The struggle between Egypt and Iraq over Arab hegemony constitutes the main theme of this study. Focussing on the struggle over Middle Eastern defense between 1945-58, and culminating in the conflict over the Baghdad Pact (1955-58), it sheds new light on Arab politics during the period under review. This research concentrates predominantly on the regional actors. The underlying assumption is that policies were not necessarily formulated in Washington and London, and that — often enough — major decisions taken in Ankara, Cairo, Baghdad, Damascus, Amman and other Arab capitals affected decision-makers in Western capitals. The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World is based on newly-released British, American and Israeli documents, as well as on all available Arab sources. The study's value rests upon its discussion of the Baghdad Pact, a significant event which was hitherto neglected, yet marked a watershed in modern Arab history. This study's approach offers an analytical framework with which the present struggle for hegemony in the Arab world may be examined.
This book explores the formation of the Baghdad Pact and Anglo-American defence policies in the Middle East, 1950-1959. It determines the aims with which the pact was established; the failings of the pact, and the struggle that was undertaken against it by hostile countries. It examines the events surrounding the formation, development and collapse of the pact, and Anglo-American attempts to contain the Soviet Union in the Middle East. It also deals with British and American policies towards the pact and Middle Eastern defence. It seeks to examine British and American post-war defence policies in the Middle East and their collective defence projects in the region, such as the Middle East Command and Northern Tier, leading to the Baghdad Pact. It does not attempt to offer a comprehensive history of British and American policies in the Middle East, and particularly aims to explore those policies with regard to the problems of Middle East defence. In addition, it explores the policies of the local members of the pact, and examines the pact's internal structure. It poses the questions of how the members of the pact and the United States perceived the question of Middle East defence; what their basic aims were; and what problems they faced while trying to achieve these aims and implementing their chosen solutions.
Barnett explores the relationships among Arab identity, the meaning of Arabism, and desired regional order in the Middle East from 1920 to the present, focusing on Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia.
Oil lies at the heart of the modern history of the Middle East. For decades, the world’s largest oil reserves have enriched the region’s nations. But oil wealth has not brought with it universal prosperity. It has, though, transformed the Middle Eastern people and societies—enriching empires and engendering anarchies. Empires and Anarchies is an unconventional history of oil in the Middle East. In Michael Quentin Morton’s account the burnt-out remains of Saddam Hussein’s armaments and the human tragedy of the Arab Spring are as much of the story as the shimmering skylines of oil-rich nations. From the first explorers trudging through the desert to the excesses of the Peacock Throne and the high stakes of OPEC, Morton lays out the history of oil in compelling detail, arguing that oil simultaneously enriched and fractured the Middle East, eroding traditional ways of life, and eventually contributing to the rise of Islamic radicalism. The book is essential reading for anyone interested in the promises and peril of the world’s oil boom.
How are alliances made? In this book, Stephen M. Walt makes a significant contribution to this topic, surveying theories of the origins of international alliances and identifying the most important causes of security cooperation between states. In addition, he proposes a fundamental change in the present conceptions of alliance systems. Contrary to traditional balance-of-power theories, Walt shows that states form alliances not simply to balance power but in order to balance threats. Walt begins by outlining five general hypotheses about the causes of alliances. Drawing upon diplomatic history and a detailed study of alliance formation in the Middle East between 1955 and 1979, he demonstrates that states are more likely to join together against threats than they are to ally themselves with threatening powers. Walt also examines the impact of ideology on alliance preferences and the role of foreign aid and transnational penetration. His analysis show, however, that these motives for alignment are relatively less important. In his conclusion, he examines the implications of "balance of threat" for U.S. foreign policy.
One of Foreign Affairs' Best of Books of 2021 and "Books For The Century"! "Book of the Week" on Fareed Zakaria GPS Financial Times Best Books of 2020 The definitive account of how regime change in the Middle East has proven so tempting to American policymakers for decades—and why it always seems to go wrong. "It's a first-rate work, intelligently analyzing a complex issue, and learning the right lessons from history." —Fareed Zakaria Since the end of World War II, the United States has set out to oust governments in the Middle East on an average of once per decade—in places as diverse as Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan (twice), Egypt, Libya, and Syria. The reasons for these interventions have also been extremely diverse, and the methods by which the United States pursued regime change have likewise been highly varied, ranging from diplomatic pressure alone to outright military invasion and occupation. What is common to all the operations, however, is that they failed to achieve their ultimate goals, produced a range of unintended and even catastrophic consequences, carried heavy financial and human costs, and in many cases left the countries in question worse off than they were before. Philip H. Gordon's Losing the Long Game is a thorough and riveting look at the U.S. experience with regime change over the past seventy years, and an insider’s view on U.S. policymaking in the region at the highest levels. It is the story of repeated U.S. interventions in the region that always started out with high hopes and often the best of intentions, but never turned out well. No future discussion of U.S. policy in the Middle East will be complete without taking into account the lessons of the past, especially at a time of intense domestic polarization and reckoning with America's standing in world.