This volume is the first comprehensive scholarly analysis of the strategic reconfiguration of Central Asia as Russia has become more disengaged from the nations in the region and as these nations have developed new relations to the south, east, and west. The international implications are enormous because of the rich energy sources—oil and natural gas—located in the Caspian Sea area. The authors assess a variety of internal security policy challenges confronting these states—for example, the potential for conflict arising from such factors as a mixed ethnic population, resource scarcity, particularly in relation to water management, and an Islamic revival. They also examine the security policy content of relations between the Central Asian states and regional and international powers—specifically the stakes, interests, and policies of Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, and the United States. These internal challenges and the evolution of relations with external powers may result in new cooperative relationships, but they may also lead to destabilizing rivalry and interstate enmity in Central Asia. It is important to identify new patterns of relevance for future security cooperation in the region, but the potential for a new security system or for new institutions to manage security in the region remains uncertain. These issues are explored by a team of prominent specialists from Western Europe, the United States, Russia and China.
The final index entry of "zero-sum game" aptly encapsulates much about the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War (or Gulf War I as the author terms it) and its spinoff of the 1991 Gulf War II, particularly from the perspective of the US. Torock (whose background is unspecified except for the Melbourne signoff on the preface) views Saddam Hussein as a Frankenstein monster created by, and later turning against, the superpowers in a familiar pattern of their contest of political intervention in the Third World. Includes 16 pages of references. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
This book relates social constraints and opportunities to micro-level exile decision making. It focuses on Cuban, Indo-Chinese, Ethiopian, Eritrean and Iranian exile communities in the United States. The book analyzes the origins of these large groups of exiles and their treatment under US policy.
Secret Wars is the first book to systematically analyze the ways powerful states covertly participate in foreign wars, showing a recurring pattern of such behavior stretching from World War I to U.S.-occupied Iraq. Investigating what governments keep secret during wars and why, Austin Carson argues that leaders maintain the secrecy of state involvement as a response to the persistent concern of limiting war. Keeping interventions “backstage” helps control escalation dynamics, insulating leaders from domestic pressures while communicating their interest in keeping a war contained. Carson shows that covert interventions can help control escalation, but they are almost always detected by other major powers. However, the shared value of limiting war can lead adversaries to keep secret the interventions they detect, as when American leaders concealed clashes with Soviet pilots during the Korean War. Escalation concerns can also cause leaders to ignore covert interventions that have become an open secret. From Nazi Germany’s role in the Spanish Civil War to American covert operations during the Vietnam War, Carson presents new insights about some of the most influential conflicts of the twentieth century. Parting the curtain on the secret side of modern war, Secret Wars provides important lessons about how rival state powers collude and compete, and the ways in which they avoid outright military confrontations.
Alexander L. George was one of the most productive and respected political scientistsof the late twentieth century. He and his wife, Juliette George, wrote one of the firstpsychobiographies, and Professor George went on to write seminal articles and booksfocusing on political psychology, the operational code, foreign policy decisionmaking,case study methodology, deterrence, coercive diplomacy, policy legitimacy, and bridgingthe gap between the academic and policymaking communities. This book is the firstand only one to contain examples of the works across these fields written by AlexanderGeorge and several of his collaborators. • This is a collection of Alexander L. George's works from the major fields to whichhe contributed.• There are biographical essays by his wife and co-author (Juliette L. George), daughter(Mary George Douglass), former student (Dan Caldwell), and professional colleague(Janice Gross Stein).• There are 25 photographs of Alexander L. George and his family which have notpreviously been published.
A detailed and carefully structured study of Soviet/Russian attitudes and responses to military interventions. It explores cases from the Gulf War in 1990 to the intervention led by Western states in Libya in 2011.
At the height of the Cold War, Soviet ideologues, policymakers, diplomats, and military officers perceived the countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America as the future reserve of socialism, holding the key to victory over Western forces. The zero-sum nature of East-West global competition induced the United States to try to thwart Soviet ambitions. The result was predictable: the two superpowers engaged in proxy struggles against each other in faraway, little-understood lands, often ending up entangled in protracted and highly destructive local fights that did little to serve their own agendas. Using a wealth of recently declassified sources, this book tells the complex story of Soviet involvement in the Horn of Africa, a narrowly defined geographic entity torn by the rivalry of two large countries (Ethiopia and Somalia), from the beginning of the Cold War until the demise of the Soviet Union. At different points in the twentieth century, this region—arguably one of the poorest in the world—attracted broad international interest and large quantities of advanced weaponry, making it a Cold War flashpoint. The external actors ultimately failed to achieve what they wanted from the local conflicts—a lesson relevant for U.S. policymakers today as they ponder whether to use force abroad in the wake of the unhappy experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan.