Whilst feminist philosophy has frequently engaged with political theory, this original book instead considers legal theory and the practical operation of law. The work considers some of the contested meanings of what it is to be a self, a person or an individual in relation to the law of obligations. The discussion still impacts upon political theory as it concerns the way in which the question of what it is to be a woman has been defined within recent feminist theory. In order to overcome what appears to be a block in feminist legal theory, the book draws together areas of philosophy which are not normally considered within feminist or legal theory.
It is both an ideal and an assumption of traditional conceptions of justice for liberal democracies that citizens are autonomous, self-governing persons. Yet standard accounts of the self and of self-government at work in such theories are hotly disputed and often roundly criticized in most of their guises. John Christman offers a sustained critical analysis of both the idea of the 'self' and of autonomy as these ideas function in political theory, offering interpretations of these ideas which avoid such disputes and withstand such criticisms. Christman's model of individual autonomy takes into account the socially constructed nature of persons and their complex cultural and social identities, and he shows how this model can provide a foundation for principles of justice for complex democracies marked by radical difference among citizens. His book will interest a wide range of readers in philosophy, politics, and the social sciences.
Presents a synoptic survey of human life in its personal, social, and mythical dimensions, drawing from a variety of sources. McIntosh asserts that no major aspect of human life can be adequately understood except in the context of the whole; thus, understanding the self, others, and the world requires an intermingling of conscious and unconscious levels of thought and awareness. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
Jonardon Ganeri presents a ground-breaking study of selfhood, drawing on Indian theories of consciousness and mind. He explores the notion of embodiment and the centrality of the emotions to the self, and shows how to harmonize the idea of the first-person perspective with a naturalist worldview which encompasses the normative.
A notable contribution to our understanding of ourselves. This book explores the realm of human behavior in social situations and the way that we appear to others. Dr. Goffman uses the metaphor of theatrical performance as a framework. Each person in everyday social intercourse presents himself and his activity to others, attempts to guide and cotnrol the impressions they form of him, and employs certain techniques in order to sustain his performance, just as an actor presents a character to an audience. The discussions of these social techniques offered here are based upon detailed research and observation of social customs in many regions.
From the mysterious powers and forces peculiar to both individual and community that can turn our lives into either good or bad lives, I wish to point to two such powers being at the same time different in their own nature and yet closely related to each other: The powers that emerge from exemplary persons and leaders. Understood as basic to both sociology and the philosophy of history, it comes to us as no surprise that the problem of exemplary persons and leaders - along with the questions of the qualities types, selections and education of leaders; forms of unison existing be tween leaders and their followers, all of which belonging to the subdivisions of this problem - must be a burning problem for a people whose historical leaders from all walks of life have, in part, been swept away by wars and revolutions. This fact we also find in all salient epochs of history characterized more or less by changes in leadership. It is precisely for this reason that in our own time every group appears to struggle ever so hard with this problem, namely, who their leaders should be. This pertains equally to a group within a party, to a class, to occupations, to unions, to various schools or present-day youth movements, and even to religious and ecclesias tical groupings. Beyond any comparison, there is yearning everywhere for lead ership.
This book is a sequel to Self as Body in Asian Theory and Practice (SUNY, 1992) and anticipates a third book, Self as Image in Asian Theory and Practice. In order to address issues as diverse as the promotion of human rights or the resolution of sexism in ways that avoid inadvertent lapses into cultural chauvinism, alternative cultural perspectives that begin from differing conceptions of self and self-realization must be articulated and respected. This book explores the articulation of personal character within the disparate cultural experiences of Japan, China, and South Asia.
This book offers both a naturalistic and critical theory of signs, minds, and meaning-in-the-world. It provides a reconstructive rather than deconstructive theory of the individual, one which both analytically separates and theoretically synthesizes a range of faculties that are often confused and conflated: agency (understood as a causal capacity), subjectivity (understood as a representational capacity), selfhood (understood as a reflexive capacity), and personhood (understood as a sociopolitical capacity attendant on being an agent, subject, or self). It argues that these facilities are best understood from a semiotic stance that supersedes the usual intentional stance. And, in so doing, it offers a pragmatism-grounded approach to meaning and mediation that is general enough to account for processes that are as embodied and embedded as they are articulated and enminded. In particular, while this theory is focused on human-specific modes of meaning, it also offers a general theory of meaning, such that the agents, subjects and selves in question need not always, or even usually, map onto persons. And while this theory foregrounds agents, persons, subjects and selves, it does this by theorizing processes that often remain in the background of such (often erroneously) individuated figures: ontologies (akin to culture, but generalized across agentive collectivities), interaction (not only between people, but also between people and things, and anything outside or in-between), and infrastructure (akin to context, but generalized to include mediation at any degree of remove).
Recent Western thought has consistently emphasized the individualistic strand in our understanding of persons at the expense of the social strand. Thus, it is generally thought that persons are self-determining and autonomous, where these are understood to be capacities we exercise most fully on our own, apart from others, whose influence on us tends to undermine that autonomy. Love, Friendship, and the Self argues that we must reject a strongly individualistic conception of persons if we are to make sense of significant interpersonal relationships and the importance they can have in our lives. It presents a new account of love as intimate identification and of friendship as a kind of plural agency, in each case grounding and analyzing these notions in terms of interpersonal emotions. At the center of this account is an analysis of how our emotional connectedness with others is essential to our very capacities for autonomy and self-determination: we are rational and autonomous only because of and through our inherently social nature. By focusing on the role that relationships of love and friendship have both in the initial formation of our selves and in the on-going development and maturation of adult persons, Helm significantly alters our understanding of persons and the kind of psychology we persons have as moral and social beings.
