Embassies are integral to international diplomacy, their staff instrumental to inter-governmental dialogue, strategic partnerships, trading relationships and cultural exchange. But Embassies are also discreet political spaces. Notionally sovereign territory ‘immune’ from local jurisdiction, in moments of crisis Embassies have often been targets of protest and sites of confrontation. It is this aspect of Embassy experience that this collection of essays explores and Embassies in Crisis revisits flashpoints in the recent lives of Embassies overseas at times of acute political crisis. Ranging across multiple British and other embassy crises, unusually, this book offers equal insights to international historians and members of the diplomatic community.
Cardinal Joseph Mindszenty (18921975) was in 195671 "guest" of the American Embassy in Budapest, Hungary. During these 15 years he wrote a great number of letters and messages transmitted through diplomatic channels to four US Presidents and their Secretaries of State. There are only two Presidential answers: from Kennedy and from Nixon. In general, the Department of State instructed the Charg in Budapest to inform the Cardinal orally: his message has been received in the White House/State Department. This correspondence in his integrity remained buried in 5 archives. This book is offered for all those willing to learn the various problems of Cold War and detente periode, American diplomacy and the thinking of the great cardinal, in his generation hero of freedom for the Hungarians and for the World. * From the letters of the Cardinal: The Treaty of Versailles-"Trianon has dismembered us, and Yalta has created a Soviet satellite out of us." (October 23, 1957) "The moral qualifications leave the sinful-livers and blood-wallowers cold." (November 8, 1957) "Today nothing is more important (and perhaps it is not too late) for mankind, than that its leaders and the led should learn what bolshevism is in the way that we its poor, wretched satellites have experienced in body and soul. This great lesson can equal the Declaration of Independence in its effect." (June 23, 1960) "This peace [i.e., the peace of Central Europe] has been the peace of the graveyard; only those who are not imprisoned can be satisfied with a jail." (August 10, 1961) " illegality never can become legality, as the injustice justice." (March 13, 1964) * Rev. Adam Somorjai, OSB (b. 1952), a Hungarian Benedictine living in Rome (Italy) worked in various Church Offices, editor of the correspondence of Cardinal Mindszenty with the Popes and Cardinal Secretaries of State of the Vatican. Prof. Tibor Zinner (b. 1948), legal historian, university professor in Budapest, Hungary's best-known expert on 20th-century political trials, author of numerous publications, e.g. on Imre Nagy and Lszl Rajk.
The appraisal of the political dialogue and negotiations with the communist regimes of East Central Europe commenced by the Holy See in the 1960s did not provoke only lively debates among contemporaries, but remains to the present day one of the most debated questions of the twentieth-century history: should it be assessed as a fixed path to which no alternative existed, or was it a flawed initiative which merely served the international legitimacy of the communist totalitarian system? This volume enriches the results of earlier historiography with new perspectives and confirmes inter alia that a black-and-white reading (often based on a one-sided use of sources) of Ostpolitik is incorrect: just as the critical assessment, which frequently places local considerations at the forefront, requires revision, the at times apologetic outlook defending the Vatican’s Eastern policy is also untenable. Only a nuanced and source-focused analysis of the ambitions of the Roman and Muscovite centers, and of local politics and Churches, as well as dialogue between the various research trends, can help us to gain a more thorough knowledge of (and make us better understand) those fixed paths upon which the Roman and local ecclesiastics of the era were forced to travel and which limited the possibility of success.
“Victim of history,” “a martyr from behind the Iron Curtain,” “the Hungarian Gandhi” – these are just some of the epithets which people used to describe Cardinal Mindszenty, archbishop of Esztergom, who was the last Hungarian prelate to use the title of prince primate. Today, Mindszenty has been forgotten in most countries except for Hungary, but when he died in 1975, he was known all over the world as a symbol of the struggle of the Catholic Church against communism. Cardinal Mindszenty held the post of archbishop of Esztergom from 1945 until 1974, but during this period of almost three decades he served barely four years in office. The political police arrested him on December 26, 1948, and the Budapest People’s Court subsequently sentenced him to life imprisonment. Based on the Stalinist practice of show trials, one of the accusations against Mindszenty, referring to his legitimist leanings, was his alleged attempt to re-establish Habsburg rule in Hungary. He regained freedom during the 1956 revolution but only for a few days. He was granted refuge by the US Embassy in Budapest between November 4, 1956 –September 28, 1971. In the fifteen years he spent at the American embassy enormous changes took place in the world while his personality remained frozen into the past. When in 1971 Pope Paul VI received the Hungarian foreign minister, he called Mindszenty “the victim of history”. His last years were spent free at last, but far away from his homeland. In Hungary, the Catholic believers eagerly await his beatification.
Dealing with Dictators explores America's Cold War efforts to make the dictatorships of Eastern Europe less tyrannical and more responsive to the country's international interests. During this period, US policies were a mix of economic and psychological warfare, subversion, cultural and economic penetration, and coercive diplomacy. Through careful examination of American and Hungarian sources, László Borhi assesses why some policies toward Hungary achieved their goals while others were not successful. When George H. W. Bush exclaimed to Mikhail Gorbachev on the day the Soviet Union collapsed, "Together we liberated Eastern Europe and unified Germany," he was hardly doing justice to the complicated history of the era. The story of the process by which the transition from Soviet satellite to independent state occurred in Hungary sheds light on the dynamics of systemic change in international politics at the end of the Cold War.
Few political lives have been as dramatic, or as marked by sudden changes of fortune, as that of Janos Kadar, Hungary's communist leader from 1956 to 1988. A reformist who at first supported Imre Nagy's 1956 attempt to distance his country from Soviet domination, Kadar eventually threw in his lot with the Soviet Union and the repression which followed Hungary's attempt at revolution in 1956. Was he an ambitious, ruthless party functionary or a tragic visionary who sought to preserve a modicum of independence for his country by abandoning its aspirations and his friends? In this, the first biography in English since the collapse of the Soviet bloc, Roger Gough paints a vivid picture of Kadar's personality and career, whilst analysing his significance for Hungary and his place in the history of European communism. "A Good Comrade" is a powerful portrait of a man who dominated Hungarian political life for three decades.
The 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol are the cornerstones of international refugee law. This Commentary provides a systematic, article-by-article analysis of their provisions in addition to crosscutting thematic chapters. The Commentary is an indispensable tool for lawyers, decision-makers, and academics.
More than half a century after Eisenhower left office, the history of his presidency is so clouded by myth, partisanship, and outright fraud that most people have little understanding of how Ike’s administration worked or what it accomplished. We know—or think we know—that Eisenhower distrusted his vice president, Richard Nixon, and kept him at arm’s length; that he did little to advance civil rights; that he sat by as Joseph McCarthy’s reckless anticommunist campaign threatened to wreck his administration; and that he planned the disastrous 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. None of this is true. The President and the Apprentice reveals a different Eisenhower, and a different Nixon. Ike trusted and relied on Nixon, sending him on many sensitive overseas missions. Eisenhower, not Truman, desegregated the military. Eisenhower and Nixon, not Lyndon Johnson, pushed the Civil Rights Act of 1957 through the Senate. Eisenhower was determined to bring down McCarthy and did so. Nixon never, contrary to recent accounts, saw a psychotherapist, but while Ike was recovering from his heart attack in 1955, Nixon was overworked, overanxious, overmedicated, and at the limits of his ability to function.
