This is an in-depth analysis of the U.S.-Japan security alliance and its implications for Japan and the Asia-Pacific region. It moves away from the official line that the alliance is a vital aspect of Japan's security policy and introduces issues and arguments that are often overlooked: American security policy has failed to achieve its goals; Japan's interests are not fully served by the alliance; the alliance itself is a source of instability in the region; and the arrangement has placed constraints on Japan's own political development. The author measures current developments in U.S. foreign policy against Japan's role in the region and Japan's own political development. He assesses the consequences of the alliance for the current regional situation in Northeast Asia, looks at future policy options for Japan, and makes the case for a neutralist security policy.
This is an in-depth analysis of the U.S.-Japan security alliance and its implications for Japan and the Asia-Pacific region. It moves away from the official line that the alliance is a vital aspect of Japan's security policy and introduces issues and arguments that are often overlooked: American security policy has failed to achieve its goals; Japan's interests are not fully served by the alliance; the alliance itself is a source of instability in the region; and the arrangement has placed constraints on Japan's own political development. The author measures current developments in U.S. foreign policy against Japan's role in the region and Japan's own political development. He assesses the consequences of the alliance for the current regional situation in Northeast Asia, looks at future policy options for Japan, and makes the case for a neutralist security policy.
The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future explains the inner workings of the U.S.-Japan alliance and recommends new approaches to sustaining this critical bilateral security relationship.
Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo’s decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace? Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan’s decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor in Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decision-makers.
On May 8, 1945, Victory in Europe Day-shortened to "V.E. Day"-brought with it the demise of Nazi Germany. But for the Allies, the war was only half-won. Exhausted but exuberant American soldiers, ready to return home, were sent to join the fighting in the Pacific, which by the spring and summer of 1945 had turned into a gruelling campaign of bloody attrition against an enemy determined to fight to the last man. Germany had surrendered unconditionally. The Japanese would clearly make the conditions of victory extraordinarily high. In the United States, Americans clamored for their troops to come home and for a return to a peacetime economy. Politics intruded upon military policy while a new and untested president struggled to strategize among a military command that was often mired in rivalry. The task of defeating the Japanese seemed nearly unsurmountable, even while plans to invade the home islands were being drawn. Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall warned of the toll that "the agony of enduring battle" would likely take. General Douglas MacArthur clashed with Marshall and Admiral Nimitz over the most effective way to defeat the increasingly resilient Japanese combatants. In the midst of this division, the Army began a program of partial demobilization of troops in Europe, which depleted units at a time when they most needed experienced soldiers. In this context of military emergency, the fearsome projections of the human cost of invading the Japanese homeland, and weakening social and political will, victory was salvaged by means of a horrific new weapon. As one Army staff officer admitted, "The capitulation of Hirohito saved our necks." In Implacable Foes, award-winning historians Waldo Heinrichs (a veteran of both theatres of war in World War II) and Marc Gallicchio bring to life the final year of World War Two in the Pacific right up to the dropping of the atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, evoking not only Japanese policies of desperate defense, but the sometimes rancorous debates on the home front. They deliver a gripping and provocative narrative that challenges the decision-making of U.S. leaders and delineates the consequences of prioritizing the European front. The result is a masterly work of military history that evaluates the nearly insurmountable trials associated with waging global war and the sacrifices necessary to succeed.
This is an in-depth analysis of the U.S.-Japan security alliance and its implications for Japan and the Asia-Pacific region. It moves away from the official line that the alliance is a vital aspect of Japan's security policy and introduces issues and arguments that are often overlooked: American security policy has failed to achieve its goals; Japan's interests are not fully served by the alliance; the alliance itself is a source of instability in the region; and the arrangement has placed constraints on Japan's own political development. The author measures current developments in U.S. foreign policy against Japan's role in the region and Japan's own political development. He assesses the consequences of the alliance for the current regional situation in Northeast Asia, looks at future policy options for Japan, and makes the case for a neutralist security policy.
Japan's new politics challenge some basic assumptions about U.S.-Japan alliance management. CFR Senior Fellow Sheila A. Smith explores this new era of alternating parties in power and reveals the growing importance of Japan's domestic politics in shaping alliance cooperation.
