The 9/11 Commission investigating the September 11, 2001, attacks concluded that the nationOCOs intelligence community had failed to OCyconnect the dots, OCO thus ushering in the era of homeland security. As a result state and local fusion centers emerged; however, there is little research available addressing either their activities or effectiveness. Joyal explores these and related issues. Drawing upon the perceptions of those working in and closely with state fusion centers, particularly law enforcement, it appears that fusion centers are successful in improving law enforcementOCOs ability to collect and share information; however, they continue to struggle with several challenges, namely developing robust analytical capabilities and overcoming persistent subcultural obstacles."
The United States has poured over a billion dollars into a network of interagency intelligence centers called “fusion centers.” These centers were ostensibly set up to prevent terrorism, but politicians, the press, and policy advocates have criticized them for failing on this account. So why do these security systems persist? Pacifying the Homeland travels inside the secret world of intelligence fusion, looks beyond the apparent failure of fusion centers, and reveals a broader shift away from mass incarceration and toward a more surveillance- and police-intensive system of social regulation. Provided with unprecedented access to domestic intelligence centers, Brendan McQuade uncovers how the institutionalization of intelligence fusion enables decarceration without fully addressing the underlying social problems at the root of mass incarceration. The result is a startling analysis that contributes to the debates on surveillance, mass incarceration, and policing and challenges readers to see surveillance, policing, mass incarceration, and the security state in an entirely new light.
Contents: (1) Increase in Precursor Crimes: Causes; Decline in State Sponsorship; Amateurization of Terror; Shift in Threat Environ.; Enhanced Counterterrorism Measures; (2) Ex. of Terrorist Precursor Activity in the U.S.: Front Bus. and Charities; Counterfeiting Money; Counterfeit Goods; Fraud (Benefits, Food Stamps); Narcotics; Smuggling and Import/Export Violations; Bribery; Robbery/Theft; Phone Scams and Cell Phone Activity; Immigration and Identity Crimes; Incitement; Training; Div. of Labor within Terrorist Org.; Potential for Ident. and Infiltration; Fundraising and Longevity of Terror Campaigns; Precursor Crimes¿ Effect on Threat Environ.; (3) Fed. Role, and SLT Role in Intell./Invest. of Crimes; Coord. of Fed. and SLT Efforts.
This Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) Intelligence Guide for First Responders is designed to assist state, local, tribal law enforcement, firefighting, homeland security, and appropriate private sector personnel in accessing and understanding Federal counterterrorism, homeland security, and weapons of mass destruction intelligence reporting. Most of the information contained in this guide was compiled, derived, and adapted from existing Intelligence Community and open source references. The ITACG consists of state, local, and tribal first responders and federal intelligence analysts from the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, working at the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to enhance the sharing of federal counterterrorism, homeland security, and weapons of mass destruction information with state, local, and tribal consumers of intelligence.
This intelligence guide was prepared in response to requests from law enforcement executives for guidance in intelligence functions in a post-September 11 world. It will help law enforcement agencies develop or enhance their intelligence capacity and enable them to fight terrorism and other crimes while preserving community policing relationships. The world of law enforcement intelligence has changed dramatically since September 11, 2001. State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies have been tasked with a variety of new responsibilities; intelligence is just one. In addition, the intelligence discipline has evolved significantly in recent years. As these various trends have merged, increasing numbers of American law enforcement agencies have begun to explore, and sometimes embrace, the intelligence function. This guide is intended to help them in this process. The guide is directed primarily toward state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies of all sizes that need to develop or reinvigorate their intelligence function. Rather than being a manual to teach a person how to be an intelligence analyst, it is directed toward that manager, supervisor, or officer who is assigned to create an intelligence function. It is intended to provide ideas, definitions, concepts, policies, and resources. It is a primera place to start on a new managerial journey. Every law enforcement agency in the United States, regardless of agency size, must have the capacity to understand the implications of information collection, analysis, and intelligence sharing. Each agency must have an organized mechanism to receive and manage intelligence as well as a mechanism to report and share critical information with other law enforcement agencies. In addition, it is essential that law enforcement agencies develop lines of communication and information-sharing protocols with the private sector, particularly those related to the critical infrastructure, as well as with those private entities that are potential targets of terrorists and criminal enterprises. Not every agency has the staff or resources to create a formal intelligence unit, nor is it necessary in smaller agencies. This document will provide common language and processes to develop and employ an intelligence capacity in SLTLE agencies across the United States as well as articulate a uniform understanding of concepts, issues, and terminology for law enforcement intelligence (LEI). While terrorism issues are currently most pervasive in the current discussion of LEI, the principles of intelligence discussed in this document apply beyond terrorism and include organized crime and entrepreneurial crime of all forms. Drug trafficking and the associated crime of money laundering, for example, continue to be a significant challenge for law enforcement. Transnational computer crime, particularly Internet fraud, identity theft cartels, and global black marketeering of stolen and counterfeit goods, are entrepreneurial crime problems that are increasingly being relegated to SLTLE agencies to investigate simply because of the volume of criminal incidents. Similarly, local law enforcement is being increasingly drawn into human trafficking and illegal immigration enterprises and the often associated crimes related to counterfeiting of official documents, such as passports, visas, driver's licenses, Social Security cards, and credit cards. All require an intelligence capacity for SLTLE, as does the continuation of historical organized crime activities such as auto theft, cargo theft, and virtually any other scheme that can produce profit for an organized criminal entity. To be effective, the law enforcement community must interpret intelligence-related language in a consistent manner. In addition, common standards, policies, and practices will help expedite intelligence sharing while at the same time protecting the privacy of citizens and preserving hard-won community policing relationships.~
The value proposition for fusion centres is that by integrating various streams of information and intelligence, including that flowing from the federal government, state, local, and tribal governments, as well as the private sector, a more accurate picture of risks to people, economic infrastructure, and communities can be developed and translated into protective action. The ultimate goal of fusion is to prevent manmade (terrorist) attacks and to respond to natural disasters and manmade threats quickly and efficiently should they occur. As recipients of federal government-provided national intelligence, another goal of fusion centres is to model how events inimical to U.S. interests overseas may be manifested in their communities, and align protective resources accordingly. There are several risks to the fusion centre concept -- including potential privacy and civil liberties violations, and the possible inability of fusion centres to demonstrate utility in the absence of future terrorist attacks, particularly during periods of relative state fiscal austerity. Fusion centres are state-created entities largely financed and staffed by the states, and there is no one "model" for how a centre should be structured. State and local law enforcement and criminal intelligence seem to be at the core of many of the centres.
In the aftermath of 9/11, many law enforcement agencies (LEAs) shifted more resources toward developing counterterrorism (CT) and homeland security (HS) capabilities. This volume examines the effects the focus on CT and HS has had on law enforcement since 9/11, including organizational changes, funding mechanisms, how the shift has affected traditional crime-prevention efforts, and an assessment of benefits, costs, and future challenges.
A comprehensive collection on police and policing, written by experts in political theory, sociology, criminology, economics, law, public health, and critical theory.
FEMA has the statutory authority to deliver numerous disaster and non-disaster financial assistance programs in support of its mission, and that of the Department of Homeland Security, largely through grants and cooperative agreements. These programs account for a significant amount of the federal funds for which FEMA is accountable. FEMA officials are responsible and accountable for the proper administration of these funds pursuant to federal laws and regulations, Office of Management and Budget circulars, and federal appropriations law principles.
