This paper presents a model of optimal taxation in which both private agents and the government can default on their debt. We first consider Ramsey equilibria in which the government can precommit to its policies but in which private agents can default. We then consider sustainable equilibria in which both government and private agent decision rules are required to be sequentially rational. We show that when there is sufficiently little discounting and government consumption fluctuates enough, the Ramsey allocations and policies (in which the government never defaults) can be supported by a sustainable equilibrium.
What determines the size and form of redistributive programs, the extent and type of public goods provision, the burden of taxation across alternative tax bases, the size of government deficits, and the stance of monetary policy during the course of business and electoral cycles? A large and rapidly growing literature in political economics attempts to answer these questions. But so far there is little consensus on the answers and disagreement on the appropriate mode of analysis. Combining the best of three separate traditions—the theory of macroeconomic policy, public choice, and rational choice in political science—Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini suggest a unified approach to the field. As in modern macroeconomics, individual citizens behave rationally, their preferences over economic outcomes inducing preferences over policy. As in public choice, the delegation of policy decisions to elected representatives may give rise to agency problems between voters and politicians. And, as in rational choice, political institutions shape the procedures for setting policy and electing politicians. The authors outline a common method of analysis, establish several new results, and identify the main outstanding problems.
An integrated approach to the economics of sovereign default Fiscal crises and sovereign default repeatedly threaten the stability and growth of economies around the world. Mark Aguiar and Manuel Amador provide a unified and tractable theoretical framework that elucidates the key economics behind sovereign debt markets, shedding light on the frictions and inefficiencies that prevent the smooth functioning of these markets, and proposing sensible approaches to sovereign debt management. The Economics of Sovereign Debt and Default looks at the core friction unique to sovereign debt—the lack of strong legal enforcement—and goes on to examine additional frictions such as deadweight costs of default, vulnerability to runs, the incentive to “dilute” existing creditors, and sovereign debt’s distortion of investment and growth. The book uses the tractable framework to isolate how each additional friction affects the equilibrium outcome, and illustrates its counterpart using state-of-the-art computational modeling. The novel approach presented here contrasts the outcome of a constrained efficient allocation—one chosen to maximize the joint surplus of creditors and government—with the competitive equilibrium outcome. This allows for a clear analysis of the extent to which equilibrium prices efficiently guide the government’s debt and default decisions, and of what drives divergences with the efficient outcome. Providing an integrated approach to sovereign debt and default, this incisive and authoritative book is an ideal resource for researchers and graduate students interested in this important topic.
This paper proposes a signaling model that offers a new perspective on why governments deviate from optimal tax smoothing and delay debt stabilization. In our model, dependable—but not fully credible—governments have an incentive to tighten the fiscal regime when the signaling effect on credit ratings is larger (that is, when a sufficiently large stock of debt has been accumulated). At this point, they may deviate from tax smoothing not to be mimicked by weak governments. The model predicts that primary balances and debt stocks are complementary inputs in the credit rating function as tests on Italian, Irish, Belgian, and Danish data show.
A substantially revised new edition of a widely used text, offering both an introduction to recursive methods and advanced material. Recursive methods offer a powerful approach for characterizing and solving complicated problems in dynamic macroeconomics. Recursive Macroeconomic Theory provides both an introduction to recursive methods and advanced material, mixing tools and sample applications. Only experience in solving practical problems fully conveys the power of the recursive approach, and the book provides many applications. This third edition offers substantial new material, with three entirely new chapters and significant revisions to others. The new content reflects recent developments in the field, further illustrating the power and pervasiveness of recursive methods. New chapters cover asset pricing empirics with possible resolutions to puzzles; analysis of credible government policy that entails state variables other than reputation; and foundations of aggregate labor supply with time averaging replacing employment lotteries. Other new material includes a multi-country analysis of taxation in a growth model, elaborations of the fiscal theory of the price level, and age externalities in a matching model. The book is suitable for both first- and second-year graduate courses in macroeconomics and monetary economics. Most chapters conclude with exercises. Many exercises and examples use Matlab programs, which are cited in a special index at the end of the book.
The substantially revised fourth edition of a widely used text, offering both an introduction to recursive methods and advanced material, mixing tools and sample applications. Recursive methods provide powerful ways to pose and solve problems in dynamic macroeconomics. Recursive Macroeconomic Theory offers both an introduction to recursive methods and more advanced material. Only practice in solving diverse problems fully conveys the advantages of the recursive approach, so the book provides many applications. This fourth edition features two new chapters and substantial revisions to other chapters that demonstrate the power of recursive methods. One new chapter applies the recursive approach to Ramsey taxation and sharply characterizes the time inconsistency of optimal policies. These insights are used in other chapters to simplify recursive formulations of Ramsey plans and credible government policies. The second new chapter explores the mechanics of matching models and identifies a common channel through which productivity shocks are magnified across a variety of matching models. Other chapters have been extended and refined. For example, there is new material on heterogeneous beliefs in both complete and incomplete markets models; and there is a deeper account of forces that shape aggregate labor supply elasticities in lifecycle models. The book is suitable for first- and second-year graduate courses in macroeconomics. Most chapters conclude with exercises; many exercises and examples use Matlab or Python computer programming languages.
Part 6: Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy. 19. Asset prices, consumption, and the business cycle (J.Y. Campbell). 20. Human behavior and the efficiency of the financial system (R.J. Shiller). 21. The financial accelerator in a quantitative business cycle framework (B. Bernanke, M. Gertler and S. Gilchrist). Part 7: Monetary and Fiscal Policy. 22. Political economics and macroeconomic policy (T. Persson, G. Tabellini). 23. Issues in the design of monetary policy rules (B.T. McCallum). 24. Inflation stabilization and BOP crises in developing countries (G.A. Calvo, C.A. Vegh). 25. Government debt (D.W. Elmendorf, N.G. Mankiw). 26. Optimal fiscal and monetary policy (V.V. Chari, P.J. Kehoe).
A fully expanded edition of the Nobel Prize–winning economist's classic book This collection of essays uses the lens of rational expectations theory to examine how governments anticipate and plan for inflation, and provides insight into the pioneering research for which Thomas Sargent was awarded the 2011 Nobel Prize in economics. Rational expectations theory is based on the simple premise that people will use all the information available to them in making economic decisions, yet applying the theory to macroeconomics and econometrics is technically demanding. Here, Sargent engages with practical problems in economics in a less formal, noneconometric way, demonstrating how rational expectations can satisfactorily interpret a range of historical and contemporary events. He focuses on periods of actual or threatened depreciation in the value of a nation's currency. Drawing on historical attempts to counter inflation, from the French Revolution and the aftermath of World War I to the economic policies of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, Sargent finds that there is no purely monetary cure for inflation; rather, monetary and fiscal policies must be coordinated. This fully expanded edition of Rational Expectations and Inflation includes Sargent's 2011 Nobel lecture, "United States Then, Europe Now." It also features new articles on the macroeconomics of the French Revolution and government budget deficits.
Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
