Concentrates on the pivotal role of President John F. Kennedy's Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara. This study particularly focuses on the greater role McNamara played in foreign affairs than any previous Secretary of Defense.
Alliance politics is a regular headline grabber. When a possible military crisis involving Russia, North Korea, or China rears its head, leaders and citizens alike raise concerns over the willingness of US allies to stand together. As rival powers have tightened their security cooperation, the United States has stepped up demands that its allies increase their defense spending and contribute more to military operations in the Middle East and elsewhere. The prospect of former President Donald Trump unilaterally ending alliances alarmed longstanding partners, even as NATO was welcoming new members into its ranks. Military Alliances in the Twenty-First Century is the first book to explore fully the politics that shape these security arrangements – from their initial formation through the various challenges that test them and, sometimes, lead to their demise. Across six thematic chapters, Alexander Lanoszka challenges conventional wisdom that has dominated our understanding of how military alliances have operated historically and into the present. Although military alliances today may seem uniquely hobbled by their internal difficulties, Lanoszka argues that they are in fact, by their very nature, prone to dysfunction.
McNamara, Clifford and the Burdens of Vietnam, 1965-1969, volume VI in the newly named Secretaries of Defense Historical Series, covers the incumbency of Robert S. McNamara, as well as the brief, but significant, tenure of Clark M. Clifford. McNamara's key role in the ever-deepening U.S. involvement in Vietnam between 1965 and 1968 forms the centerpiece of the narrative. During these years, Vietnam touched every aspect of Lyndon B. Johnson's administration, determining budget priorities, provoking domestic unrest, souring relations with NATO, and complicating negotiations with the Soviet Union.McNamara's early miscalculations about Vietnam became the source of deep disappointments. Relations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, never good, frayed almost to the breaking point as McNamara repeatedly rejected military advice in favor of his civilian experts. McNamara's carefully crafted plans failed, his frustrations grew, and he became estranged from the President. His private attempts to check the war's momentum contradicted his public statements supporting the military effort and tarred McNamara as a hypocrite. McNamara's successor, Clark Clifford, arrived with a reputation as a hawk, but focused most of his effort on extricating the United States from Vietnam.McNamara and Clifford presided over the Department of Defense during momentous and dangerous times. Vietnam was one of a series of wars, emergencies, and interventions involving U.S. interests. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, declining U.S. prestige and power in Europe and NATO, war in the Middle East, heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula, arms control talks with the Soviet Union, and violent protests at home competed for attention. Overseeing the Vietnam War and contending with these complex policy issues taxed even McNamara's enormous energy and brilliant intellect as he struggled to manage DoD programs. His long-cherished cost-cutting programs fell by the wayside; his favored weapons systems were swept aside; his committed efforts to limit strategic arms faltered; and his reputation was permanently tarnished.McNamara, Clifford and the Burdens of Vietnam highlights the interaction of McNamara and Clifford with the White House, Congress, the JCS, the State Department, and other federal agencies involved in policy formulation. The two secretaries attempted to impose order while fighting a war whose cost of winning became as morally prohibitive as the price of losing.
A narrative history and assessment of the early years of Robert McNamara's tenure as Secretary of Defense, including McNamara's relationship with Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, the transformation of the Department of Defense as a part of Kennedy's New Frontier, and the Pentagon's handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Bay of Pigs episode, and onset of the Vietnam War along with other major national security events and developments during a turbulent and momentous period of the Cold War. (Fuller description is on the dust jacket flaps.)
In the pantheon of air power spokesmen, Giulio Douhet holds center stage. His writings, more often cited than perhaps actually read, appear as excerpts and aphorisms in the writings of numerous other air power spokesmen, advocates-and critics. Though a highly controversial figure, the very controversy that surrounds him offers to us a testimonial of the value and depth of his work, and the need for airmen today to become familiar with his thought. The progressive development of air power to the point where, today, it is more correct to refer to aerospace power has not outdated the notions of Douhet in the slightest In fact, in many ways, the kinds of technological capabilities that we enjoy as a global air power provider attest to the breadth of his vision. Douhet, together with Hugh “Boom” Trenchard of Great Britain and William “Billy” Mitchell of the United States, is justly recognized as one of the three great spokesmen of the early air power era. This reprint is offered in the spirit of continuing the dialogue that Douhet himself so perceptively began with the first edition of this book, published in 1921. Readers may well find much that they disagree with in this book, but also much that is of enduring value. The vital necessity of Douhet’s central vision-that command of the air is all important in modern warfare-has been proven throughout the history of wars in this century, from the fighting over the Somme to the air war over Kuwait and Iraq.
Tells the story of the growing Chinese Navy - The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) - and its expanding capabilities, evolving roles and military implications for the USA. Divided into four thematic sections, this special collection of essays surveys and analyzes the most important aspects of China's navel modernization.
Author Edward Keefer chronicles and analyses the tenure of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, who worked to counter the Soviet Union's growing military strength during the administration of President Jimmy Carter. Flush with cash from oil and gas development, the Soviets came closest to matching the United States in strategic power than at any other point in the Cold War, threatening to make the U.S. land-based missile force vulnerable to a first strike. By most reckonings the Kremlin also surpassed the West in conventional arms and forces in Central Europe, creating a direct threat to NATO. In response, Brown, a nuclear physicist, advocated for the development of more technologically advanced weapon systems to offset the Soviet military advantage, but faced Carter's efforts to reign in the defense budget. Eventually the secretary, backed by the JCS, the national security adviser, and key members of Congress, persuaded a reluctant Carter to increase defense spending for the last two years of his term. As a result weapons development such as stealth technology, precision-guided bombs, and cruise missiles went forward. These initiatives and more provided a head start for the acclaimed Ronald Reagan revolution in defense. As the author points out, there was more continuity than contrast in defense policy between Carter and Reagan. The book also highlights Brown's policymaking efforts and his influence on Carter as the administration responded to international events such as the Middle East peace process, the Iran revolution and hostage crisis, the rise of radical Islam, negotiations with the Soviets over arms limitations, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the creation of a new security framework in the Persian Gulf region. Other topics cover policy toward Latin America Africa, China, and Southeast Asia. The book is also a history of the Defense Department, including the continual development of the All-Volunteer Force and the organizational changes that saw improved policy formulation and acquisition decisions. Political strategists, political scientists, international relations scholars, foreign policy advocates, historians, and political economists may be interested in this comprehensive historical reference for United States defense and foreign policy under the James (Jimmy) Carter administration. High school students pursuing research for essays and term papers for Government, Modern World History, and United States History may be interested in this resource. Additionally, undergraduate and graduate level students may be interested in this authoritative resource for research relating to international relations, public administration, military science, public policy economics, and introduction to political theory courses. Related products: Presidential History resources collection is available here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/presidential-history Other resources relating to the President James (Jimmy) Carter administration can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/39-jimmy-carter Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series resources can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/foreign-relations-united-states-series-frus Other published works by the US Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense can be found here: https: //bookstore.gpo.gov/agency/office-secretary-defense
National secuirty strategy is a vast subject involving a daunting array of interrelated subelements woven in intricate, sometimes vague, and ever-changing patterns. Its processes are often irregular and confusing and are always based on difficult decisions laden with serious risks. In short, it is a subject understood by few and confusing to most. It is, at the same time, a subject of overwhelming importance to the fate of the United States and civilization itself. Col. Dennis M. Drew and Dr. Donald M. Snow have done a considerable service by drawing together many of the diverse threads of national security strategy into a coherent whole. They consider political and military strategy elements as part of a larger decisionmaking process influenced by economic, technological, cultural, and historical factors. I know of no other recent volume that addresses the entire national security milieu in such a logical manner and yet also manages to address current concerns so thoroughly. It is equally remarkable that they have addressed so many contentious problems in such an evenhanded manner. Although the title suggests that this is an introductory volume - and it is - I am convinced that experienced practitioners in the field of national security strategy would benefit greatly from a close examination of this excellent book. Sidney J. Wise Colonel, United States Air Force Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education