Using the firm-level data set, the paper attempts to examine the dynamic patterns in the allocation of credit across firms in recent Korea. In particular, the paper examines the dynamic patterns in the allocation of credit across large and small firms before and after the crisis. The data suggest that large firms, to some extent, are leaving banks and going to the capital market for their financing after the crisis. The data also suggest that profitable small firms are gaining easier access to the credit from financial institutions after the crisis. Is this shift (in the allocation of bank credit from large firms to small firms) due to lenders' choice or due to borrowers' changed incentives? The paper suggests that the improved lending practices of banks, at least partially, contributed to this shift of bank credit from large firms to small firms.
After years of strong performance, Korea’s economy entered a crisis in 1997, owing largely to structural problems in its financial and corporate sectors. These problems emerged in the second half of that year, when the capital inflows that had helped finance Korea’s growth were reversed, as foreign investors—reeling from losses in other Southeast Asian economies—decided to reduce their exposure to Korea. This paper focuses on the sources of the crisis that originated in the financial sector, the measures taken to deal with it, and the evolution of key banking and financial variables in its aftermath.
First published in 1999, this book explores the question of is the business organisation a result of efficiency or is it a result of a state-business organisation a result of a state-business interaction? This question being in the context of the Korean chaebol system and the Japanese Keiretsu system; this book explores the political and economic growth and then the following down fall of these systems occurred without rupturing either country’s state policy regarding the chaebol or the keiretsu.
Asian business conglomerates have clearly been successful agents of growth, mobilizing capital, borrowing technology from abroad and spearheading Asia's exports. However, these firms have long had a number of organisational and financial weaknesses, including heavy reliance on debt, that make them vulnerable to shocks. Nowhere was this more true than in Korea, where the large corporate groups known as chaebol have dominated the economic landscape. This collection of essays by leading political scientists and economists provides a comprehensive look at the chaebol problem in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. The authors consider the historical evolution of the chaebol and their contribution to the onset of economic turmoil in 1997. The book analyses the government's short-run response to corporate and financial distress, and outlines an agenda for longer-term reform of the financial system, corporate governance and the politics of business-government relations.
Seminar paper from the year 2011 in the subject Economics - Finance, grade: A, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, course: Advanced Macroeconomics, language: English, abstract: What had happened to Korea, and why did the nation have to face the IMF crisis in 1997 all of a sudden? To see what the causes for the crisis were, analyses from six essays of scholars and experts in the field of economics will be introduced and compared. While they have similar and different views for the causes at the same time, their views can be grouped into two categories: internal factors and external factors. When the Korean currency crisis broke out, the IMF and many scholars focused the whole crisis on Korea’s internal problems. However, there are many other scholars who attribute the causes not only to internal but also to external problems. The experts who see the causes as internal problems think the crisis originated from internal factors of Korea such as policy mistakes, highly leveraged corporate sectors, and banking system. The external factors refer to the external shocks such as contagion effect from South-east financial crisis and appreciation of Japanese yen. Although all the causes for the crisis are closely related with each other, addressing the causes separately would give people better understanding of the context. On Nov. 1997, Korea faced the IMF crisis, or also known as the financial crisis, which caused severe damage to the Korean economy. The new OECD member was reduced from being the world’s eleventh largest economy to an economy surviving on overnight loans from the international money markets. The won, the Korean currency, fell by more than 50 percent against the US dollar. Also, KOSPI (the Korea Composite Stock Price Index) fell by thirty percent, and the short-term interest rate shot up to forty percent per year. Consequently, on Dec. 1997, Korea called the IMF for rescue, owing $58.3 billion of financial aid. As shown in table 1 and 2 in the appendix 1, Korea had performed continual rapid GDP growth at the rate of 7.8 percent per year in average from 1960 to 1997.
This volume connects the evolving modern financial systems of China, Japan, and Korea to the development and growth of their economies through the first decade of the twenty-first century. It also identifies the commonalities among all three systems while taking into account their social, political, and institutional differences. Essays consider the reform of the Chinese economy since 1978, the underwhelming performance of the Japanese economy since about 1990, and the growth of the Korean economy over the past three decades. These economies engaged in rapid catch-up growth processes and share similar economic structures. While domestic forces have driven each country’s financial trajectory, international short-term financial flows have presented opportunities and challenges for all. For these countries, the nature and role of the financial system in generating real economic growth is integral, though nuanced and complex. The result is a fascinating spectrum of experiences with powerful takeaways.
The 1997 South Korean financial crisis not only shook the country itself but also sent shock waves through the financial world at large. This impressive book critically assesses the conventional wisdom surrounding the Korean crisis and the performance of the IMF-sponsored reform programme.Looking first at the strengths and weaknesses of 'Korea Inc.
This paper analyzes some of the structural problems associated with the Korean financial sector, and investigates whether the financial system has allocated credit in an efficient way over the past three decades. Using data for 32 manufacturing sectors, we find no evidence that credit flows were directed to the relatively more profitable sectors, either before or after the financial reforms. We also find that the flow of credits did not contribute to improve the economic performance of the favored industries over time.
For many years up until 1997, Korea was widely seen in economic and financial circles as something of a miracle. The financial crisis that Korea experienced then did much to set its economy back, but by 2001 it was still the 13th largest economy in terms of GDP in the world. This enticing collection, with contributions from experts with an impressive knowledge of Korea and its economy, charts not only the well documented causes of the crisis, but more importantly, its response and recovery from it. With an admirable scholarly rigour, the book covers such topics as: *the origin and evolution of the Korean economic system and its special factors including chaebols *Korean industries since the crisis *What happened to the money after the capital flight of the crisis and did the USA benefit? "The Korean Economy at the" "Crossroads" is intended and recommended not only for students and academics involved in international finance, economics and Asian studies, but also for the business leaders and policy makers who can draw lessons from the books important analyses.
