A reprint of the Harvard U. Press edition of 1977, this book analyzes one element in American cold war decision making--military advice and influence on the use of force--and considers how the proportion of military influence, relative to that of civilian advisers, has varied since WWII. Includes a new preface and epilogue to this edition. Paper edition (07469-7), $16.50. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
While American national security policy has grown more interventionist since the Cold War, Washington has also hoped to shape the world on the cheap. Misled by the stunning success against Iraq in 1991, administrations of both parties have pursued ambitious aims with limited force, committing the country's military frequently yet often hesitantly, with inconsistent justification. These ventures have produced strategic confusion, unplanned entanglements, and indecisive results. This collection of essays by Richard K. Betts, a leading international politics scholar, investigates the use of American force since the end of the Cold War, suggesting guidelines for making it more selective and successful. Betts brings his extensive knowledge of twentieth century American diplomatic and military history to bear on the full range of theory and practice in national security, surveying the Cold War roots of recent initiatives and arguing that U.S. policy has always been more unilateral than liberal theorists claim. He exposes mistakes made by humanitarian interventions and peace operations; reviews the issues raised by terrorism and the use of modern nuclear, biological, and cyber weapons; evaluates the case for preventive war, which almost always proves wrong; weighs the lessons learned from campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam; assesses the rise of China and the resurgence of Russia; quells concerns about civil-military relations; exposes anomalies within recent defense budgets; and confronts the practical barriers to effective strategy. Betts ultimately argues for greater caution and restraint, while encouraging more decisive action when force is required, and he recommends a more dispassionate assessment of national security interests, even in the face of global instability and unfamiliar threats.
In 1950, when he commissioned the first edition of The Armed Forces Officer, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall told its author, S.L.A. Marshall, that "American military officers, of whatever service, should share common ground ethically and morally." In this new edition, the authors methodically explore that common ground, reflecting on the basics of the Profession of Arms, and the officer's special place and distinctive obligations within that profession and especially to the Constitution.
In a career that paralleled the emergence of the United States as an international power, Marshall was a participant in every significant event contributing to the nation's status as a superpower. From his first combat duty in the Philippines at the turn of the century, through both World Wars, into the cold war and the Korean conflict, Marshall was a key figure in devising and implementing US military strategies and foreign policies. Stoler emphasizes the years 1939-1951, when Marshall served as World War II army chief of staff, special presidential representative to China, secretary of state at the beginning of the cold war and Korean War secretary of defense. The book is unique in its merging of military and diplomatic history with biography. It includes a chronology and a bibliographic essay. “Drawing on more detailed works, supplemented by his sound judgments based on his own careful research, Stoler has successfully caught the spirit of the man and his work.” — Forrest C. Pogue, official biographer of Marshall, former director of the George C. Marshall Foundation “Useful, fascinating and very informative... Stoler illuminates many historical debates and events...” — David Eisenhower, author of Eisenhower at War: 1943-1945 “A very readable book based on the most recent scholarship and presented in a way that students can understand.” — Michael J. Hogan, Ohio State University “In a skillful work of compression and synthesis, Mark A. Stoler... sets himself an ambitious dual task: to render comprehensible the life of an individual almost no one knew well and to ground this life firmly in the context of the revolution in American foreign relations during the first half of the twentieth century. The enterprise succeeds admirably, partly because Marshall’s career lends itself to such treatment and partly because Stoler demonstrates a flair for selecting the essential from the immaterial.” — H. W. Brands, The American Historical Review “This is the best available one-volume biography of this distinguished man... Stoler demonstrates Marshall’s intellectual growth as he came to understand international politics and the limits of power.” — Daniel R. Beaver, The Historian “[A] richly researched and balanced assessment... Stoler’s insights into Marshall are many and valuable. He perfectly captures his sterling integrity and the extent of his exemplary nonpartisanship... this is the best single-volume about a true hero.” — Barry F. Machado, The Journal of Military History “[A]n excellent book... There have been short one-volume biographies of Marshall before, but this is the best of the lot... Among the strengths of Stoler’s treatment are his careful exposition of the factors in Marshall’s youth crucial to the formation of his character, the importance of his various experiences with the National Guard, the Plattsburg volunteers, and the Civilian Conservation Corps in conditioning his faith in citizen soldiers, and the formative role of his professional education at the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth and the Infantry School at Fort Benning.” — I. B. Holley, Jr., The Journal of American History “[Stoler] is able to present the issues faced by the new chief of staff lucidly and with great insight... In sum, Professor Stoler, with style and verve, has produced an excellent summary volume on George C. Marshall and his times... the book [is] insightful, readable, provocative, and manageable. I highly recommend it.” — Douglas Kinnard, Naval War College Review “[T]he book breaks through the general’s deliberately cultivated stoic persona and demonstrates the humanity that made him so admired in public and private. Stoler’s work stands as a model of its genre, a concise study that incorporates themes from the large body of current scholarship in the field without ever losing sight of its central character... Stoler captures the complexity of the man and his times in a book that is a pleasure to read.” — Donald A. Ritchie, The Oral History Review “This is a useful volume for those who lack the time to read all four volumes of Forrest Pogue’s biography.” — Gaddis Smith, Foreign Affairs
"Power and Military Effectiveness is an instructive reassessment of the increasingly popular belief that military success is one of democracy's many virtues. International relations scholars, policy makers, and military minds will be well served by its lessons."--BOOK JACKET.
For more than 40 years, U.S. defense policy and the design of military capabilities were driven by the threat to national security posed by the Soviet Union and its allies. As the Soviet Union collapsed, analysts wondered what effect this dramatic change would have upon defense policy and the military capabilities designed to support it. Strangely enough, this development would ultimately have little effect on our defense policy. Over a decade later, American forces are a smaller, but similar version of their Cold War predecessors. The author argues that, despite many suggestions for significant change, the bureaucratic inertia of comfortable military elites has dominated the defense policy debate and preserved the status quo with only minor exceptions. This inertia raises the danger that American military capabilities will be inadequate for future warfare in the information age. In addition, such legacy forces are inefficient and inappropriately designed for the demands of frequent and important antiterrorist and peace operations. Lacquement offers extensive analysis concerning the defense policymaking process from 1989 to 2001, including in particular the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. This important study also provides a set of targeted policy recommendations that can help solve the identified problems in preparing for future wars and in better training for peace operations.
This volume examines US Army Special Forces efforts to mobilize and train indigenous minorities in Vietnam. Christopher K. Ives shows how before the Second Indochina War, the Republic of Vietnam had begun to falter under the burden of an increasingly successful insurgency. The dominant American military culture could not conform to President Kennedy’s guidance to wage 'small wars', while President Diem’s provincial and military structures provided neither assistance nor security. The Green Berets developed and executed effective counterinsurgency tactics and operations with strategic implications while living, training, and finally fighting with the Montagnard peoples in the Central Highlands. Special Forces soldiers developed and executed what needed to be done to mobilize indigenous minorities, having assessed what needed to be known. Combining Clausewitz, business theory and strategic insight, this book provides an important starting point for thinking about how the US military should be approaching the problems of today's ‘small wars’. US Special Forces and Counterinsurgency in Vietnam will be of much interest to students of the Vietnam War, Special Forces operations, military innovation and strategic theory in general.
How nonstate military strategies overturn traditional perspectives on warfare Since September 11th, 2001, armed nonstate actors have received increased attention and discussion from scholars, policymakers, and the military. Underlying debates about nonstate warfare and how it should be countered is one crucial assumption: that state and nonstate actors fight very differently. In Nonstate Warfare, Stephen Biddle upturns this distinction, arguing that there is actually nothing intrinsic separating state or nonstate military behavior. Through an in-depth look at nonstate military conduct, Biddle shows that many nonstate armies now fight more "conventionally" than many state armies, and that the internal politics of nonstate actors—their institutional maturity and wartime stakes rather than their material weapons or equipment—determines tactics and strategies. Biddle frames nonstate and state methods along a continuum, spanning Fabian-style irregular warfare to Napoleonic-style warfare involving massed armies, and he presents a systematic theory to explain any given nonstate actor’s position on this spectrum. Showing that most warfare for at least a century has kept to the blended middle of the spectrum, Biddle argues that material and tribal culture explanations for nonstate warfare methods do not adequately explain observed patterns of warmaking. Investigating a range of historical examples from Lebanon and Iraq to Somalia, Croatia, and the Vietcong, Biddle demonstrates that viewing state and nonstate warfighting as mutually exclusive can lead to errors in policy and scholarship. A comprehensive account of combat methods and military rationale, Nonstate Warfare offers a new understanding for wartime military behavior.
General Adams reflects on his experiences in the cold war, during which he served in both manned bombers and missile silos. He tells stories of famous and not-so-famous cold warriors, including some from the US Navy. Some stories are humorous; some stories are tragic. Having traveled extensively in Russia and some former Soviet Union states after retirement, General Adams tells us about his former adversaries, the Soviet cold warriors. In the process, he leaves no doubt about his respect for all who served so valiantly in the "strategic triad"-- the strategic command, the ICBM force, and the submarine Navy.
