Euro-Atlantic system, and especially the relationship between the US and the European Union and NATO cooperation with the EU, despite the difficulties, are and will be one of the most important elements in the process of building a new global multipolar order. However, the United States and the European Union should pursue a more correlated international policy, based on a realistic and idealistic vision of the world. The world needs the Euro-Atlantic community, as there is no and there won't be in the near future such integrated community of values and interests in the new emerging global order. The above problems are describe in this monograph, which was written in the framework of the research project called: "The role of the Euro-Atlantic system in a multipolar world in the context of the emerging new global order."
This book examines the evolution of the Euro-Atlantic security system, from cooperation to rivalry and crisis, since the beginning of the 21st century. By highlighting the causes, manifestations and international consequences of this evolution, the author describes a stage of crisis in the security system, characterized by increasing rivalry for spheres of influence, militarization of policies and the suspension of cooperation due to the growing divergence between the interests of the West – now including the Central European states – and Russia, leading to a subsequent reconfiguration of the world order. Adopting a neo-realistic approach, the author demonstrates that members of the Euro-Atlantic security system, irrespective of the values they claim to hold, are guided in their actions on the international stage by clearly defined interests. The first part of the book analyses the nature of the Euro-Atlantic security system, while the second part illustrates the limited success of Euro-Atlantic collaboration, for example in combating terrorism. Lastly, the third part discusses the consequences of the crisis, such as the conflict in Ukraine, and prospects for the future evolution of the Euro-Atlantic security system.
The concept of ‘culture’ is a relatively modern invention. It stems from the Latin term cultura meaning cultivation. Cicero was the first to use this word in a non-agricultural context. In his Tusculanae Disputationes he reflected on the ‘cultivation of the soul’ (cultura animi). Later this term was rarely used in this sense but as of the 17th century more and more authors considered culture an intellectual and not an agricultural phenomenon. Samuel Pufendorf (1632–1694) described culture as a vehicle overcoming natural barbarism. He was followed by German philosophers of culture. Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803) argued that human creativity was as important as human rationality and called attention to national cultures. The works of German romantic philosophers were mainly focused on the specificity of the German culture, a factor that was to unite divided German statehoods. At the same time, however, Herder and his followers noticed other national cultures, including first of all those of East and Central Europe. It is therefore noteworthy that the early philosophical reflection on culture was closely connected with the specific traditions of East and Central Europeans.
What is East Central Europe? Can it be defined with any precision? The question of definition is a difficult one as is ussually the case concerning borderlands whose historical developments show little continuity and an uncertain identity born of the conflict between aspirations and reality. It is in East Central Europe that „no peace settlement is ever final, no frontiers are secure and each generation must begin its work anew”. Is there any chance that this definition will become out of date?
Spengler's work describes how we have entered into a centuries-long "world-historical" phase comparable to late antiquity, and his controversial ideas spark debate over the meaning of historiography.
Will the increased economic connectivity across the Eurasian supercontinent transform Europe into the western peninsula of Greater Eurasia? The unipolar era entailed the US organising the two other major economic regions of the world, Europe and Asia, under US leadership. The rise of “the rest”, primarily Asia with China at the centre, has ended the unipolar era and even 500-years of Western dominance. China and Russia are leading efforts to integrate Europe and Asia into one large region. The Greater Eurasian region is constructed with three categories of economic connectivity – strategic industries built on new and disruptive technologies; physical connectivity with bimodal transportation corridors; and financial connectivity with new development banks, trading currencies and payments systems. China strives for geoeconomic leadership by replacing the US leadership position, while Russia endeavours to reposition itself from the dual periphery of Europe and Asia to the centre of a grand Eurasian geoeconomic constellation. Europe, positioned between the trans-Atlantic region and Greater Eurasia, has to adapt to the new international distribution of power to preserve its strategic autonomy.
This unique book looks at the impact of European integration - and, in particular, the institutional challenges it involves - from the perspective of the smaller member states.
Through a compilation of foreign policy documents and statements, harnessed together by a section of analytic works, this book seeks to highlight the shift in Russian foreign policy at the beginning of the twenty-first century. This compilation presents the work of formative scholars in this field who are concerned with the evolution of Russia Foreign policy thinking and behavior. This volume compiles critical documents and statements (treaties, addresses and articles) that deal with the formation of new conceptions of security in the New World order. The articles critically evaluate the implications of these new initiatives and lend insight to these documents and statements in practice. They address a wide range of topics from the crisis in Kosovo to domestic Russian policy, with an eye to the future of Russian policy.
Alpo Rusi provides a broad vision of the strategic landscape for the coming century, warning against dangers inherent in the emerging world order. He predicts a more complexand potentially hostilemultipolar system based on four or five rival trading blocs. Despite the centrality of trade rivalries, the role of military force will not vanish. Although he considers superpower conflict unlikely, he expects that lower-level conflicts will become more prevalent. Consequently, Rusi believes that the trading blocs will have to actively pursue security arrangements that will safeguard the traditional role of the nation-state. }Examining the international system from a geopolitical and geoeconomic perspective, Alpo Rusi provides a broad vision and bold forecast of the emerging strategic landscape for the coming century. An asymmetrical world system is emerging. The United States is now the sole true world power; it forms the core of a unipolar order characterized by an uneven division of world power and economic resources. Rusi argues, however, that this postCold War order will not survive into the next century.Rusi suggests that the power vacuum in the former Soviet empire will be filled by China in Asia and by the European Union in Eastern Europe, Russias disintegration and decline in world power status will continue but may have reached its bottom line economically, and Islam will gain strength in various parts of the world, embracing a new international role. He also predicts that the world will be split into four or five distinct trading blocs: A European bloc formed around the European Union; an East Asian bloc, potentially strong, interventionist, and even aggressive, formed around China and the Singapore economic region; Japan, as a strong and still competitive economic power; and a Pan-American bloc, also strong but potentially isolationist, formed around the United States. One of the question marks will be the future ability of an orthodox Russia to facilitate conditions for an economic space. According to Rusi, these trading blocs will develop new political or geopolitical interests. For example, the European bloc will extract fossil fuels from the former Soviet Union instead of the Middle East, thereby changing the existing global trade system. Each bloc will have certain internal problemsthe Europeans will be linked to the unstable successors to the Soviet Union, the East Asian Bloc will have to contemplate whether Chinas economic growth and geopolitical expansions will create a new bipolar world in the early twenty-first century, and the Pan-American bloc will struggle with continuing political and economic instability in South and Central America.Finally, Rusi warns that it is crucial for the European and Pan-American blocs to build upon the traditional Euro-Atlantic relationship. Without it, he argues, a truly polarizedand potentially hostilebloc system will take root, most likely lining the Western pan-regions against Chinas expansiveness. }
