Status report on federal and local efforts to secure radiological sources: hearing before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, first session, September 14, 2009.
Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia
Congress has long sought, through legislation and oversight, to protect the United States against terrorist threats, especially from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) are one type of CBRN weapon. Explosive-driven "dirty bombs" are an often-discussed type of RDD, though radioactive material can also be dispersed in other ways. This report provides background for understanding the RDD threat and responses, and presents issues for Congress. Appendices: Technical Background; Some U.S. Vulnerabilities to RDDS. Charts and tables. This is a print on demand edition of an important, hard-to-find publication.
" U.S. and international security experts have raised concerns that certain types of radioactive material could be used to make a terrorist weapon, known as a radiological dispersal device or a "dirty bomb." Such material, which is typically sealed in a metal capsule known as a sealed radiological source, is commonly used worldwide in medical and industrial settings. To help secure these sources, in 2012, NNSA began an RSZ pilot project in two countries. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 mandated GAO to, among other things, assess efforts to establish RSZs. In this study, GAO (1) examined current federal efforts to secure radiological sources in the United States and in foreign countries and (2) assessed NNSA's efforts to plan for and establish an RSZ pilot project. GAO reviewed relevant regulations and guidance for securing U.S. and international radiological sources, as well as NNSA's RSZ pilot project documents; examined GAO guidance and professional practices for planning and evaluating pilot projects; interviewed officials from NNSA, NRC, State, and the Department of Homeland Security; and obtained written responses to questions from IAEA. "
"In the hands of terrorists, radiologicalmaterial, such as cesium-137, could beused to construct a "dirty bomb." Suchmaterial-encapsulated in steel ortitanium and called a sealed source-iscommonly found in equipment used byU.S. medical facilities to treat, amongother things, cancer patients. NRC isresponsible for regulating thecommercial use of sealed sources andhas relinquished its regulatory authorityto 37 states, known as AgreementStates. In 2008, NNSA established aprogram to provide security upgradesto U.S. hospitals and medical facilitiesthat use radiological sources.GAO was asked to determine (1) theextent to which NRC's requirementsensure the security of radiologicalsources at U.S. medical facilities and(2) the status of NNSA's efforts toimprove the security of sources atthese facilities. GAO reviewed relevantlaws, regulations, and guidance;interviewed federal agency and stateofficials; and visited 26 hospitals andmedical facilities in 7 states andWashington, D.C."
