Signal was the most widely circulated magazine in Europe during the Second World War. Published under the auspices of the Wehrmacht and supervised by Goebbels' Ministry of Propaganda, Signal was distributed in twenty languages throughout occupied Europe between 1940 and 1945. Signal was meant for the consumption of the people of occupied Europe to show them the excellent conditions of life in Germany and the power and might of German armed forces in Europe and North Africa. The pages from Signal which are shown here are taken from its English edition, produced originally for the United States and Ireland.
Among the many controversies of World War II, prominent is the debate over Germany's strategy in the north of the Soviet Union, as the tide of war turned, and gigantic Russian armies began to close in on Berlin. In this long-awaited work, Henrik Lunde--former U.S. Special Forces officer and author of renowned previous works on the campaigns in Norway and Finland--turns his sights to the withdrawal of Army Group North. Providing cool-headed analysis to the problem, the author first acknowledges that Hitler--often accused of holding onto ground for the sake of it--had valid reasons in this instance to maintain control of the Baltic coast. Without it, his supply of iron ore from Sweden would have been cut off, German naval (U-boat) bases would have been compromised, and an entire simpatico area of Europe--including East Prussia--would have been forsaken. On the other hand, Germany's maintaining control of the Baltic would have meant convenient supply for forces on the coast--or evacuation if necessary--and perhaps most important, remaining German defensive pockets behind the Soviets' main drive to Europe would tie down disproportionate offensive forces. Stalwart German forces remaining on the coast and on their flank could break the Soviet tidal wave. However, unlike during today's military planning, the German high command, in a situation that changed by the month, had to make quick decisions and gamble, with the fate of hundreds of thousands of troops and the entire nation at stake on quickly decided throws of their dice. As Henrik Lunde carefully details in this work, Hitler guessed wrong. By leaving four entire battle-hardened armies in isolation along the Baltic, the Soviets pulling up to the Oder River encountered weaker opposition than they had a right to expect. Having economic (or aid) resources of their own, they cared little for Hitler's own supply line and instead simply lunged at his center of power: Berlin. Once that was taken the remaining German pockets could be wiped out. The Germans deprived themselves of many of their strongest forces when they most needed them, and the climactic battle for their capital took place. In this book, both combats and strategy are described in the final stages of the fighting in the Northern Theater, with Lunde's even-handed analysis of the campaign a reward to every student of World War II. REVIEWS "... tackles "five exceedingly complicated and interrelated subjects to examine and understand Hitler's decision to defend the Baltic States at all costs." They are: military strategy; Hitler's strategic thinking; changing conditions affecting opposing forces; Hitler's fascination with Scandinavia and the Baltic Region; and the validity of Hitler's stated reasons for refusing to withdraw from the Baltic. In his short concluding chapter, Lunde addresses and debunks the validity of the reasons put forth by Hitler for his unshakeable attachment to the defense of the Baltic Region and Scandinavia." Henry Gole, author of Soldiering, The Road to Rainbow, and co-author of Exposing the Third Reich: Colonel Truman Smith in Hitler's Germany "...a detailed examination of one of the worst of Hitler's many bad decisions in the later years of the Second World War, and a valuable addition to the literature on the fighting on the Eastern Front." History of War "In Hitler's Wave-Breaker Concept, historian and former US Special Forces officer Henrik Lunde undertakes a sober, much-needed corrective evaluation of Hitler's military decisions, with a stress on the defensive actions of Army Group North after the attempt to defeat the Soviet Union had disintegrated."--Michigan War Studies Review The lessons for political masters and military commanders in this book are numerous and they speak to the challenges of juggling operational and strategic balls concurrently. Lunde has written a very telling book about a region and a campaign that did not adjust to the changing strategic and operational realities on the ground. Casemate has published a high quality book and I would strongly recommend it for those interested in further appreciating the multi-faceted approach required in the interaction between international relations and military operations. War History Online
Winner of both the National Book Award for Arts and Letters and the National Book Critics Circle Award for Criticism, Paul Fussell's The Great War and Modern Memory was one of the most original and gripping volumes ever written about the First World War. Frank Kermode, in The New York Times Book Review, hailed it as "an important contribution to our understanding of how we came to make World War I part of our minds," and Lionel Trilling called it simply "one of the most deeply moving books I have read in a long time." In its panaramic scope and poetic intensity, it illuminated a war that changed a generation and revolutionized the way we see the world. Now, in Wartime, Fussell turns to the Second World War, the conflict he himself fought in, to weave a narrative that is both more intensely personal and more wide-ranging. Whereas his former book focused primarily on literary figures, on the image of the Great War in literature, here Fussell examines the immediate impact of the war on common soldiers and civilians. He describes the psychological and emotional atmosphere of World War II. He analyzes the euphemisms people needed to deal with unacceptable reality (the early belief, for instance, that the war could be won by "precision bombing," that is, by long distance); he describes the abnormally intense frustration of desire and some of the means by which desire was satisfied; and, most important, he emphasizes the damage the war did to intellect, discrimination, honesty, individuality, complexity, ambiguity and wit. Of course, no Fussell book would be complete without some serious discussion of the literature of the time. He examines, for instance, how the great privations of wartime (when oranges would be raffled off as valued prizes) resulted in roccoco prose styles that dwelt longingly on lavish dinners, and how the "high-mindedness" of the era and the almost pathological need to "accentuate the positive" led to the downfall of the acerbic H.L. Mencken and the ascent of E.B. White. He also offers astute commentary on Edmund Wilson's argument with Archibald MacLeish, Cyril Connolly's Horizon magazine, the war poetry of Randall Jarrell and Louis Simpson, and many other aspects of the wartime literary world. Fussell conveys the essence of that wartime as no other writer before him. For the past fifty years, the Allied War has been sanitized and romanticized almost beyond recognition by "the sentimental, the loony patriotic, the ignorant, and the bloodthirsty." Americans, he says, have never understood what the Second World War was really like. In this stunning volume, he offers such an understanding.
Despite the enduring popular image of the blitzkrieg of World War II, the German Army always depended on horses. It could not have waged war without them. While the Army’s reliance on draft horses to pull artillery, supply wagons, and field kitchens is now generally acknowledged, D. R. Dorondo’s Riders of the Apocalypse examines the history of the German cavalry, a combat arm that not only survived World War I but also rode to war again in 1939. Though concentrating on the period between 1939 and 1945, the book places that history firmly within the larger context of the mounted arm’s development from the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 to the Third Reich’s surrender. Driven by both internal and external constraints to retain mounted forces after 1918, the German Army effectively did nothing to reduce, much less eliminate, the preponderance of non-mechanized formations during its breakneck expansion under the Nazis after 1933. Instead, politicized command decisions, technical insufficiency, industrial bottlenecks, and, finally, wartime attrition meant that Army leaders were compelled to rely on a steadily growing number of combat horsemen throughout World War II. These horsemen were best represented by the 1st Cavalry Brigade (later Division) which saw combat in Poland, the Netherlands, France, Russia, and Hungary. Their service, however, came to be cruelly dishonored by the horsemen of the 8th Waffen-SS Cavalry Division, a unit whose troopers spent more time killing civilians than fighting enemy soldiers. Throughout the story of these formations, and drawing extensively on both primary and secondary sources, Dorondo shows how the cavalry’s tradition carried on in a German and European world undergoing rapid military industrialization after the mid-nineteenth century. And though Riders of the Apocalypse focuses on the German element of this tradition, it also notes other countries’ continuing (and, in the case of Russia, much more extensive) use of combat horsemen after 1900. However, precisely because the Nazi regime devoted so much effort to portray Germany’s armed forces as fully modern and mechanized, the combat effectiveness of so many German horsemen on the battlefields of Europe until 1945 remains a story that deserves to be more widely known. Dorondo’s work does much to tell that story.
Manliness has always been linked to physical prowess and to war; indeed the warrior has been the archetypal man across countless cultures throughout time. In this magisterial excursion through literature, history, warfare, and sociology, one of our most prominent scholars tracks the complex relationship between the changing methods and goals of warfare and shifting models of manhood. This journey takes us from the citizen soldiers of ancient Greece to the medieval knights to the misogynistic terrorists of Al Qaeda. As he chronicles these transformations, Leo Braudy weighs the significance of everything from weapon technology to the hairstyles favored during different eras. He offers fresh insights on codes of war and codes of racial purity, and on cultural and historical figures from Socrates to Don Quixote to Napoleon to Custer to Rambo. Epic in scope and free of academic jargon, From Chivalry to Terrorism is a masterwork of scholarship that is both accessible and breathtakingly ambitious.
In this thrilling story, three unlikely people attempt to rescue a small sick child who is being subjected to Hitler's genetic research in 1939 Nazi Germany. Even though the story is fictional, the historical accuracy opens a window into the darkness of the Nazi era.
