Strategic Interaction
Strategic Interaction

Author: Erving Goffman

Publisher: University of Pennsylvania Press

Published: 1970

Total Pages: 155

ISBN-13: 0812210115

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The two essays in this classic work by sociologist Erving Goffman deal with the calculative, gamelike aspects of human interaction. Goffman examines the strategy of words and deeds; he uses the term "strategic interaction" to describe gamelike events in which an individual's situation is fully dependent on the move of one's opponent and in which both players know this and have the wit to use this awareness for advantage. Goffman aims to show that strategic interaction can be isolated analytically from the general study of communication and face-to-face interaction. The first essay addresses expression games, in which a participant spars to discover the value of information given openly or unwittingly by another. The author uses vivid examples from espionage literature and high-level political intrigue to show how people mislead one another in the information game. Both observer and observed create evidence that is false and uncover evidence that is real. In "Strategic Interaction," the book's second essay, action is the central concern, and expression games are secondary. Goffman makes clear that often, when it seems that an opponent sets off a course of action through verbal communication, he really has a finger on your trigger, your chips on the table, or your check in his bank. Communication may reinforce conduct, but in the end, action speaks louder. Those who gamble with their wits, and those who study those who do, will find this analysis important and stimulating.

Strategic Interactions in Two-sided Market Oligopolies
Strategic Interactions in Two-sided Market Oligopolies

Author: Emmanuel Farhi

Publisher:

Published: 2008

Total Pages: 32

ISBN-13:

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Strategic interactions between two-sided platforms depend not only on whether their decision variables are strategic complements or substitutes as for one-sided firms, but also -and crucially so- on whether or not the platforms subsidize one side of the market in equilibrium. For example, with prices being strategic complements across platforms, we show that a cost-reducing investment by one firm may have a positive effect on its rival's profits and a negative effect on its own profits when one side is subsidized in equilibrium. By contrast, if platforms make positive margins on both sides, the same investment has the regular, expected effects. Our analysis implies that the strategy space and the logic of competitive advantage are fundamentally different in two-sided markets relative to one-sided markets.

Location Choices Under Strategic Interactions
Location Choices Under Strategic Interactions

Author: Juan Alcácer

Publisher:

Published: 2012

Total Pages: 34

ISBN-13:

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The literature on location choices has mostly emphasized the impact of location and firm characteristics. However, most industries with a significant presence of multi-location firms are oligopolistic in nature, which suggests that strategic interaction among firms plays an important role in firms' decision-making processes. This paper explores how strategic interaction among competitors affects firms' geographic expansion across time and markets. Specifically, we build a model in which two firms that differ in their capabilities enter sequentially into two markets with different potentials for profit. The model is solved using game theory under three learning scenarios that capture the ability of a firm to transfer its capabilities across markets: no learning, local learning, and global learning. Three equilibrium strategies arise: accommodate, marginalize, and collocate. We identify how these strategies emerge depending on the tradeoff between the opportunity costs of absence (giving competitors a lead in a market) and the entrenchment benefits (the cost advantage firms develop through learning-by-doing when they enter early). Both the opportunity costs of absence and the entrenchment benefits vary according to initial relative firm capabilities, relative market profitability, and learning rates. Our model offers a comprehensive approach to understanding the drivers of firm location choices by modeling not only the impact of location and firm heterogeneity, but also the strategic interaction among firms.

Understanding Strategic Interaction
Understanding Strategic Interaction

Author: Wulf Albers

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

Published: 2012-12-06

Total Pages: 526

ISBN-13: 3642604951

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Strategic interaction occurs whenever it depends on others what one finally obtains: on markets, in firms, in politics etc. Game theorists analyse such interaction normatively, using numerous different methods. The rationalistic approach assumes perfect rationality whereas behavioral theories take into account cognitive limitations of human decision makers. In the animal kingdom one usually refers to evolutionary forces when explaining social interaction. The volume contains innovative contributions, surveys of previous work and two interviews which shed new light on these important topics of the research agenda. The contributions come from highly regarded researchers from all over the world who like to express in this way their intellectual inspiration by the Nobel-laureate Reinhard Selten.

Multiunit Organization and Multimarket Strategy
Multiunit Organization and Multimarket Strategy

Author: Joel Baum

Publisher: Elsevier

Published: 2001-06-15

Total Pages: 420

ISBN-13: 0762307218

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A conspicuous feature of the modern economy is the multitude of multiunit systems that operate in several markets - an organizational form that arguably rivals the "M-form" as the 20th century's most successful. Research traditions studying multiunit systems include the multimarket perspective, which has used commitment and mutual forbearance theory, and the multiunit perspective, which has used learning and knowledge transfer theory. These perspectives are interdisciplinary, but to date there has been little direct interaction among them. This text aims to bring these areas together, discussing such things as: examining how variation in firm capabilities affects the co-ordination of branches and thus their forbearance or transfer of routines; bridging theories of market conduct and internal behaviour to explore how knowledge about markets and competitor behaviour is transferred among organizational units; making a theory of contingent multiunit or single-unit competitive advantage that can account for the coexistence of these organizational forms in many markets; and examining the effects of firm contacts in alliances or technological fields on their competitive behaviours.

Strategic Market Relationships
Strategic Market Relationships

Author: Bill Donaldson

Publisher: John Wiley & Sons

Published: 2007-05-21

Total Pages: 289

ISBN-13: 0470028807

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Strategic Market Relationships, 2nd Edition develops the reader’s understanding of the nature, relevance and importance of creating and sustaining relationships as a strategic resource. It takes a managerial perspective to the study of relationships, from strategy to implementation. The first edition was the first text that comprehensively addressed relationships as a strategic issue, and considering relationships as strategic and as a basis for competition is central to this book. In a nutshell, strategic market relationships is the process of analyzing, formulating and implementing a relationship strategy for an organisation. The new edition is being totally restructured in the light of teaching experience with the book and new research since it was published. Most of the existing content will still be there but presented in a new logic. Continues to map relationships from strategy to implementation Text more clearly divided into strategy and implementation parts Continues to focus on close relationships and on the management of relationships Continues with introductory case illustration and end of chapter teaching cases with many new ones All chapter updated with new research since the last publication Revamped chapter on relationship planning including a stronger focus on strategic choice and relationship development New chapter on relationship types/archetypes to develop on the theme of classification and the management of specific relationships New chapter on organizing relationships New chapter on people and relationships E-relationship chapter integrated into chapter on communication and dialogue in a relationship New chapter on channel relationships Chapter on relationship performance restructured around costs and value. Ethics and researching relationships expanded in the conclusion chapter

Competition and Strategic Interaction in New Markets
Competition and Strategic Interaction in New Markets

Author: Rory Morgan McDonald

Publisher:

Published: 2012

Total Pages:

ISBN-13:

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My dissertation focuses on how firms compete effectively in new markets, and explores several strategic issues faced by firms in these contexts. These include how firms strategically interact with their rivals, how they quickly and efficiently craft successful strategies and develop viable business models, and how they successfully position themselves as the cognitive referent in the new market they are creating. While prior research has examined many of these issues in the context of established markets, my research investigates new markets and traces the activities of entrepreneurial rivals. Through an in-depth, longitudinal field study of five firms in the online investing market, I develop new theory to explain how firms successfully achieve these objectives. The first theoretical framework offers an explanation for how firms win the race to develop a viable business model. As the new market emerged, high performing firms enacted three strategies in sequence, which helped them get to a business model quickly and efficiency. First, executives attended to substitutes and copied from rivals. Next, they actively tested assumptions and made major resource commitments to the most lucrative business model opportunity. Finally, they maintained loose links in the organizational activity system to accommodate emergent sources of value. The resultant middle range theory has implications for research on competition in new markets and the strategic processes of developing business models. The second theoretical framework offers an explanation for how some firms become the cognitive referent in a new market while others fail to do so. Although prior research has shown how firms and other actors use rhetoric and symbolic activities to create new markets, I analyze how entrepreneurial firms use the same cultural strategies to position themselves in a new market they are creating. Successful firms conceptualize market creation as problem solving and follow a sequence that begins with narrowly directed rhetorical attacks aimed at current solutions, progresses to shifting stories to coincide with emergent logics, and culminates with eschewing labels that audiences attach to them as these firms introduce novel products to the market. By contrast, unsuccessful firms undermine their own positions through improper use of symbolic market creation activities. The resultant theory is relevant to the literatures on cultural strategy and the performance of entrepreneurial firms.