Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games
Author: Richard D. McKelvey
Publisher:
Published: 1995
Total Pages: 38
ISBN-13:
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Quantal Response Equilibrium
Author: Jacob K. Goeree
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Published: 2016-06-28
Total Pages: 328
ISBN-13: 1400880920
DOWNLOAD EBOOKQuantal Response Equilibrium presents a stochastic theory of games that unites probabilistic choice models developed in psychology and statistics with the Nash equilibrium approach of classical game theory. Nash equilibrium assumes precise and perfect decision making in games, but human behavior is inherently stochastic and people realize that the behavior of others is not perfectly predictable. In contrast, QRE models choice behavior as probabilistic and extends classical game theory into a more realistic and useful framework with broad applications for economics, political science, management, and other social sciences. Quantal Response Equilibrium spans the range from basic theoretical foundations to examples of how the principles yield useful predictions and insights in strategic settings, including voting, bargaining, auctions, public goods provision, and more. The approach provides a natural framework for estimating the effects of behavioral factors like altruism, reciprocity, risk aversion, judgment fallacies, and impatience. New theoretical results push the frontiers of models that include heterogeneity, learning, and well-specified behavioral modifications of rational choice and rational expectations. The empirical relevance of the theory is enhanced by discussion of data from controlled laboratory experiments, along with a detailed users' guide for estimation techniques. Quantal Response Equilibrium makes pioneering game-theoretic methods and interdisciplinary applications available to a wide audience.
Quantal Response Equilibrium
Author: Jacob K. Goeree
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Published: 2016-06-28
Total Pages: 322
ISBN-13: 069112423X
DOWNLOAD EBOOKQuantal Response Equilibrium presents a stochastic theory of games that unites probabilistic choice models developed in psychology and statistics with the Nash equilibrium approach of classical game theory. Nash equilibrium assumes precise and perfect decision making in games, but human behavior is inherently stochastic and people realize that the behavior of others is not perfectly predictable. In contrast, QRE models choice behavior as probabilistic and extends classical game theory into a more realistic and useful framework with broad applications for economics, political science, management, and other social sciences. Quantal Response Equilibrium spans the range from basic theoretical foundations to examples of how the principles yield useful predictions and insights in strategic settings, including voting, bargaining, auctions, public goods provision, and more. The approach provides a natural framework for estimating the effects of behavioral factors like altruism, reciprocity, risk aversion, judgment fallacies, and impatience. New theoretical results push the frontiers of models that include heterogeneity, learning, and well-specified behavioral modifications of rational choice and rational expectations. The empirical relevance of the theory is enhanced by discussion of data from controlled laboratory experiments, along with a detailed users' guide for estimation techniques. Quantal Response Equilibrium makes pioneering game-theoretic methods and interdisciplinary applications available to a wide audience.
A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games
Author: John C. Harsanyi
Publisher: Mit Press
Published: 1988
Total Pages: 378
ISBN-13: 9780262582384
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThe authors, two of the most prominent game theorists of this generation, have devoted a number of years to the development of the theory presented here, and to its economic applications. They propose rational criteria for selecting one particular uniformly perfect equilibrium point as the solution of any noncooperative game. And, because any cooperative game can be remodelled as a noncooperative bargaining game, their theory defines a one-point solution for any cooperative game as well.By providing solutions - based on the same principles of rational behavior - for all classes of games, both cooperative and noncooperative, both those with complete and with incomplete information, Harsanyi and Selten's approach achieves a remarkable degree of theoretical unification for game theory as a whole and provides a deeper insight into the nature of game-theoretic rationality.The book applies this theory to a number of specific game classes, such as unanimity games; bargaining with transaction costs; trade involving one seller and several buyers; two-person bargaining with incomplete information on one side, and on both sides. The last chapter discusses the relationship of the authors' theory to other recently proposed solution concepts, particularly the Kohberg-Mertens stability theory.John C. Harsanyi is Flood Research Professor in Business Administration and Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley. Reinhard Selten is Professor of Economics Institute of Social and Economic Sciences: University of Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany.
Game Theory and Machine Learning for Cyber Security
Author: Charles A. Kamhoua
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
Published: 2021-09-08
Total Pages: 546
ISBN-13: 1119723949
DOWNLOAD EBOOKGAME THEORY AND MACHINE LEARNING FOR CYBER SECURITY Move beyond the foundations of machine learning and game theory in cyber security to the latest research in this cutting-edge field In Game Theory and Machine Learning for Cyber Security, a team of expert security researchers delivers a collection of central research contributions from both machine learning and game theory applicable to cybersecurity. The distinguished editors have included resources that address open research questions in game theory and machine learning applied to cyber security systems and examine the strengths and limitations of current game theoretic models for cyber security. Readers will explore the vulnerabilities of traditional machine learning algorithms and how they can be mitigated in an adversarial machine learning approach. The book offers a comprehensive suite of solutions to a broad range of technical issues in applying game theory and machine learning to solve cyber security challenges. Beginning with an introduction to foundational concepts in game theory, machine learning, cyber security, and cyber deception, the editors provide readers with resources that discuss the latest in hypergames, behavioral game theory, adversarial machine learning, generative adversarial networks, and multi-agent reinforcement learning. Readers will also enjoy: A thorough introduction to game theory for cyber deception, including scalable algorithms for identifying stealthy attackers in a game theoretic framework, honeypot allocation over attack graphs, and behavioral games for cyber deception An exploration of game theory for cyber security, including actionable game-theoretic adversarial intervention detection against advanced persistent threats Practical discussions of adversarial machine learning for cyber security, including adversarial machine learning in 5G security and machine learning-driven fault injection in cyber-physical systems In-depth examinations of generative models for cyber security Perfect for researchers, students, and experts in the fields of computer science and engineering, Game Theory and Machine Learning for Cyber Security is also an indispensable resource for industry professionals, military personnel, researchers, faculty, and students with an interest in cyber security.
Experimental Business Research
Author: Rami Zwick
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Published: 2007-02-26
Total Pages: 332
ISBN-13: 0387242449
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThis is one of the few titles that brings together studies that adopt laboratory based experimental economics methods to study an array of business and policy issues, spanning the entire business domain, including accounting, economics, management, marketing and cognitive science.
Games And Dynamic Games
Author: Alain Haurie
Publisher: World Scientific Publishing Company
Published: 2012-03-23
Total Pages: 488
ISBN-13: 981440134X
DOWNLOAD EBOOKDynamic games arise between players (individuals, firms, countries, animals, etc.) when the strategic interactions among them recur over time and decisions made during one period affect both current and future payoffs. Dynamic games provide conceptually rich paradigms and tools to deal with these situations.This volume provides a uniform approach to game theory and illustrates it with present-day applications to economics and management, including environmental, with the emphasis on dynamic games.At the end of each chapter a case study called game engineering (GE) is provided, to help readers understand how problems of high social priority, such as environmental negotiations, exploitation of common resources, can be modeled as games and how solutions can be engineered.
Game Theory through Examples
Author: Erich Prisner
Publisher: American Mathematical Soc.
Published: 2014-12-31
Total Pages: 287
ISBN-13: 1614441154
DOWNLOAD EBOOKGame Theory through Examples is a thorough introduction to elementary game theory, covering finite games with complete information. The core philosophy underlying this volume is that abstract concepts are best learned when encountered first (and repeatedly) in concrete settings. Thus, the essential ideas of game theory are here presented in the context of actual games, real games much more complex and rich than the typical toy examples. All the fundamental ideas are here: Nash equilibria, backward induction, elementary probability, imperfect information, extensive and normal form, mixed and behavioral strategies. The active-learning, example-driven approach makes the text suitable for a course taught through problem solving. Students will be thoroughly engaged by the extensive classroom exercises, compelling homework problems, and nearly sixty projects in the text. Also available are approximately eighty Java applets and three dozen Excel spreadsheets in which students can play games and organize information in order to acquire a gut feeling to help in the analysis of the games. Mathematical exploration is a deep form of play; that maxim is embodied in this book. Game Theory through Examples is a lively introduction to this appealing theory. Assuming only high school prerequisites makes the volume especially suitable for a liberal arts or general education spirit-of-mathematics course. It could also serve as the active-learning supplement to a more abstract text in an upper-division game theory course.
Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria
Author: Eric van Damme
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Published: 2012-12-06
Total Pages: 331
ISBN-13: 364296978X
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThe last decade has seen a steady increase in the application of concepts from noncooperative game theory to such diverse fields as economics, political science, law, operations research, biology and social psychology. As a byproduct of this increased activity, there has been a growing awareness of the fact that the basic noncooperative solution concept, that of Nash equilibrium, suffers from severe drawbacks. The two main shortcomings of this concept are the following: (i) In extensive form games, a Nash strategy may prescribe off the equilibrium path behavior that is manifestly irrational. (Specifically, Nash equilibria may involve incredible threats), (ii) Nash equilibria need not be robust with respect to small perturbations in the data of the game. Confronted with the growing evidence to the detriment of the Nash concept, game theorists were prompted to search for more refined equilibrium notions with better properties and they have come up with a wide array of alternative solution concepts. This book surveys the most important refinements that have been introduced. Its objectives are fourfold (i) to illustrate desirable properties as well as drawbacks of the various equilibrium notions by means of simple specific examples, (ii) to study the relationships between the various refinements, (iii) to derive simplifying characterizations, and (iv) to discuss the plausibility of the assumptions underlying the concepts.
Differential Topology
Author: Victor Guillemin
Publisher: American Mathematical Soc.
Published: 2010
Total Pages: 242
ISBN-13: 0821851934
DOWNLOAD EBOOKDifferential Topology provides an elementary and intuitive introduction to the study of smooth manifolds. In the years since its first publication, Guillemin and Pollack's book has become a standard text on the subject. It is a jewel of mathematical exposition, judiciously picking exactly the right mixture of detail and generality to display the richness within. The text is mostly self-contained, requiring only undergraduate analysis and linear algebra. By relying on a unifying idea--transversality--the authors are able to avoid the use of big machinery or ad hoc techniques to establish the main results. In this way, they present intelligent treatments of important theorems, such as the Lefschetz fixed-point theorem, the Poincaré-Hopf index theorem, and Stokes theorem. The book has a wealth of exercises of various types. Some are routine explorations of the main material. In others, the students are guided step-by-step through proofs of fundamental results, such as the Jordan-Brouwer separation theorem. An exercise section in Chapter 4 leads the student through a construction of de Rham cohomology and a proof of its homotopy invariance. The book is suitable for either an introductory graduate course or an advanced undergraduate course.
