Rent-Sharing

Rent-Sharing

Author: Nicole Gürtzgen

Publisher:

Published: 2008

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13:

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This paper analyses whether wages in Germany respond to firm-specific profitability conditions. Particular emphasis lies on the question of whether the extent of rent-sharing varies across different systems of wage determination. Those may be categorised into sector-specific wage agreements, firm-specific wage agreements and wage determination without any bargaining coverage. To derive testable hypotheses, we set up a theoretical model that analyses the sensitivity of wages to firm-specific conditions under different wage setting structures. The hypotheses are tested using an establishment-level panel data set from the mining and manufacturing sector. The results of the empirical analysis generally suggest that rent-sharing is present in Germany. However, the extent of rent-sharing is found to be significantly lower in establishments that are subject to a collective wage agreement - irrespective of whether the agreement is industry- or firm-specific. While pooled OLS estimates yield positive estimates of the rent-sharing coefficient in establishments that are covered by a collective contract, SYS-GMM-estimates accounting for unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity of rents point to a rent-sharing coefficient of zero.


Rent-Sharing and Collective Bargaining Coverage

Rent-Sharing and Collective Bargaining Coverage

Author: Nicole Guertzgen

Publisher:

Published: 2009

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13:

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Using a linked employer-employee dataset, this paper analyses the relationship between firm profitability and wages. Particular emphasis is given to the question of whether the sensitivity of wages to firm-specific rents varies with collective bargaining coverage. To address this issue, we distinguish sector- and firm-specific wage agreements and wage determination without any bargaining coverage. Our findings indicate that individual wages are positively related to firm-specific quasi-rents in the non-union sector and under firm-specific contracts. Industry-wide wage contracts, however, are associated with a significantly lower responsiveness of wages to firm-level profitability.