Repairing Bertrand Russell’s 1913 Theory of Knowledge
Repairing Bertrand Russell’s 1913 Theory of Knowledge

Author: Gregory Landini

Publisher: Springer Nature

Published: 2022-01-22

Total Pages: 405

ISBN-13: 3030663566

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This book repairs and revives the Theory of Knowledge research program of Russell’s Principia era. Chapter 1, 'Introduction and Overview', explains the program’s agenda. Inspired by the non-Fregean logicism of Principia Mathematica, it endorses the revolution within mathematics presenting it as a study of relations. The synthetic a priori logic of Principia is the essence of philosophy considered as a science which exposes the dogmatisms about abstract particulars and metaphysical necessities that create prisons that fetter the mind. Incipient in The Problems of Philosophy, the program’s acquaintance epistemology embraced a multiple-relation theory of belief. It reached an impasse in 1913, having been itself retrofitted with abstract particular logical forms to address problems of direction and compositionality. With its acquaintance epistemology in limbo, Scientific Method in Philosophy became the sequel to Problems. Chapter 2 explains Russell’s feeling intellectually dishonest. Wittgenstein’s demand that logic exclude nonsense belief played no role. The 1919 neutral monist era ensued, but Russell found no epistemology for the logic essential to philosophy. Repairing, Chapters 4–6 solve the impasse. Reviving, Chapters 3 and 7 vigorously defend the facts about Principia. Studies of modality and entailment are viable while Principia remains a universal logic above the civil wars of the metaphysicians.

Repairing Bertrand Russell's 1913 Theory of Knowledge
Repairing Bertrand Russell's 1913 Theory of Knowledge

Author: Gregory Landini

Publisher:

Published: 2021

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13: 9783030663575

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This book repairs and revives the Theory of Knowledge research program of Russell's Principia era. Chapter 1, 'Introduction and Overview', explains the program's agenda. Inspired by the non-Fregean logicism of Principia Mathematica, it endorses the revolution within mathematics presenting it as a study of relations. The synthetic a priori logic of Principia is the essence of philosophy considered as a science which exposes the dogmatisms about abstract particulars and metaphysical necessities that create prisons that fetter the mind. Incipient in The Problems of Philosophy, the program's acquaintance epistemology embraced a multiple-relation theory of belief. It reached an impasse in 1913, having been itself retrofitted with abstract particular logical forms to address problems of direction and compositionality. With its acquaintance epistemology in limbo, Scientific Method in Philosophy became the sequel to Problems. Chapter 2 explains Russell's feeling intellectually dishonest. Wittgenstein's demand that logic exclude nonsense belief played no role. The 1919 neutral monist era ensued, but Russell found no epistemology for the logic essential to philosophy. Repairing, Chapters 4-6 solve the impasse. Reviving, Chapters 3 and 7 vigorously defend the facts about Principia. Studies of modality and entailment are viable while Principia remains a universal logic above the civil wars of the metaphysicians.

Wittgensteins Critique of Russells Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement
Wittgensteins Critique of Russells Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement

Author: James R. Connelly

Publisher: Anthem Press

Published: 2021-03-30

Total Pages: 305

ISBN-13: 1785277421

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Wittgenstein’s May–June 1913 critique of Russell’s multiple-relation theory of judgement (or MRTJ) marked a crucial turning point in the lives of two great twentieth-century thinkers. It was also a watershed moment within the history of analytic philosophy itself. Yet scholarly consensus around a satisfactory interpretation of the nature of the critique, the extent of and reasons for its impact on Russell, along with the role it played within Wittgenstein’s development have remained elusive. With these facts in mind, this book aims to accomplish four interrelated goals. The first is to develop a compelling reading of Wittgenstein’s May–June 1913 critique of Russell’s MRTJ. The second is to defend this reading, called the ‘logical interpretation’ (or LI) against its most prominent competitors in the scholarly literature. Third, the book aims to situate Wittgenstein’s critique of the MRTJ and Russell’s reaction to it, within the broader context of each of Wittgenstein’s and Russell’s respective philosophical developments. Fourth and finally, the book aims to introduce students and scholars of early analytic philosophy to, and familiarize them with the historical events, textual evidence, scholarly controversies, letters, notes and diagrams, consideration of which is integral to constructing a plausible reading of Wittgenstein’s objection.

The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, Volume 7
The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, Volume 7

Author: Elizabeth Ramsden Eames

Publisher: Taylor & Francis

Published: 2024-08-01

Total Pages: 320

ISBN-13: 1040246591

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This volume provides a historical introduction in the writing of the manuscript. Theory of Knowledge: The 1913 Manuscript is the only book-length work on epistemology that Russell left unpublished in its original form, and its publication here is an important addition to knowledge of Russell's thought.

The Principles of Mathematics
The Principles of Mathematics

Author: Bertrand Russell

Publisher: W. W. Norton & Company

Published: 1996

Total Pages: 580

ISBN-13: 9780393314045

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Russell's classic The Principles of Mathematics sets forth his landmark thesis that mathematics and logic are identical--that what is commonly called mathematics is simply later deductions from logical premises.

Theory of Knowledge
Theory of Knowledge

Author: Bertrand Russell

Publisher: Routledge

Published: 2013-04-15

Total Pages: 238

ISBN-13: 113585839X

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Theory of Knowledge gives us a picture of one of the great minds of the twentieth century at work. It is possible to see the unsolved problems left without disguise or evasion. Historically, it is invaluable to our understanding of both Russell's own thought and his relationship with Wittgenstein.

Fixing Reference
Fixing Reference

Author: Imogen Dickie

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Published: 2015-12-03

Total Pages: 295

ISBN-13: 0191072214

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Imogen Dickie develops an account of aboutness-fixing for thoughts about ordinary objects, and of reference-fixing for the singular terms we use to express them. Extant discussions of this topic tread a weary path through descriptivist proposals, causalist alternatives, and attempts to combine the most attractive elements of each. The account developed here is a new beginning. It starts with two basic principles. The first connects aboutness and truth: a belief is about the object upon whose properties its truth or falsity depends. The second connects truth and justification: justification is truth conducive; in general and allowing exceptions, a subject whose beliefs are justified will be unlucky if they are not true, and not merely lucky if they are. These principles--one connecting aboutness and truth; the other truth and justification--combine to yield a third principle connecting aboutness and justification: a body of beliefs is about the object upon which its associated means of justification converges; the object whose properties a subject justifying beliefs in this way will be unlucky to get wrong and not merely luck to get right. The first part of the book proves a precise version of this principle. Its remaining chapters use the principle to explain how the relations to objects that enable us to think about them--perceptual attention; understanding of proper names; grasp of descriptions--do their aboutness-fixing and thought-enabling work. The book includes discussions of the nature of singular thought and the relation between thought and consciousness.