The author examines in detail the organization of the U.S. intelligence community, its attempts to monitor and predict the development of Soviet forces from the early days of the cold war, and how these attempts affected American policy and weapons production. Originally published in 1987. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
This work analyses the vulnerability of America's land-based missile force to a pre-emptive Soviet strike as an issue in US strategic and political debate. It examines why the issue rose to prominence in the way it did in the 1970s and then fell away as a concern in the 1980s without being solved in the way it had been presented. It details the way in which the issue was exploited for political and strategic purposes which were often at odds with a concern for this vulnerability.
Committee Serial No. 91-14 (part 1). Considers DOD FY70 budget requests and generally reviews military preparedness, systems procurement, and RPD programs. Classified material has been deleted; Committee Serial No. 91-14 (part 2). Considers DOD FY70 budget requests and generally reviews military preparedness, systems procurement, and RPD programs. Includes investigation of charges by A. Ernest Fitzgerald, Office of Asst Secretary for Financial Management, AF Dept, that Lockheed C-5A aircraft developed for AF experienced inordinately high cost overruns.
In this closely reasoned and lucid analysis, an important thinker on American strategy surveys weapons technology and its military and political implications for the 1970s. J. I. Coffey refutes the argument that American national security requires "superior" strategic offensive forces or extensive air and missile defenses. In so doing he assesses in simple terms the various factors involved in this complex and difficult subject. While many books on strategy deal only with a single area or a particular weapons system, this work synthesizes technical and non-technical considerations across the whole range of national security issues affected by strategic power-war-fighting, deterrence, Communist behavior, alliance relationships, nuclear proliferation, and arms control. Its orderly and authoritative marshaling of tabulated data, its citations from Department of Defense documents and congressional hearings, and its classifications of the alternative options which strategy makers can now pursue, are all invaluable to both the student of national security and the professional strategist.