In March 2009, the Fund established a new Framework Administered Account to administer external financial resources for selected Fund activities (the “SFA Instrument”). The financing of activities under the terms of the SFA Instrument is implemented through the establishment and operation of a subaccount within the SFA. This paper requests Executive Board approval to establish the AFRITAC Central subaccount under the terms of the SFA Instrument.
This chapter examines the prospects for effective cross-border resolution of failing systemically important banks. It begins by recalling the prevalence of national interests when cross-border banks were resolved in the financial crisis. It notes that in some cases foreign creditors benefitted from nationally-driven action, even if sometimes they did not. However, it concludes that the positive externalities from nationally motivated action are likely to be lower in the future because of the likely lower incidence of bail-outs. It then turns to the prospects of cross-border cooperation both in the case of single point of entry (SPE) and multiple point of entry (MPE) resolutions. It argues that cross-border cooperation will be important to maximise value to creditors in both cases, obviously in the case of MPE but also to an extent that is sometimes not recognised in the case of SPE. Finally, it turns to an assessment of how likely it is that cross-border cooperation will emerge (a) under the FSB Key Attributes and (b) within the European Union, dealing with both the Banking Union and the EU as a whole.
Developing an effective framework for cross-border resolution is a key priority in international regulatory reform. Large bank failures during the global financial crisis brought home the lack of adequate tools for resolving “too-big-to-fail” institutions. In cross-border cases, misaligned incentives and lack of robust mechanisms for resolution and cross-border cooperation left some country authorities with little choice but to take unilateral actions, which contributed to the high fiscal costs of the crisis and resulted in disorderly resolution in some cases
This report argues that policy reforms in micro- and macro-prudential regulation and macroeconomic policies are needed for Europe to reap the important diversification and efficiency benefits from cross-border banking, while reducing the risks stemming from large cross-border banks.Available online as pdf at: http: //www.cepr.org/pubs/books/CEPR/cross-border_banking.pd
Cross-border banking, while having the potential for a more efficient financial sector, also creates potential challenges for bank supervisors and regulators. This volume discusses topics that include: the landscape of cross-border bank activity, the resulting competitive implications, emerging challenges for prudential regulation, and more. Cross-border banking, while having the potential for a more efficient financial sector, also creates potential challenges for bank supervisors and regulators. It requires cooperation by regulatory authorities across jurisdictions and a clear delineation of authority and responsibility. That delineation is typically not present and regulatory authorities often have significantly different incentives to respond when cross-border-active banks encounter difficulties. Most of these issues have only begun to be seriously evaluated. This volume, one of the first attempts to address these issues, brings together experts and regulators from different countries. The wide range of topics discussed include: the current landscape of cross-border bank activity, the resulting competitive implications, emerging challenges for prudential regulation, safety net concerns, failure resolution issues, and the potential future evolution of international banking.
Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Subcommittee on National Security and International Trade and Finance
Since 2008, many countries across the globe have witnessed the introduction of new recovery and resolution regimes for banks. Whereas much may have been achieved on regional levels, this has not been perfect, and many global challenges remain unsolved. The Research Handbook on Cross-Border Bank Resolution analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the current regulatory framework for cross-border bank crises with contributions from eminent experts from the US, EU, Japan and China. The topic is addressed from both economic, and legal perspectives, with a special section devoted to real-life cases.
This paper presents a stylized analysis of the effects of ring-fencing (i.e., different restrictions on cross-border transfers of excess profits and/or capital between a parent bank and its subsidiaries located in different jurisdictions) on cross-border banks. Using a sample of 25 large European banking groups with subsidiaries in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe (CESE), we analyze the impact of a CESE credit shock on the capital buffers needed by the sample banking groups under different forms of ring-fencing. Our simulations show that under stricter forms of ring-fencing, sample banking groups have substantially larger needs for capital buffers at the parent and/or subsidiary level than under less strict (or in the absence of any) ring-fencing.
Most recent regulations establish that resolution of global banking groups shall be done according to bail-in procedures and following a Single Point of Entry (SPE) as opposed to a Multiple Point of Entry (MPE) approach. The latter requires parent holding of global groups to put up front the equity capital needed to absorb losses possibly emerging in foreign subsidiaries branches. No model rationalized so far such resolution regime. We build a model of optimal design of resolution regimes and compare three regimes: SPE with cooperative authorities, SPE with non-cooperative authorities and MPE (ring-fencing). We find that the costs for bondholders of bail-inable instruments is generally higher under noncooperative regimes and ring-fencing. We also find that in those cases banks have ex ante incentives to reduce their exposure in foreign assets. We also examine recent case studies that help us rationalize the model results.
