"This paper assesses and measures regulatory governance in 21 infrastructure regulators in Brazil. Regulatory Governance is decomposed into four main attributes: autonomy; decision-rules; means and tools; and accountability. A ranking is proposed and the main areas for improvement identified. A comparison of the proposed regulatory governance index and other indexes internationally available is performed. Section 2 sets up the analytical framework for the report, identifying key components of regulatory governance, namely, autonomy (political and financial), procedures for decision-making, tools and means (including personnel), and accountability. Section 3 assesses each of these components in practice, reporting the results of a survey with 21 regulatory agencies in Brazil, which was designed and implemented in 2005. Section 4 measures regulatory governance based on three related indexes, ranks the Brazilian regulators among themselves, and compares the proposed indexes with other two indicators available in the literature. Section 5 presents the conclusions."
More than 200 new infrastructure regulators have been created around the world in the last 15 years. They were established to encourage clear and sustainable long-term economic and legal commitments by governments and investors to encourage new investment to benefit existing and new customers. There is now considerable evidence that both investors and consumers-the two groups that were supposed to have benefited from these new regulatory systems-have often been disappointed with their performance. The fundamental premise of this book is that regulatory systems can be successfully reformed only if there are independent, objective and public evaluations of their performance. Just as one goes to a medical doctor for a regular health checkup, it is clear that infrastructure regulation would also benefit from periodic checkups. This book provides a general framework as well as detailed practical guidance on how to perform such "regulatory checkups."
This report encourages governments to “think big” about the relevance of regulatory policy and assesses the recent efforts of OECD countries to develop and deepen regulatory policy and governance.
This book provides insights into infrastructure sector performance by focusing on the links between key indicators for utilities, and changes in ownership, regulatory agency governance, and corporate governance, among other dimensions. By linking inputs and outputs over the last 15 years, the analysis is able to uncover key determinants that have impacted performance and address why the effects of such dimensions resulted in significant changes in the performance of infrastructure service provision.
Electricity, natural gas, telecommunications, railways, and water supply, are often vertically and horizontally integrated state monopolies. This results in weak services, especially in developing and transition economies, and for poor people. Common problems include low productivity, high costs, bad quality, insufficient revenue, and investment shortfalls. Many countries over the past two decades have restructured, privatized and regulated their infrastructure. This report identifies the challenges involved in this massive policy redirection. It also assesses the outcomes of these changes, as well as their distributional consequences for poor households and other disadvantaged groups. It recommends directions for future reforms and research to improve infrastructure performance, identifying pricing policies that strike a balance between economic efficiency and social equity, suggesting rules governing access to bottleneck infrastructure facilities, and proposing ways to increase poor people's access to these crucial services.
The 2021 edition includes input indicators on public finance and employment; process indicators include data on institutions, budgeting practices, human resources management, regulatory governance, public procurement, governance of infrastructure, public sector integrity, open government and digital government. Outcome indicators cover core government results (e.g. trust, political efficacy, inequality reduction) and indicators on access, responsiveness, quality and satisfaction for the education, health and justice sectors.
This report identifies the critical points where undue influence can be exercised at different moments in the life of a regulator and discusses some of the avenues for developing a culture of independence, including through interactions with stakeholders, staffing and financing.
The aim of this paper is to empirically explore the relationship between the quality of political institutions and the performance of regulation, an issue that has recently occupied much of the policy debate on the effectiveness of infrastructure industry reforms. Taking the view that political accountability is a key factor that links political structures and regulatory processes, the authors investigate, for the case of telecommunications, its impact on the performance of regulation in two time-series-cross-sectional data sets on 29 developing countries and 23 industrial countries covering the period 1985-99. In addition to confirming some well documented results on the positive role of regulatory governance in infrastructure industries, the authors provide empirical evidence on the impact of the quality of political institutions and their modes of functioning on regulatory performance. The analysis of the data sets shows that the (positive) effect of political accountability on the performance of regulation is stronger in developing countries. An important policy implication of this finding is that future reforms in these countries should give due attention to the development of politically accountable systems.
Countries exiting conflict and fragility face many urgent priorities and almost invariably suffer from substantial infrastructure deficits. There is typically very little infrastructure investment during periods of fragility and conflict, and existing installations are often damaged or destroyed. The purpose of this manual is to contribute to improvements in the quality of infrastructure regulation. It does so by identifying key principles for the governance of infrastructure regulators and by suggesting how these principles can be introduced successfully and maintained over time. The introduction of cross-cutting governance principles for regulators is based on the assumption that a uniform set of governance principles can be less costly and complex for governments to implement and enforce and will provide potential investors with a more consistent and predictable regulatory environment to navigate. The manual also discusses the process of implementing regulatory governance reforms in fragile contexts. Improvements in governance frameworks for infrastructure regulators will support better and accountable regulatory decision-making, as well as increased investment and overall economic development. Case studies from relevant country experience complement and provide context to the discussion on principles.
Ch. 1. Regulating infrastructure : a review of the issues, problems, and challenges / Ed Araral [und weitere] -- pt. I. Problems, issues, and perspectives in regulation, regulatory design and outcomes. ch. 2. Infrastructure regulation : what works, why, and how do we know? / Judith Clifton [und weitere]. ch. 3. Does political accountability matter for infrastructure regulation? : the case of telecommunications / Farid Gasmi, Paul Noumba and Laura Recuero Virto. ch. 4. Entry relaxation and an independent regulator : performance impact on the mobile telecoms industry in Asia / Chalita Srinuan, Pratompong Srinuan and Erik Bohlin -- pt. II. Electricity sector regulation & governance. ch. 5. Risk, regulation and governance : institutional processes and regulatory risk in the Thai energy sector / Darryl S.L. Jarvis. ch. 6. Electricity tariff regulation in Thailand : analyses and applications of incentive regulation / Puree Sirasoontorn. ch. 7. Regulating power without a five year plan : institutional changes in the Chinese power sector / Kun-Chin Lin, Mika Purra and Hui Lin. ch. 8. The Indonesian electricity sector : institutional transition, regulatory capacity and outcomes / Mika Purra. ch. 9. Regulating the independent power producers : a comparative analysis of performance of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, and Tamil Nadu in India / Rajendra Kumar. ch. 10. Partial privatization and nested regulation : institutional choices in public sector and regulatory reform / Sunil Tankha. ch. 11. The electricity industry reform in Korea : lessons for further liberalization / Junki Kim and Kyuhyun Kim -- pt. III. Water sector regulation & governance. ch. 12. Regulatory independence and contract incompleteness : assessing regulatory effectiveness in water privatization in Manila / Xun Wu, Loit Batac and Nepomuceno A. Malaluan. ch. 13. Can regulation improve the performance of government-controlled water utilities? / David Ehrhardt and Nils Janson. ch. 14. Effects of regulatory quality and political institutions on access to water and sanitation / Andrew B. Whitford, Helen Smith and Anant Mandawat. ch. 15. The regulation of water infrastructure in Italy : origins and effects of an 'hybrid' regulatory system / Alberto Asquer. ch. 16. Measuring effectiveness of regulation across a river system : a welfare approach / Alex Coram and Lyle Noakes. ch. 17. Private sector participation and regulatory reform in water supply : the Southern Mediterranean experience / Edouard Perard. ch. 18. Tempered responsiveness through regulatory negotiations in the water sector : managing unanticipated innovations emerging from participation reforms / Boyd Fuller and Sunil Tankha
