBM) – have done little to promote NDS. The study identifies four prominent factors which could potentially improve India–Pakistan NDS: increased regional economic integration; domestic politics in favor of détente; a precedent of successful treaties; and the involvement of external arbiters in reducing South Asian nuclear deterrence instability.
Conventional Deterrence is a book about the origins of war. Why do nations faced with the prospect of large-scale conventional war opt for or against an offensive strategy? John J. Mearsheimer examines a number of crises that led to major conventional wars to explain why deterrence failed. He focuses first on Allied and German decision making in the years 1939–1940, analyzing why the Allies did not strike first against Germany after declaring war and, conversely, why the Germans did attack the West. Turning to the Middle East, he examines the differences in Israeli and Egyptian strategic doctrines prior to the start of the major conventional conflicts in that region. Mearsheimer then critically assays the relative strengths and weaknesses of NATO and the Warsaw Pact to determine the prospects for conventional deterrence in any future crisis. He is also concerned with examining such relatively technical issues as the impact of precision-guided munitions (PGM) on conventional deterrence and the debate over maneuver versus attrition warfare.Mearsheimer pays considerable attention to questions of military strategy and tactics. Challenging the claim that conventional detrrence is largely a function of the numerical balance of forces, he also takes issue with the school of thought that ascribes deterrence failures to the dominance of "offensive" weaponry. In addition to examining the military consideration underlying deterrence, he also analyzes the interaction between those military factors and the broader political considerations that move a nation to war.
The nuclear test explosions in India and Pakistan in 1998, followed by the outbreak of hostilities over Kashmir in 1999, marked a frightening new turn in the ancient, bitter enmity between the two nations. Although the tension was eclipsed by the events of 9/11 and the subsequent American attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq, it has not disappeared, as evidenced by the 2001 attack in the Indian Parliament by Islamic fundamentalists out of Kashmir. By 2002, these two nuclear-armed neighbors seemed to be once again on the brink of war. This book outlines the strategic structure of the rivalry and the dynamic forces driving it, and investigates various possible solutions. The expert contributors focus on the India-Pakistan rivalry, but also consider the China factor in South Asia's nuclear security dilemma. Although essentially political-strategic in its approach, the book includes coverage of opposing military arsenals and the impact of local terrorism on the delicate balance of power.
"Mansoor Ahmed's Pakistan's Pathway to the Bomb reveals a new history of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and the bureaucratic competition that shaped it from its inception in 1956 until the 1998 nuclear tests and beyond. While the enduring security dilemma from India was the chief driver for the country's quest for the bomb, heated domestic rivalries within the country's technocratic community influenced the direction and growth of the nuclear program in equal measure. Ahmed offers a revisionist assessment of the role of Dr. A. Q. Khan, the giant of Pakistan's nuclear program. He reveals the competition between Khan Research Laboratories and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, how A. Q. Khan was able to build a cult of personality that inflated his role in the public mind, and how Khan was able to build a fiefdom largely outside of state control that proliferated nuclear technology abroad. Drawing on elite interviews and previously untapped primary-source documents, this book sheds light on the process by which Pakistan became a nuclear power"--
In May 1998, in reaction to India’s nuclear weapons tests, Pakistan tested six nuclear weapons. Following this, the country opted for a policy of minimum deterrence, and within a year Pakistan had altered its policy stance by adding the modifier of minimum ‘credible’ deterrence. This book looks at how this seemingly innocuous shift seriously impacted on Pakistan’s nuclear policy direction and whether the concept of minimum has lost its significance in the South Asian region’s changed/changing strategic environment. After providing a brief historical background exploring why and how Pakistan carried out the nuclear development program, the book questions why Pakistan could not sustain the minimum deterrence that it had conceptualized in the immediate aftermath of the 1998 test. It examines the conceptual theoretical framework of the essentials of minimum deterrence in order to question whether Pakistan’s nuclear policy remained consistent with this, as well as to discover the rudimentary factors that are responsible for the inconsistencies with regard to minimum deterrence conceived in this study. The book goes on to look at the policy options that Pakistan had after acquiring the nuclear capability, and what the rationale was for selecting minimum deterrence. The book not only highlights Pakistan deterrent force building, but also analyzes closely Pakistan’s doctrinal posture of first use option. Furthermore, it examines the policy towards arms control and disarmament, and discusses whether these individual policy orientations are consistent with the minimum deterrence. Conceptually providing a deeper understanding of Pakistan’s post-1998 nuclear policy, this book critically examines whether the minimum deterrence conceived could be sustained both at the theoretical and operational levels. It will be a useful contribution in the field of Nuclear Policy, Security Studies, Asian Politics, Proliferation/Non-Proliferation Studies, and Peace Studies. This book will be of interest to policy makers, scholars, and students of nuclear policy, nuclear proliferation and arms control related research.
