This unique volume offers a definitive new history of European economies at war from 1914 to 1918. It studies how European economies mobilised for war, how existing economic institutions stood up under the strain, how economic development influenced outcomes and how wartime experience influenced post-war economic growth. Leading international experts provide the first systematic comparison of economies at war between 1914 and 1918 based on the best available data for Britain, Germany, France, Russia, the USA, Italy, Turkey, Austria-Hungary and the Netherlands. The editors' overview draws some stark lessons about the role of economic development, the importance of markets and the damage done by nationalism and protectionism. A companion volume to the acclaimed The Economics of World War II, this is a major contribution to our understanding of total war.
With the costs of war dominating our economic news and discussions, Paul Poast’s new text is a needed, relevant and thought-provoking new offering. Written in an extremely accessible manner, the book is an interesting addition to a course at any level. The book’s low price makes it a perfect complement to a Principles text, a Social Issues book, or any upper-level course on war or international security into which an instructor would like to add some economic data or theory.
World War I created a set of forces that affected the political arrangements and economies of all the countries involved. This period in global economic history between World War I and II offers rich material for studying international monetary and sovereign debt policies. Debt and Entanglements between the Wars focuses on the experiences of the United States, United Kingdom, four countries in the British Commonwealth (Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Newfoundland), France, Italy, Germany, and Japan, offering unique insights into how political and economic interests influenced alliances, defaults, and the unwinding of debts. The narratives presented show how the absence of effective international collaboration and resolution mechanisms inflicted damage on the global economy, with disastrous consequences.
Bad things occur and persist because of the presence of powerful beneficiaries. In this provocative and illuminating book, Imad Moosa illustrates the economic motivations behind the last 100 years of international conflict, citing the numerous powerful individual and corporate war profiteers that benefit from war.
"This remarkable book should be the standard work for a long time. A true comparative study, it relates the experience of all the main countries (and sometimes others) to a series of key issues that are deftly analyzed and not just described. In addition to the basics--production, consumption, food, finance and organization--the book deals with such famous themes as war as the bringer-of-growth and stimulus-to-technology, and such special questions as the exploitation of occupied areas and economic warfare. Throughout, Professor Milward of Manchester relates economics to strategy in an illuminating way."--Foreign Affairs "An admirable state-of-the-arts report on what we know about how agriculture, population, technology, labor, industrial production, and public finance were affected by the war. He also sets out some highly challenging findings concerning the rationale and effectiveness of economic strategy as applied b the main powers. And he has tentatively advanced some large concepts about the nature of advanced economies as revealed by the manner in which they strove to cope with the war. His approach is broadly comparative: he gives us an account not only of the relative economic performance of individual European powers, but also of the Japanese and American war economies, plus a few observations on the situation in many smaller countries from Australia to Yugoslavia. The book is a mine of information and arresting concepts."--American Historical Review "Milward displays an impressive mastery of his material, both from a historical and economic point of view. He uses quantification effectively, but the book can be read with ease and pleasure by those who are neither trained in nor interested in econometrics. Lucidly written, this superb work deserves a much wider audience than merely specialists."--Journal of Economic Literature "Milward's portrayal of events operates on the proposition that strategic deicions cannot be understood apart from the economic considerations which each leader or government had to take into account. . . . a permanent contribution to our understanding of World War II. Henceforth it will be hard to escape his contention that the big battalions that counted were those on the production line."--Journal of Interdisciplinary History
Does growing economic interdependence among great powers increase or decrease the chance of conflict and war? Liberals argue that the benefits of trade give states an incentive to stay peaceful. Realists contend that trade compels states to struggle for vital raw materials and markets. Moving beyond the stale liberal-realist debate, Economic Interdependence and War lays out a dynamic theory of expectations that shows under what specific conditions interstate commerce will reduce or heighten the risk of conflict between nations. Taking a broad look at cases spanning two centuries, from the Napoleonic and Crimean wars to the more recent Cold War crises, Dale Copeland demonstrates that when leaders have positive expectations of the future trade environment, they want to remain at peace in order to secure the economic benefits that enhance long-term power. When, however, these expectations turn negative, leaders are likely to fear a loss of access to raw materials and markets, giving them more incentive to initiate crises to protect their commercial interests. The theory of trade expectations holds important implications for the understanding of Sino-American relations since 1985 and for the direction these relations will likely take over the next two decades. Economic Interdependence and War offers sweeping new insights into historical and contemporary global politics and the actual nature of democratic versus economic peace.
Armies fight battles, states fight wars. To focus solely on armies is to neglect the broader story of victory and defeat. Military power stems from an economic base, and without wealth, soldiers cannot be paid, weapons cannot be procured, and food cannot be bought. War finance is among the most consequential decisions any state makes: how a state finances a war affects not only its success on the battlefield but also its economic stability and its leadership tenure. In How States Pay for Wars, Rosella Cappella Zielinski clarifies several critical dynamics lying at the nexus of financial and military policy.Cappella Zielinski has built a custom database on war funding over the past two centuries, and she combines those data with qualitative analyses of Truman's financing of the Korean War, Johnson’s financing of the Vietnam War, British financing of World War II and the Crimean War, and Russian and Japanese financing of the Russo-Japanese War. She argues that leaders who attempt to maximize their power at home, and state power abroad, are in a constant balancing act as they try to win wars while remaining in office. As a result of political risks, they prefer war finance policies that meet the needs of the war effort within the constraints of the capacity of the state.
How does one package and sell confidence in the stability of a nation riven by civil strife? This was the question that loomed before the Philadelphia financial house of Jay Cooke & Company,&8239;entrusted&8239;by the US government with an unprecedented sale of bonds to finance the Union war effort in the early days of the American Civil War.&8239;How the government and its agents marketed these bonds revealed a version of the war the public was willing to buy and buy into, based not just in the full faith and credit of the United States but also in the success of its armies and its long-term vision for open markets. From Maine to California, and in foreign halls of power and economic influence,&8239;thousands of agents were deployed to&8239;sell&8239;a clear message: Union victory was unleashing the American economy itself. This fascinating work of&8239;financial and political history&8239;during&8239;the Civil War&8239;era&8239;shows&8239;how the marketing and sale of bonds crossed the Atlantic to Europe and beyond, helping ensure foreign countries' vested interest in the Union's success. Indeed, David K. Thomson demonstrates how Europe, and ultimately all corners of the globe, grew deeply interdependent on American finance during, and in the immediate aftermath of, the American Civil War.&8239;
