This Open Access book analyses the emergence of Russia as a global food power and what it means for global food trade. Russia's strategy for food production and trade has changed significantly since the end of the Soviet period, and this is the first book to take account of Russia's rise as a food power and the global implications of that rise. It includes food trade policy and practice, and developments in regional food trade. This book will be of interest to academics and practitioners in agricultural economics, international trade, and international food trade.
This book examines the Soviet agricultural crisis of 1931-1933 which culminated in the major famine of 1933. It is the first volume in English to make extensive use of Russian and Ukrainian central and local archives to assess the extent and causes of the famine. It reaches new conclusions on how far the famine was 'organized' or 'artificial', and compares it with other Russian and Soviet famines and with major twentieth century famines elsewhere. Against this background, it discusses the emergence of collective farming as an economic and social system.
This book considers the effectiveness of food supply, or the withholding of it, or the threat of withholding it, in winning allies or punishing recalcitrant nations. Paarlberg also debates whether the "weapon of food" has ever been used as an instrument of foreign policy in a consistent manner. He examines past and present grain policies in India, the Soviet Union and the United States, and concludes that this "weapon" has been used very infrequently and that, when used, it has failed. The constraint to the use or success of the food weapon as an instrument of foreign policy is domestic food and farm policy. The author examines and evaluates the instances when food power has been used--such as Jimmy Carter's grain embargo to Afghanistan in the wake of Soviet occupation of that country--but the major finding is that such episodes are rare. ISBN 0-8014-1772-4 (alk. paper): $29.95; ISBN 0-8014-9345-5 (pbk.): $12.95.
"My goal is to show the reader that the Soviet political and economic system was unstable by its very nature. It was just a question of when and how it would collapse...." —From the Introduction to Collapse of an Empire The Soviet Union was an empire in many senses of the word—a vast mix of far-flung regions and accidental citizens by way of conquest or annexation. Typical of such empires, it was built on shaky foundations. That instability made its demise inevitable, asserts Yegor Gaidar, former prime minister of Russia and architect of the "shock therapy" economic reforms of the 1990s. Yet a growing desire to return to the glory days of empire is pushing today's Russia backward into many of the same traps that made the Soviet Union untenable. In this important new book, Gaidar clearly illustrates why Russian nostalgia for empire is dangerous and ill-fated: "Dreams of returning to another era are illusory. Attempts to do so will lead to defeat." Gaidar uses world history, the Soviet experience, and economic analysis to demonstrate why swimming against this tide of history would be a huge mistake. The USSR sowed the seeds of its own economic destruction, and Gaidar worries that Russia is repeating some of those mistakes. Once again, for example, the nation is putting too many eggs into one basket, leaving the nation vulnerable to fluctuations in the energy market. The Soviets had used revenues from energy sales to prop up struggling sectors such as agriculture, which was so thoroughly ravaged by hyperindustrialization that the Soviet Union became a net importer of food. When oil prices dropped in the 1980s, that revenue stream diminished, and dependent sectors suffered heavily. Although strategies requiring austerity or sacrifice can be politically difficult, Russia needs to prepare for such downturns and restrain spending during prosperous times. Collapse of an Empire shows why it is imperative to fix the roof before it starts to rain, and why so
