Until the 1990s, the main users of safeguards and antidumping laws were Australia, Canada, the European Union, and the United States. Since then, many countries have implemented such laws, leading to a proliferation in antidumping and safeguard activity across the world. This timely book documents the political economy surrounding the implementation of these laws in seven Latin American countries and provides details on the institutions created, implementation of the laws, and subsequent activity. It finds that, in the larger political context, antidumping and safeguards are a necessary quid pro quo to certain important sectors to obtain much more liberalized trade policies for the general economy.
The binding of tariff rates and adoption of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization-sanctioned safeguards and antidumping mechanisms provided the basis to remove a multitude of instruments of protection in the Latin American countries discussed in this paper. At the same time, they helped in maintaining centralized control over the management of pressures for protection in agencies with economy-wide accountabilities. The World Trade Organization's procedural requirements (for example, to follow published criteria, or participation by interested parties) helped leaders to change the culture of decision-making from one based on relationships to one based on objective criteria. However, when Latin American governments attempted to introduce economic sense - such as base price comparisons on an economically sensible measure of long-run international price rather than the more generous constructed cost concept that is the core of WTO rules - protection-seekers used the rules against them. They pointed out that World Trade Organization rules do not require the use of such criteria, nor do procedures in leading users (industrial countries) include such criteria. In sum, the administrative content of the rules supported liberalization; the economic content did not.
The binding of tariff rates and adoption of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization-sanctioned safeguards and antidumping mechanisms provided the basis to remove a multitude of instruments of protection in the Latin American countries discussed in this paper. At the same time, they helped in maintaining centralized control over the management of pressures for protection in agencies with economy-wide accountabilities. The World Trade Organization's procedural requirements (for example, to follow published criteria, or participation by interested parties) helped leaders to change the culture of decision-making from one based on relationships to one based on objective criteria. However, when Latin American governments attempted to introduce economic sense - such as base price comparisons on an economically sensible measure of long-run international price rather than the more generous constructed cost concept that is the core of WTO rules - protection-seekers used the rules against them. They pointed out that World Trade Organization rules do not require the use of such criteria, nor do procedures in leading users (industrial countries) include such criteria. In sum, the administrative content of the rules supported liberalization; the economic content did not.
Until the 1990s, the main users of safeguards and antidumping laws were Australia, Canada, the European Union, and the United States. Since then, many countries have implemented such laws, leading to a proliferation in antidumping and safeguard activity across the world. This timely book documents the political economy surrounding the implementation of these laws in seven Latin American countries and provides details on the institutions created, implementation of the laws, and subsequent activity. It finds that, in the larger political context, antidumping and safeguards are a necessary quid pro quo to certain important sectors to obtain much more liberalized trade policies for the general economy.
Abstract: "Beginning in the late 1980s, Argentina implemented a series of reforms that were revolutionary in speed and scope, including trade liberalization. After the implementation of these policies, a record number of antidumping petitions came forward. Under a situation of high inflation, the government reinforced its fiscal and monetary policies by announcing that it would minimize the use of such measures. The flexible disciplines of the existing domestic antidumping regulations facilitated this objective. Later, when the GATT/WTO-sanctioned trade remedies were implemented, the government made a serious attempt to establish discipline by including liberal regulations and creating special institutional arrangements. A presumption built into the construction of the new mechanisms was that adhering to WTO requirements would strengthen the resistance against protection. This presumption turned out to be false. Changing circumstances, including severe peso overvaluation, had significant effects on the number and outcome of antidumping investigations. Regarding safeguards, the government followed the letter and the spirit of the WTO agreement. In relation to the number of petitions, few measures have been implemented. Rejections were based on a concern for consumer costs and on failure of the industry seeking protection to provide a convincing modernization plan. This, plus the fact that some cases were brought to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, have made safeguards a less attractive instrument for protection-seekers than antidumping. An important positive side of the story is that unlike previous balance of payments adjustments, in spite of the major crisis that followed the recent devaluation, the hard-won liberalization has been maintained."--World Bank web site.
This volume examines the interaction between private and public institutions in the trade policy-making process of eight Latin American countries and trade bargaining in sub-regional, hemispheric and multilateral fora. Faced with expanding trade agendas, diversifying negotiation fora, and an uncertain global economy, each country has found its own niche in regional integration and global insertion, providing a wealth of idiosyncratic and convergent policies.
"Mexico's creation and use of safeguard and antidumping processes to advance its liberalization illustrate three key points: (1) The country was able to use the instruments without losing political control. In a period of crisis that threatened congressional approval of critical steps in the liberalization-brought on by currency overvaluation and recession, along with unexpected demands from the United States in the North American Free Trade Agreement negotiations-the government applied a number of trade defense measures. Once the problems were addressed with adequate instruments the number of measures dropped drastically. The instruments had not been captured by protection-seeking interests;
May 1995 Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay undertook extensive trade reform at a time of crisis, at which time institutional reform was difficult to undertake. Many of the countries had become members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in the late 1980s and anticipated institutional reform. Only later did they reform trade policymaking institutions to bring them somewhat in line with trade policy regimes and GATT rules. These countries have all used reference prices and antidumping provisions of GATT, rather than safeguards, to provide relief from import surges. They have all tried to centralize trade policy by moving it from different agencies into a single agency. Despite liberalization, some sectors -- including automobiles, textiles and agriculture -- remain protected. Lessons the author draws from experience in these coutries: 1) the deteriorating macroeconomic situations are the main challenge to maintaining open trade policy; 2) trade policymaking must be constantly reviewed to prevent reversals, and the costs of protection must be communicated to the public at large; 3) There must be short-run measures to help domestic activities adjust to short-run price movements and alleviate pressure for protection. The danger -- such measures (unrelated to long-run price trends) can become permanent. 4) external commitments (through WTO or customs unions) can be used to discourage a return to protection; 5) extending reform (to labor and capital markets and the regulatory framework) will help maintain and extend trade liberalization. Allowing factors of production to move smoothly from one activity to another could help prevent the buildup of pressures that lead to protection; 6) an institution to consider exceptional protection should be advisory (independent of day-to-day trade policymaking), so that it works steadily, free from administrative pressures and exigencies. Requests for protection must be handled openly and transparently, with the findings subject to public scrutiny. Procedures for granting relief through safeguards and similar mechanisms must reflect all interests, including those of consumers, exporters, and users of the product; and 7) the analysis to establish injury must conform to high technical standards. The criteria to consider trade policies must reflect national interests, not those of any particular sector.
"Peru's experience in the application of antidumping and safeguard measures is characterized by a radical change in the philosophy and procedures of trade at the beginning of the 1990s, and by an increasing use of these mechanisms. Trade liberalization was accompanied by the liberalization of foreign currency transactions and of financial and labor markets. Also, the internal revenue administration was modernized, institutions for regulation and competition defense were created, and state enterprises were transferred to private owners or concessionaires. New laws and institutions were created to regulate markets, including INDECOPI, a novel government agency charged with antimonopoly regulation and consumer defense, and which houses the Antidumping and Subsidies Commission. This highly autonomous and technical Commission became the central player in the implementation of WTO rules and procedures for fair trade. Since the reform was launched, a total of 81 trade protection cases have been presented, of which 57 were followed by a dumping investigation. The application of antidumping duties was approved for 29 of the cases investigated. Only two cases of safeguard investigations were recorded, one of which (Chinese textile clothing articles) is still in the negotiation phase. This paper reviews that case experience in detail, concluding that Peru has clearly differentiated between unfair competition and dumping on the one hand, and damage and safeguards on the other, and has applied strict technical criteria to the former and broader political considerations to the latter. Despite recent indications of a partial retreat from those principles, the decade-old reform is expected to last. "-- World Bank web site.
