“A fine book…In the twenty-two chapters that comprise the background and the campaign narrative, the author is at his best when he moves away from the Washington scene to detail the field operations. But it is the second part of the book—seven chapters labeled “Facets”—that moves Centennial Campaign into the realm of the exceptional. Here Dr. Gray combines impressive research, careful analysis, and sound deduction to reconstruct Indian movements, locations, and concentrations.”—Western Historical Quarterly
Drawing on more than 22 years' research, this book presents an exhaustive chronology of the Great Sioux Campaign in three parts: the U.S. Seventh Cavalry's communications, decisions and movements October 15, 1875-June 21, 1876, are traced day-by-day; the three-day prelude to the Battle of Little Bighorn hour-by-hour; and the battle itself minute-by-minute. The separate actions of the several military commands and the Indians involved are narrated in coherent sequence. Archival intelligence summaries offer the reader fresh perspective on the events leading to the decisive Indian victory known as Custer's Last Stand.
During the first half of 1876 the Army conducted three expeditions against the Sioux and Cheyenne Indians. The results of these three expeditions were: the first expedition destroying a small village, the second expedition being defeated in a meeting engagement, and the third expedition suffering the annihilation of five companies. The results lead to questioning the Army’s focus on attacking and destroying villages as the primary target of their expeditions. If the Army had a complete understanding of the Sioux they would have realized that the “hub of all power” or center of gravity of the Sioux was the horse, which every major aspect of Sioux life was augmented and dependent upon. The first three expeditions of the Sioux Campaign of 1876 demonstrate that: senior Army commanders planned their campaigns, expeditions, and organizations around their knowledge of Sioux mobility, the primary source of power for the Sioux warrior was mobility gained from the horse, Army forces could not bring their advantage in firepower to bear on Sioux warriors. Army commanders understood the mobility of the Sioux village and their warriors, but they failed to take the next step—challenging the old assumption that attacking villages and using a strategy of exhaustion was the correct way to subdue the Sioux. Instead, Army forces should have concentrated their attacks on center of gravity of the Sioux—the horse.
This volume offers accounts of the many battles and skirmishes in the Great Sioux War as they were observed by participating officers, enlisted men, scouts, surgeons, and newspaper correspondents. The selections-some rendered immediately after the encounters and some set down in reminiscences years later - are important and little-known sources of information about the war. By their personal nature, they give a compelling sense of immediacy to the actions. The editor's introduction and commentary on each of the accounts help readers understand the interrelationship of events and appreciate the entire spectrum of the conflict.
This monograph discusses the role of operational art in the Sioux War of 1876, the U.S. Army’s largest campaign between the Civil War and the Spanish-American War. This campaign, often overlooked in the historical study of operational art, demonstrates the successful application of operational art in a non-traditional campaign: the U.S. Army’s defeat of the Northern Sioux Indians and their allies. This campaign also demonstrates how operational art can lead to operational victory, despite repeated tactical failures. The monograph first defines operational art, based on emerging U.S. Army doctrine, and then reviews its role in three campaigns that served as models for the Army’s operations in the Sioux War of 1876: Grant’s 1864-1865 campaign to defeat the Confederacy, the Southern Plains War of 1868-1869, and the Red River War of 1874-1875. The plans and execution of the Sioux War of 1876 are then reviewed and analyzed utilizing the definition of operational art and modem concepts for operational planning. The causes of failure in the 1876 campaign are then analyzed, based on Cohen and Gooch’s methodology for analysis of military failure, followed by explanation of the campaign’s ultimate success. The monograph concludes that the Frontier Army’s success in this campaign demonstrates successful application of operational art, despite many errors in planning and execution committed by General Sheridan and his subordinates. Additional lessons from this campaign include the danger of blindly applying previously successful models for operations, the preeminent role of the operational commander, and the validity of operational art in campaigns against unconventional foes.
The Great Sioux War pitted almost one-third of the U.S. Army against Lakota Sioux and Northern Cheyennes. By the time it ended, this war had played out on twenty-seven different battlefields, resulted in hundreds of casualties, cost millions of dollars, and transformed the landscape and the lives of survivors on both sides. In this compelling sourcebook, Paul Hedren uses extensive documentation to demonstrate that the American army adapted quickly to the challenges of fighting this unconventional war and was more effectively led and better equipped than is customarily believed.
The Great Sioux War of 1876–77 began at daybreak on March 17, 1876, when Colonel Joseph J. Reynolds and six cavalry companies struck a village of Northern Cheyennes—Sioux allies—thereby propelling the Northern Plains tribes into war. The ensuing last stand of the Sioux against Anglo-American settlement of their homeland spanned some eighteen months, playing out across more than twenty battle and skirmish sites and costing hundreds of lives on both sides and many millions of dollars. And it all began at Powder River. Powder River: Disastrous Opening of the Great Sioux War recounts the wintertime Big Horn Expedition and its singular great battle, along with the stories of the Northern Cheyennes and their elusive leader Old Bear. Historian Paul Hedren tracks both sides of the conflict through a rich array of primary source material, including the transcripts of Reynolds’s court-martial and Indian recollections. The disarray and incompetence of the war’s beginnings—officers who failed to take proper positions, disregard of orders to save provisions, failure to cooperate, and abandonment of the dead and a wounded soldier—in many ways anticipated the catastrophe that later occurred at the Little Big Horn. Forty photographs, many previously unpublished, and five new maps detail the action from start to ignominious conclusion. Hedren’s comprehensive account takes Powder River out of the shadow of the Little Big Horn and reveals how much this critical battle tells us about the army’s policy and performance in the West, and about the debacle soon to follow.
Following the discovery of gold deposits, in December 1875 the US Government ordered the indigenous population of the Black Hills in what is now South Dakota and Wyoming, the Sioux, to return to the Great Sioux Reservation. When the Sioux refused, the US Army sent forces into the area, sparking a conflict that would make Lieutenant Colonel George Custer, Chief Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse, and others household names around the world. Examining a series of engagements in the Black Hills War, including Rosebud, Little Bighorn, and Slim Buttes, this fully illustrated study assesses the forces fighting on both sides in this momentous campaign, casting light on the origins, tactics, armament, and battlefield performance of the US Cavalry and their Sioux opponents at the height of the Indian Wars.
