This volume explores the social and political forces behind constitution making from a global perspective. It combines leading theoretical perspectives on the social and political foundations of constitutions with a range of in-depth case studies on constitution making in nineteen countries. The result is an examination of constitutions as social phenomena and their interaction with other social phenomena, from various perspectives in the social sciences.
The long revolutionary movements that gave birth to constitutional democracies in the Americas were founded on egalitarian constitutional ideals. They claimed that all men were created equal with similar capacities and also that the community should become self-governing. Following the first constitutional debates that took place in the region, these promising egalitarian claims, which gave legitimacy to the revolutions, soon fell out of favor. Advocates of a conservative order challenged both ideals and favored constitutions that established religion and created an exclusionary political structure. Liberals proposed constitutions that protected individual autonomy and rights but established severe restrictions on the principle of majority rule. Radicals favored an openly majoritarian constitutional organization that, according to many, directly threatened the protection of individual rights. This book examines the influence of these opposite views during the 'founding period' of constitutionalism in countries including the United States, Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela.
Constitutionalization of world politics is emerging as an unintended consequence of international treaty making driven by the logic of democratic power. The analysis will appeal to scholars of International Relations and International Law interested in international cooperation, as well as institutional and constitutional theory and practice.
This study locates the principles of the United States Constitution in the political philosophy of colonial New England, Puritan practices and the ideals of English personal rights and limited government common to all of the colonies.
A distinguished international team of legal theorists examine the issue of constitutionalism and pose such foundational questions as Why have a constitution? How do we know what the constitution of a country really is? How should a constitution be interpreted? Why should one generation feel bound by the constitution of an earlier one?The volume will be of particular importance to those in philosophy, law, political science and international relations interested in whether and what kinds of constitutions should be adopted in countries without them, and involved in debates about constitutional interpretation.
Using a methodology that both analyzes particular constitutional texts and theories and reconstructs their historical evolution, Chris Thornhill examines the social role and legitimating status of constitutions from the first quasi-constitutional documents of medieval Europe, through the classical period of revolutionary constitutionalism, to recent processes of constitutional transition. A Sociology of Constitutions explores the reasons why modern societies require constitutions and constitutional norms and presents a distinctive socio-normative analysis of the constitutional preconditions of political legitimacy.
Over the last forty years modern constitutional scholarship has concentrated on an analysis of rights, while principles of constitutional law concerning the structure of government have been largely down-played. The irony of this interpretive emphasis is that the body of the Constitution contains relatively little dealing directly with rights. Rather, it is primarily a blueprint for the establishment of a complex form of federal-democratic structure. The Constitution as Political Structure emphasizes the central role served by the structural portions of the Constitution. Redish argues that these structural values were designed to provide the framework in which our rights-based system may flourish, and that judicial abandonment of these structural values threatens the very foundations of American political theory. In its exposition of the textual and theoretical rationales for judicial enforcement of the structural values embodied in the Constitution, this book presents a principled alternative to the extremes of judicial abdication articulated by certain scholars and Justices on the one hand, and the result-oriented ideological involvement advocated in some quarters on the other. This work will be of great interest to scholars of law and political science.
Edward S. Corwin is the twentieth century's most eminent commentator on the Constitution. Unfortunately, he died before he could write the single definitive work on the Constitution he had planned. In three volumes, of which this is the first, Richard Loss has edited and introduced major essays by Corwin that best delineate his argument in political thought and constitutional law. The essays in Volume One examine the foundations of American political and constitutional thought, the powers of Congress, and the President's power of removal. Corwin addresses topics that vary from "The Worship of the Constitution" to "The Constitution as Instrument and Symbol." He discusses the lessons of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, takes up the relationship of the Constitution to New Deal democracy, and examines democratic dogma and political science. A fascinating essay treating the theory of evolution shows how this idea replaced the idea of natural law in American constitutional tradition. Loss's introduction provides a biographical sketch of Corwin, elaborates and appraises his argument and characterizes Corwin's legacy to the present generation of scholars. Loss shows that far from ending debate, Corwin's essays on political thought and the removal power establish an intellectual agenda for further inquiry into the tenets of constitutional law. In an epilogue Loss deals with Corwin's understanding of Alexander Hamilton's position on the President's removal power, an important topic involving not only presidential prerogative, but the comparative rank of Hamilton's Federalist papers on the presidency and Hamilton's Pacificus letters. Corwin on the Constitution will be of particular interest to judges, historians, law teachers, political scientists, students of constitutional law and American political thought.
A bold argument that constitutional states are not weaker because their powers are divided -- they are often stronger because they solve collective action problems rooted in speech and communication.
Constitutional law has been and remains an area of intense philosophical interest, and yet the debate has taken place in a variety of different fields with very little to connect them. In a collection of essays bringing together scholars from several constitutional systems and disciplines, Philosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law unites the debate in a study of the philosophical issues at the very foundations of the idea of a constitution: why one might be necessary; what problems it must address; what problems constitutions usually address; and some of the issues raised by the administration of a constitutional regime. Although these issues of institutional design are of abiding importance, many of them have taken on new significance in the last few years as law-makers have been forced to return to first principles in order to justify novel practices and arrangements in their constitutional orders. Thus, questions of constitutional 'revolutions', challenges to the demands of the rule of law, and the separation of powers have taken on new and pressing importance. The essays in this volume address these questions, filling the gap in the philosophical analysis of constitutional law. The volume will provoke specialists in philosophy, politics, and law to develop new philosophically grounded analyses of constitutional law, and will be a valuable resource for graduate students in law, politics, and philosophy.
