An anthology of 40 speeches by President Ronald Reagan, Vice President George Bush, and Secretary of State George Shultz. Taken together they represent a comprehensive accounting of the Reagan administration's foreign policy: the principles on which it is based, its goals and purposes, the plans and programs by which it has been advanced, and the progress it has made toward achieving its goals. The addresses cover each of the regions of the world and the major foreign policy initiatives undertaken by the Reagan administration.
Describes a method of negotiation that isolates problems, focuses on interests, creates new options, and uses objective criteria to help two parties reach an agreement.
... dedicated to the advancement and understanding of those principles and practices, military and political, which serve the vital security interests of the United States.
Since the rise to power of Mikhail Gorbachev, observers increasingly ask, 'Is the Cold War over? What do these changes mean for foreign policy? How confident can we be about anyone's ability to foresee the future?' This volume brings together a representative group of interpreters of the Cold War to address some of the recurrent questions. Responses divide both scholars and politicians. Critics of the Bush administration charge it has shown more nostalgia for the familiar patterns of the Cold War than energy in responding to changes in Soviet-American relations. Serious scholars who often agree on foreign policy assessments differ on key issues concerning the end of the Cold War and what will take its place. Contributors: William D. Anderson, Clay Clemens, Michael Cox, Anton W. Deporte, R. Bates Gill, Norman Graebner, Sterling Kernek, Shao-Chuan Leng, Peter Rutland, Peter Shearman, Steve Smith, Jack Spence, and Kenneth W. Thompson. Co-Published with the Miller Center of Public Affairs.
In The Reagan Moment, the ideas, events, strategies, trends, and movements that shaped the 1980s are revealed to have had lasting effects on international relations: The United States went from a creditor to a debtor nation; democracy crested in East Asia and returned to Latin America; the People's Republic of China moved to privatize, decentralize, and open its economy; Osama bin Laden founded Al Qaeda; and relations between Washington and Moscow thawed en route to the Soviet Union's dissolution. The Reagan Moment places US foreign relations into global context by examining the economic, international, and ideational relationships that bound Washington to the wider world. Editors Jonathan R. Hunt and Simon Miles bring together a cohort of scholars with fresh insights from untapped and declassified global sources to recast Reagan's pivotal years in power. Contributors: Seth Anziska, James Cameron, Elizabeth Charles, Susan Colbourn, Michael De Groot, Stephanie Freeman, Christopher Fuller, Flavia Gasbarri, Mathias Haeussler, William Inboden, Mark Atwood Lawrence, Elisabeth Mariko Leake, Melvyn P. Leffler, Evan D. McCormick, Jennifer Miller, David Painter, Robert Rakove, William Michael Schmidli, Sarah Snyder, Lauren Frances Turek, James Wilson
The United States and the Soviet Union have been negotiating nuclear arms control agreements for over twenty years, yet radical differences remain in the two sides' concept of, and approaches to, strategic stability and arms control. This book compares and contrasts those approaches, using START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) as a case study. Throughout two decades of negotiation, U.S. policy has been directed toward dialogue that would encourage convergence of American and Soviet thought on nuclear deterrence. In Kartchner's view, that hope is belied not only by continuing asymmetries in the development and deployment of their strategic nuclear arsenals, but by differing U.S. and Soviet negotiating positions. The Reagan administration viewed START as a means of repudiating SALT II, restoring a measure of balance in the U.S.-Soviet strategic competition, and as a way of closing the so-called window of vulnerability. In contrast, Kartchner analyzes the Soviets' differing views of nuclear balance, emphasizing their satisfaction with SALT II and a strategic equilibrium shaped by a decade of bilateral arms control. Kartchner offers a detailed exposition of the major negotiating issues in START, contrasting concerns of U.S. and Soviet negotiators. Not surprisingly, each side's agenda was dominated by weapon systems that figure prominently in the other's development program. The author concludes by summarizing and comparing American and Soviet quests for stability and drawing up an assessment of U.S. efforts in both SALT and START to use arms control negotiations as a kind of classroom for instructing Soviet officials in American notions of "stabilizing" versus "destabilizing" weapon technology and America's own ethnocentric view of stability. START will profoundly affect the acquisition, operation, maintenance, and cost of U.S. strategic nuclear forces well into the next century. The history and analysis presented here will provide an essential source to policymakers and students of military-political relations for much-needed further study of this treaty's implications.
