The Fourth Branch

The Fourth Branch

Author: Bernard Shull

Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing USA

Published: 2005-07-30

Total Pages: 272

ISBN-13: 031306878X

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Shrouded in mystery, managed behind closed doors, and the subject of both awe and derision, the Federal Reserve is commonly referred to as the fourth branch of our federal government, with wide-ranging influence over monetary policy, and by extension, banking, price levels, employment rates, and economic growth, income, and wealth. Bernard Shull traces the fascinating and improbable history of this institution from its establishment by an Act of Congress in 1913 to the present day. His careful analysis reveals a paradoxical phenomenon: focusing on three periods of economic stress (the inflation and deflation following World War I, the stock market crash of 1929 and subsequent Depression, and the stagflation and volatility of the 1970s and 1980s), Shull argues that despite convincing evidence that the Fed contributed to these crises, it has consistently emerged from each more powerful and influential than before. Setting the current profile of the Fed against its evolutionary context, The Fourth Branch sheds new light on the Fed's character and its impact on our economic, political, and cultural history. In many ways, the story of the Fed is the classic American epic: turning adversity into opportunity, responding to threat by innovating and adapting. Even today, under attack by liberals and conservatives alike—in the wake of the stock market bubble, economic recession, and rampant job loss—the Fed is poised to remain strong long after the tenure of legendary Chairman Alan Greenspan. Setting the current profile of the Fed against its evolutionary context, The Fourth Branch sheds new light on the Fed's character and its impact on our economic, political, and cultural history.


Stability in the Financial System

Stability in the Financial System

Author: Dimitris Papadimitriou

Publisher: Springer

Published: 1996-09-12

Total Pages: 455

ISBN-13: 1349247677

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The S&L crisis of the 1990s has given many a reason to review the events which led to a (in many ways) similar banking crisis sixty years ago, and the subsequent legislation of the Emergency Banking Act, the Banking Act of 1933, the Banking Act of 1935, and other related legislation. The reconstituted financial structure produced the longest period of financial stability in the US history, lasting one-half of a century. The book has two goals: provide an understanding of the reasons the banking reforms enacted in the 1930s were so successful; and present a set of policy proposals which offer the institutional provisions for both the financing of the capital development of the economy, and a safe payments system.


Central Banking in a Democracy

Central Banking in a Democracy

Author: John H. Wood

Publisher: Routledge

Published: 2014-10-17

Total Pages: 288

ISBN-13: 1317704312

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The Federal Reserve System, which has been Congress’s agent for the control of money since 1913, has a mixed reputation. Its errors have been huge. It was the principal cause of the Great Depression of the 1930s and the inflation of the 1970s, and participated in the massive bailouts of financial institutions at taxpayers' expense during the recent Great Recession. This book is a study of the causes of the Fed’s errors, with lessons for an improved monetary authority, beginning with an examination of the history of central banks, in which it is found that their performance depended on their incentives, as is to be expected of economic agents. An implication of these findings is that the Fed’s failings must be traced to its institutional independence, particularly of the public welfare. Consequently, its policies have been dictated by special interests: financial institutions who desire public support without meaningful regulation, as well as presidents and those portions of Congress desiring growing government financed by inflation. Monetary stability (which used to be thought the primary purpose of central banks) requires responsibility, meaning punishment for failure, instead of a remote and irresponsible (to the public) agency such as the Fed. It requires either private money motivated by profit or Congress disciplined by the electoral system as before 1913. Change involving the least disturbance to the system suggests the latter.