Designed to suit a variety of two or three credit courses and seminars, the casebook is being used to teach (1) courses in "securities litigation" that examine litigation topics under the Exchange Act and the Securities Act; (2) courses in "securities enforcement" that center on SEC and criminal enforcement, market manipulation, insider trading, and the professional responsibilities of attorneys and accountants; and (3) more specialized courses or seminars that build around the theme of "current topics in securities litigation."
In class actions, attorneys effectively hire clients rather than act as their agent. Lawyer-financed, lawyer-controlled, and lawyer-settled, this entrepreneurial litigation invites lawyers to act in their own interest. John Coffee’s goal is to save class action, not discard it, and to make private enforcement of law more democratically accountable.
This book provides you with the guidance you need to protect your clients' confidential information while facing disclosure and liability concerns under the securities laws.
"This book focuses on a very timely and important subject that merit s comprehensive analysis: "rethinking" the securities laws, with particular emphasis on the Securities Act and Securities Exchange Act. The system of securities regulation that prevails today in the United States is one that has been formed through piecemeal federal legislation, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in vocation of its administrative authority, and self-regulatory episodic action. As a consequence, the presence of consistent and logical regulation all too often is lacking. In both transactional and litigation settings, with frequency, mandates apply that are erratic and antithetical to sound public policy. Over four decades ago, the American Law Institute (ALI) adopted the ALI Federal Securities Code. The Code has not been enacted by Congress and its prospects are dim. Since that time, no treatise, monograph, or other source comprehensively has focused on this meritorious subject. The objective of this book is to identify the deficiencies that exist under the current regimen, address their failings, provide recommendations for rectifying these deficiencies, and set forth a thorough analysis for remediation in order to prescribe a consistent and sound securities law framework. By undertaking this challenge, the book provides an original and valuable resource for effectuating necessary law reform that should prove beneficial to the integrity of the U.S. capital markets, effective and fair government and private enforcement, and the enhancement of investor protection"--
"This Hornbook is aimed primarily at law students. It is a substantial abridgement of my four-volume Treatise on the law of securities regulation"--P. ix.
In Securities Regulation Reassessed, Paul Mahoney shows that policy responses to financial crises are broadly similar across place and time: political actors, hoping to avoid blame for a financial crisis, create a narrative of market failure, arguing that misbehavior by securities market participants, rather than prior policy errors, is the primary cause of the crisis. Politically obliged regulators craft reforms that purport to solve problems which are either non-existent or only tangentially related to the crisis; yet they increase the complexity and expense of compliance, resulting in consolidation and concentration of market share in the hands of already leading financial firms. Securities Regulation Reassessed illustrates these points primarily but not exclusively with evidence from the New Deal-era securities reforms in the United States. Against the conventional wisdom that regards the New Deal reforms as successful, Mahoney provides substantial countervailing evidence, showing instead that Congress’s diagnoses were systematically inaccurate and its remedies reduced competition in the securities industry. Looking farther into history, the work treats several key episodes prior to the New Deal, including the English financial crises of 1697 and 1720 and the "blue sky” era of the 1910s and 1920s in the United States. Finally, Mahoney considers the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 from the same analytical perspective. Mahoney finds a predictable pattern for efforts at securities reform: they require huge effort to enact, and yield little objectively measurable payoff and some objectively measurable harm.