Selections from four legends in maritime and air strategy: Mahan, Corbett, Douhet and Mitchell. Introduction by noted military strategist and author David Jablonsky.
An expanded edition of the leading text on military history and the role of culture on the battlefield Ideas matter in warfare. Guns may kill, but ideas determine when, where, and how they are used. Traditionally, military historians attempted to explain the ideas behind warfare in strictly rational terms, but over the past few decades, a stronger focus has been placed on how societies conceptualize war, weapons, violence, and military service, to determine how culture informs the battlefield. Warfare and Culture in World History, Second Edition, is a collection of some of the most compelling recent efforts to analyze warfare through a cultural lens. These curated essays draw on, and aggressively expand, traditional scholarship on war and society through sophisticated cultural analysis. Chapters range from an organizational analysis of American Civil War field armies, to an exploration of military culture in late Republican Rome, to debates within Ming Chinese officialdom over extermination versus pacification. In addition to a revised and expanded introduction, the second edition of Warfare and Culture in World History now adds new chapters on the role of herding in shaping Mongol strategies, Spanish military culture and its effects on the conquest of the New World, and the blending of German and East African military cultures among the Africans who served in the German colonial army. This volume provides a full range of case studies of how culture, whether societal, strategic, organizational, or military, could shape not only military institutions but also actual battlefield choices.
This book examines the meaning and management of time as a facet of the art of war in general but especially operational art. While force-time-place has for a long time been considered to be the essential trinity of warfare, the aspect of time remains largely under-researched. Relying on classic texts on art of war, the author engages with some of the top theorists and practitioners of art of war from the age of Sun Tzu to the network-centric warfare about the role of time and its management in operational art. Relying on Alvin Toffler’s theory of the “three waves,” the volume follows research into development of operational art through cycles from the agrarian age to the industrial age and into the information age.
Since its publication in 1911, Sir Julian's Corbett's Some Principles of Maritime Strategy has remained a key document within naval strategic thinking. Yet despite his undoubted influence, Corbett's theories have not been subjected to scientific review and systematic comparison with other naval thinkers. In this assessment, Dr Widen has provided a fresh interpretation of Corbett's legacy and his continued relevance as a classic theorist of naval war. Divided into three parts, the book begins with a brief biographical overview of Corbett's life, highlighting in particular his bibliographic history and the influences on his thinking. The latter two sections then describe and assess Corbett's views on military and naval theory, respectively. Together these two parts represent his overall theory of maritime strategy, including his conception of limited war, his intellectual debt to Clausewitz, command of the sea, his critic of decisive battle, as well as the different methods of naval operations. By means of a thorough assessment of Corbett's theory of maritime strategy, Dr Widén highlights the continued relevance of his theories. Both the strengths and shortcomings of Corbett's thinking are discussed and reflections offered on their intellectual, practical and doctrinal value. In so doing, Dr Widen has written a book that deserves to be read by anyone with an interest in the past, present or future of maritime strategy.
Since its publication in 1911, Sir Julian's Corbett's Some Principles of Maritime Strategy has remained a key document within naval strategic thinking. Yet despite his undoubted influence, Corbett's theories have not been subjected to scientific review and systematic comparison with other naval thinkers. In this assessment, Dr Widen has provided a fresh interpretation of Corbett's legacy and his continued relevance as a classic theorist of naval war. Divided into three parts, the book begins with a brief biographical overview of Corbett's life, highlighting in particular his bibliographic history and the influences on his thinking. The latter two sections then describe and assess Corbett's views on military and naval theory, respectively. Together these two parts represent his overall theory of maritime strategy, including his conception of limited war, his intellectual debt to Clausewitz, command of the sea, his critic of decisive battle, as well as the different methods of naval operations. By means of a thorough assessment of Corbett's theory of maritime strategy, Dr Widén highlights the continued relevance of his theories. Both the strengths and shortcomings of Corbett's thinking are discussed and reflections offered on their intellectual, practical and doctrinal value. In so doing, Dr Widen has written a book that deserves to be read by anyone with an interest in the past, present or future of maritime strategy.
This edition of the U. S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy continues to reflect the structure and approach of the core national security strategy and policy curriculum at the War College. The 5th Edition is published in two volumes that correspond roughly to the Department of National Security and Strategy¿s core courses: ¿Theory of War and Strategy¿ and ¿National Security Policy and Strategy.¿ Like previous editions, this one is based on its predecessor but contains both updates and new scholarship. Over a third of the chapters are new or have undergone significant rewrites. Many chapters, some of which appeared for years in this work, have been removed. Nevertheless, the book remains unchanged in intent and purpose. Although this is not primarily a textbook, it does reflect both the method and manner we use to teach strategy formulation to America¿s future senior leaders. The book is not a comprehensive or exhaustive treatment of either strategic theory or the policymaking process. Both volumes are organized to proceed from the general to the specific. Thus, the first volume opens with general thoughts on the nature and theory of war and strategy, proceeds to look at the complex aspect of power, and concludes with specific theoretical issues. Similarly, the second volume begins by examining the policy/strategy process, moves to a look at the strategic environment, and concludes with some specific issues. This edition continues the effort begun in the 4th Edition to include several short case studies to illustrate the primary material in the volume.
This book looks at the history of the US Air Force through the lens of its (lack of) preparedness for major wars, which is shown to be a result of its organizational culture. The U.S. Air Force is probably the most powerful military force in history, both in its destructive firepower and in its ability to project it globally. Yet, despite its unparalleled power, the Air Force entered its first three pivotal conflicts – World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War – unprepared. But surprisingly, it was remarkably well prepared for its fourth major war: the Gulf War of 1991. Could there be an underlying trait or characteristic, which influenced the Air Force between the wars, that historically caused the US Air Force to be unprepared for war or prepared for the wrong type of war? Surprisingly, there is such a factor which was quite prominent in the Air Force’s complex identity – its organizational culture. Besides providing a historical description of the Air Force, this book demonstrates clearly how its organizational culture evolved and how it caused the US Air Force to be prepared for the wrong war. It also shows that when the organizational culture changed, the Air Force changed its focus and arrived prepared for the following war: the 1991 Gulf War. This book will be of interest to students of air power, strategic studies, US public policy, and security studies in general.