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Author: Eric Brousseau
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Published: 2002-10-17
Total Pages: 604
ISBN-13: 9780521893138
DOWNLOAD EBOOKA 2002 survey of economics of contracts appealing to scholars in economics, management and law.
Author: Oren Bar-Gill
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Published: 2012-08-23
Total Pages: 297
ISBN-13: 019966336X
DOWNLOAD EBOOKSeduction by Contract explains how consumer contracts emerge from market forces and consumer psychology. Consumers' predictable mistakes - they are short-sighted, optimistic, and imperfectly rational - compel sellers to compete by hiding the true costs of products in complex, misleading contracts. Only better law can overcome the market's failure.
Author: Truman Fassett Bewley
Publisher: CUP Archive
Published: 1989-07-28
Total Pages: 452
ISBN-13: 9780521389259
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThese articles should be helpful to anyone with training in economics.
Author: Peter Benson
Publisher: Belknap Press
Published: 2019-12-17
Total Pages: 625
ISBN-13: 0674237595
DOWNLOAD EBOOK“One of the most important contributions to the field of contract theory—if not the most important—in the past 25 years.” —Stephen A. Smith, McGill University Can we account for contract law on a moral basis that is acceptable from the standpoint of liberal justice? To answer this question, Peter Benson develops a theory of contract that is completely independent of—and arguably superior to—long-dominant views, which take contract law to be justified on the basis of economics or promissory morality. Through a detailed analysis of contract principles and doctrines, Benson brings out the specific normative conception underpinning the whole of contract law. Contract, he argues, is best explained as a transfer of rights, which is complete at the moment of agreement and is governed by a definite conception of justice—justice in transactions. Benson’s analysis provides what John Rawls called a public basis of justification, which is as essential to the liberal legitimacy of contract as to any other form of coercive law. The argument of Justice in Transactions is expressly complementary to Rawls’s, presenting an original justification designed specifically for transactions, as distinguished from the background institutions to which Rawls’s own theory applies. The result is a field-defining work offering a comprehensive theory of contract law. Benson shows that contract law is both justified in its own right and fully congruent with other domains—moral, economic, and political—of liberal society.
Author: Patrick Bolton
Publisher: MIT Press
Published: 2004-12-10
Total Pages: 746
ISBN-13: 9780262025768
DOWNLOAD EBOOKA comprehensive introduction to contract theory, emphasizing common themes and methodologies as well as applications in key areas. Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way. It also presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The book emphasizes applications rather than general theorems while providing self-contained, intuitive treatment of the simple models analyzed. In this way, it can also serve as a reference for researchers interested in building contract-theoretic models in applied contexts.The book covers all the major topics in contract theory taught in most graduate courses. It begins by discussing such basic ideas in incentive and information theory as screening, signaling, and moral hazard. Subsequent sections treat multilateral contracting with private information or hidden actions, covering auction theory, bilateral trade under private information, and the theory of the internal organization of firms; long-term contracts with private information or hidden actions; and incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, and contracting with externalities. Each chapter ends with a guide to the relevant literature. Exercises appear in a separate chapter at the end of the book.
Author: W. Bentley MacLeod
Publisher: MIT Press
Published: 2022-04-05
Total Pages: 417
ISBN-13: 0262046873
DOWNLOAD EBOOKA graduate textbook on microeconomics, covering decision theory, game theory, and the foundations of contract theory, with a unique focus on the empirical. This graduate-level text on microeconomics, covering such topics as decision theory, game theory, bargaining theory, contract theory, trade under asymmetric information, and relational contract theory, is unique in its emphasis on the interplay between theory and evidence. It reviews the microeconomic theory of exchange “from the ground up,” aiming to produce a set of models and hypotheses amenable to empirical exploration, with particular focus on models that are useful for the study of contracts, institutions, and organizations. It explores research that extends price theory to the exchange of commodities when markets are incomplete, discussing recent developments in the field. Topics covered include the relationship between theory and evidence; decision theory as it is used in contract theory and institutional design; game theory; axiomatic and strategic bargaining theory; agency theory and the class of models that are considered to constitute contract theory, with discussions of moral hazard and trade with asymmetric information; and the theory of relational contracts. The final chapter offers a nontechnical review that provides a guide to which model is the most appropriate for a particular application. End-of-chapter exercises help students expand their understanding of the material, and an appendix provides brief introduction to optimization theory and the welfare theorem of general equilibrium theory. Students are assumed to be familiar with general equilibrium theory and basic constrained optimization theory.
Author: Gregory Klass
Publisher: OUP Oxford
Published: 2014-12-18
Total Pages: 417
ISBN-13: 019102208X
DOWNLOAD EBOOKIn recent years there has been a revival of interest in the philosophical study of contract law. In 1981 Charles Fried claimed that contract law is based on the philosophy of promise and this has generated what is today known as 'the contract and promise debate'. Cutting to the heart of contemporary discussions, this volume brings together leading philosophers, legal theorists, and contract lawyers to debate the philosophical foundations of this area of law. Divided into two parts, the first explores general themes in the contract theory literature, including the philosophy of promising, the nature of contractual obligation, economic accounts of contract law, and the relationship between contract law and moral values such as personal autonomy and distributive justice. The second part uses these philosophical ideas to make progress in doctrinal debates, relating for example to contract interpretation, unfair terms, good faith, vitiating factors, and remedies. Together, the essays provide a picture of the current state of research in this revitalized area of law, and pave the way for future study and debate.
Author: F. H. Buckley
Publisher: Duke University Press
Published: 1999-08-27
Total Pages: 479
ISBN-13: 0822380129
DOWNLOAD EBOOKDeclared dead some twenty-five years ago, the idea of freedom of contract has enjoyed a remarkable intellectual revival. In The Fall and Rise of Freedom of Contract leading scholars in the fields of contract law and law-and-economics analyze the new interest in bargaining freedom. The 1970s was a decade of regulatory triumphalism in North America, marked by a surge in consumer, securities, and environmental regulation. Legal scholars predicted the “death of contract” and its replacement by regulation and reliance-based theories of liability. Instead, we have witnessed the reemergence of free bargaining norms. This revival can be attributed to the rise of law-and-economics, which laid bare the intellectual failure of anticontractarian theories. Scholars in this school note that consumers are not as helpless as they have been made out to be, and that intrusive legal rules meant ostensibly to help them often leave them worse off. Contract law principles have also been very robust in areas far afield from traditional contract law, and the essays in this volume consider how free bargaining rights might reasonably be extended in tort, property, land-use planning, bankruptcy, and divorce and family law. This book will be of particular interest to legal scholars and specialists in contract law. Economics and public policy planners will also be challenged by its novel arguments. Contributors. Gregory S. Alexander, Margaret F. Brinig, F. H. Buckley, Robert Cooter, Steven J. Eagle, Robert C. Ellickson, Richard A. Epstein, William A. Fischel, Michael Klausner, Bruce H. Kobayashi, Geoffrey P. Miller, Timothy J. Muris, Robert H. Nelson, Eric A. Posner, Robert K. Rasmussen, Larry E. Ribstein, Roberta Romano, Paul H. Rubin, Alan Schwartz, Elizabeth S. Scott, Robert E. Scott, Michael J. Trebilcock
Author: Douglas G. Baird
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
Published: 2007
Total Pages: 686
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThis important volume presents a rich collection of ideas on and insights into the law and economics of contracts. It includes material relevant to a large number of legal fields. Many of the articles are classics that have, over the years, become focal points for continuing debate; others provide an easily accessible account of particular areas. The editor's comprehensive introduction provides an overview of law and economics scholarship in contracts over the past few decades and a portal into an evolving field. Topics include: the economics of contracting; efficient breach and renegotiation; expectation damages and its alternatives; default rules and mass markets.
Author: Oliver Hart
Publisher: Clarendon Press
Published: 1995-10-05
Total Pages: 244
ISBN-13: 0191521728
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThis book provides a framework for thinking about economic instiutions such as firms. The basic idea is that institutions arise in situations where people write incomplete contracts and where the allocation of power or control is therefore important. Power and control are not standard concepts in economic theory. The book begins by pointing out that traditional approaches cannot explain on the one hand why all transactions do not take place in one huge firm and on the other hand why firms matter at all. An incomplete contracting or property rights approach is then developed. It is argued that this approach can throw light on the boundaries of firms and on the meaning of asset ownership. In the remainder of the book, incomplete contacting ideas are applied to understand firms' financial decisions, in particular, the nature of debt and equity (why equity has votes and creditors have foreclosure rights); the capital structure decisions of public companies; optimal bankruptcy procedure; and the allocation of voting rights across a company's shares. The book is written in a fairly non-technical style and includes many examples. It is aimed at advanced undergraduate and graduate students, academic and business economists, and lawyers as well as those with an interest in corporate finance, privatization and regulation, and transitional issues in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and China. Little background knowledge is required, since the concepts are developed as the book progresses and the existing literature is fully reviewed.
