This book provides an overview of the gas industry and markets in the CIS. This region's strategic importance as one of the largest gas producers has largely been ignored- with the exception of Russia. The book is comprised of 10 country chapters, covering production, decision-making and regulation, domestic market reform, and trade issues.
This book applies a systems and risk perspective on international energy relations, author Per Högselius investigates how and why governments, businesses, engineers and other actors sought to promote – and oppose– the establishment of an extensive East-West natural gas regime that seemed to overthrow the fundamental logic of the Cold War.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Gazprom has dominated the Russian gas industry. However, the markets in which it operates have changed dramatically, with the company increasingly being challenged at home and abroad. At this critical moment, this insightful book analyses the involvement of the Russian gas industry in the changing international gas market and the dramatic implications for Russia’s role as a global supplier of gas in the future.
The Russian gas industry provides 50% of Russian domestic energy supplies, a substantial proportion of CIS gas supplies, and around 20% of European gas demand. Declines in production at existing fields mean that Gazprom will face increasingly difficult decisions about moving to higher cost fields on the Yamal Peninsula. The alternative will be increasing imports from Central Asian countries and allowing other Russian gas producers to increase their role in the industry. Russian exports to Europe will gradually increase and deliveries of Russian LNG will commence to Asia and the both coasts of North America. Pipeline gas deliveries to East Asian countries may have a longer time horizon. Export projects aimed at new markets will depend crucially on the maintenance of (oil and) gas prices at the levels of 2003-05. European exports will also depend on the pace of EU market liberalisation and Gazprom's ability to agree mutually acceptable terms for transit, principally with Ukraine and Belarus. Reform, liberalisation and restructuring of the Russian gas industry have been more substantial than has generally been recognised. Most important has been price reform which, in 2005, allowed Russian industrial customers to become profitable to serve at regulated prices. Price increases may significantly reduce future increases in domestic gas demand. The increasing need for production from companies other than Gazprom will ensure that liberalised access to networks expands considerably over the next decade. In the 2000s, Gazprom reclaimed its CIS gas business from intermediaries, while maintaining its de facto monopoly of exports to Europe and establishing a similar degree of authority over future exports to Asia. The merger of Gazprom and Rosneft will provide the potential to become a force in the domestic and international oil markets, particularly given the authority that the president has conferred on the company in terms of Russian energy policy.
This book explores the impact on the Russian gas sector of changes in international gas markets, including the growth of competition and development of new sources of supply.
Russia’s use of its vast energy resources for leverage against post-Soviet states such as Ukraine is widely recognized as a threat. Yet we cannot understand this danger without also understanding the opportunity that Russian energy represents. From corruption-related profits to transportation-fee income to subsidized prices, many within these states have benefited by participating in Russian energy exports. To understand Russian energy power in the region, it is necessary to look at the entire value chain—including production, processing, transportation, and marketing—and at the full spectrum of domestic and external actors involved, from Gazprom to regional oligarchs to European Union regulators. This book follows Russia’s three largest fossil-fuel exports—natural gas, oil, and coal—from production in Siberia through transportation via Ukraine to final use in Germany in order to understand the tension between energy as threat and as opportunity. Margarita M. Balmaceda reveals how this dynamic has been a key driver of political development in post-Soviet states in the period between independence in 1991 and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. She analyzes how the physical characteristics of different types of energy, by shaping how they can be transported, distributed, and even stolen, affect how each is used—not only technically but also politically. Both a geopolitical travelogue of the journey of three fossil fuels across continents and an incisive analysis of technology’s role in fossil-fuel politics and economics, this book offers new ways of thinking about energy in Eurasia and beyond.
Public debate about energy relations between the EU and Russia is distorted. These distortions present considerable obstacles to the development of true partnership. At the core of the conflict is a struggle for resource rents between energy producing, energy consuming and transit countries. Supposed secondary aspects, however, are also of great importance. They comprise of geopolitics, market access, economic development and state sovereignty. The European Union, having engaged in energy market liberalisation, faces a widening gap between declining domestic resources and continuously growing energy demand. Diverse interests inside the EU prevent the definition of a coherent and respected energy policy. Russia, for its part, is no longer willing to subsidise its neighbouring economies by cheap energy exports. The Russian government engages in assertive policies pursuing Russian interests. In so far, it opts for a different globalisation approach, refusing the role of mere energy exporter. In view of the intensifying struggle for global resources, Russia, with its large energy potential, appears to be a very favourable option for European energy supplies, if not the best one. However, several outcomes of the strategic game between the two partners can be imagined. Engaging in non-cooperative strategies will in the end leave all stakeholders worse-off. The European Union should therefore concentrate on securing its partnership with Russia instead of damaging it. Stable cooperation would need the acceptance that the partner may pursue his own goals, which might be different from one’s own interests. The question is, how can a sustainable compromise be found? This thesis finds that a mix of continued dialogue, a tit for tat approach bolstered by an international institutional framework and increased integration efforts appears as a preferable solution.
Recent increases in natural gas reserve estimates and advances in shale gas technology make natural gas a fuel with good prospects to serve a bridge to a low-carbon world. Russia is an important energy supplier as it holds the world largest natural gas reserves and it is the world's largest exporter of natural gas. Energy was one of the driving forces of Russia's recent economic recovery from the economic collapse of 1990s. These prospects have changed drastically with a global recession and the collapse of oil and gas prices from their peaks of 2008. An additional factor is an ongoing surge in a liquefied natural gas (LNG) capacity and a development of Central Asia's and the Middle East gas supplies that can compete with Russian gas in its traditional (European) and potential (Asian) markets. To study the long-term prospects for Russian natural gas, we employ the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model, a computable general equilibrium model of the world economy. While we consider the updated reserve estimates for all world regions, in this paper we focus on the results for Russian natural gas trade. The role of natural gas is explored in the context of several policy assumptions: with no greenhouse gas mitigation policy and scenarios of emissions targets in developed countries. Scenarios where Europe takes on an even more restrictive target of 80 percent reduction of greenhouse gas emissions relative to 2005 by 2050 and reduces its nuclear based generation are also considered. Asian markets become increasingly important for natural gas exports and several scenarios about their potential development are considered. We found that over the next 20-40 years natural gas can still play a substantial role in Russian exports and there are substantial reserves to support a development of the gas-oriented energy system both in Russia and in its current and potential gas importers. In the Reference scenario, exports of natural gas grow from Russia's current 7 Tcf to 10-12 Tcf in 2030 and 15-18 Tcf in 2050. Alternative scenarios provide a wider range of projections, with a share of Russian gas exports shipped to Asian markets rising to 30 percent by 2030 and more than 50 percent in 2050. Patterns of international gas trade show increased flows to the Asian region from the Middle East, Central Asia, Australia and Russia. Europe's reliance on LNG imports increases, while it still maintains sizable imports from Russia.
