An illuminating account of Russia’s attempts—and failures—to achieve great power status in Asia. Since Peter the Great, Russian leaders have been lured by opportunity to the East. Under the tsars, Russians colonized Alaska, California, and Hawaii. The Trans-Siberian Railway linked Moscow to Vladivostok. And Stalin looked to Asia as a sphere of influence, hospitable to the spread of Soviet Communism. In Asia and the Pacific lay territory, markets, security, and glory. But all these expansionist dreams amounted to little. In We Shall Be Masters, Chris Miller explores why, arguing that Russia’s ambitions have repeatedly outstripped its capacity. With the core of the nation concentrated thousands of miles away in the European borderlands, Russia’s would-be pioneers have always struggled to project power into Asia and to maintain public and elite interest in their far-flung pursuits. Even when the wider population professed faith in Asia’s promise, few Russians were willing to pay the steep price. Among leaders, too, dreams of empire have always been tempered by fears of cost. Most of Russia’s pivots to Asia have therefore been halfhearted and fleeting. Today the Kremlin talks up the importance of “strategic partnership” with Xi Jinping’s China, and Vladimir Putin’s government is at pains to emphasize Russian activities across Eurasia. But while distance is covered with relative ease in the age of air travel and digital communication, the East remains far off in the ways that matter most. Miller finds that Russia’s Asian dreams are still restrained by the country’s firm rooting in Europe.
The post-Cold War world has seen the emergence of new kinds of security threats. Whilst traditionally security threats were perceived of in terms of military threats against a state, non-traditional security threats are those that pose a threat to various internal competencies of the state and its identity both home and abroad. The European Union and the United States have identified Latin American cocaine trafficking as a security threat, but their policy responses to it have differed. This book examines the ways in which the EU and the US have conceptualized this threat. Furthermore, it explores the impact of cocaine trafficking on four state functions - economic, political, public order and diplomatic - in order to explain why it has become 'securitized'. Appealing to a variety of university courses, this book is especially relevant to security studies and European and US policy analysis, as well as criminology and sociology.
For several decades the debate over collective security -- the idea that alliances are problematic and that all nations should pledge to come to the aid of any nation that is a victim of aggression -- has been polarized. Collective Conflict Management and Changing World Politics probes the international and domestic conditions under which collective security tends to work or not, and questions if the end of the Cold War makes success more or less likely than before. The contributors conclude that collective conflict management is possible under specific situations, as they enumerate various domestic and international requisites that circumscribe such possibilities. "This is an excellent collection. The material is of a uniformly high quality along three dimensions: good writing, identification of important empirical problems relating to collective security and peacekeeping (or, using the term the volume authors prefer, collective conflict management), and good, logical reasoning.