Declared wars start and stop, but the conflicts between nations and groups around the world simmer continuously and boil over frequently. The Department of Defense (DoD) is considering a range of conflict types, including hybrid warfare-- the combination of irregular and conventional methods of warfare. This is a logical consideration of what some nations may do to confront the U.S. with an irregular threat tightly integrated with conventional force operations. To assist leaders in thinking about what emphasis to place on irregular warfare strategies and capabilities, this article explores irregular warfare from four perspectives. --
Perspectives on the American Way of War examines salient cases of American experience in irregular warfare, focusing upon the post-World War II era. This book asks why recent misfires have emerged in irregular warfare from an institutional, professional, and academic context which regularly produces evidence that there is in fact no lack of understanding of both irregular challenges and correct responses. Expert contributors explore the reasoning behind the inability to achieve victory, however defined, and argue that what security professionals have failed to fully recognize, even today, is that what is at issue is not warfare suffused with politics but rather the very opposite, politics suffused with warfare. Perspectives on the American Way of War will be of great interest to scholars of war and conflict studies, strategic and military studies, insurgency and counterinsurgency, and terrorism and counterterrorism. The book was originally published as a special issue of Small Wars & Insurgencies.
ADP 6-22 describes enduring concepts of leadership through the core competencies and attributes required of leaders of all cohorts and all organizations, regardless of mission or setting. These principles reflect decades of experience and validated scientific knowledge.An ideal Army leader serves as a role model through strong intellect, physical presence, professional competence, and moral character. An Army leader is able and willing to act decisively, within superior leaders' intent and purpose, and in the organization's best interests. Army leaders recognize that organizations, built on mutual trust and confidence, accomplish missions. Every member of the Army, military or civilian, is part of a team and functions in the role of leader and subordinate. Being a good subordinate is part of being an effective leader. Leaders do not just lead subordinates-they also lead other leaders. Leaders are not limited to just those designated by position, rank, or authority.
Gray zone warfare, also known as irregular warfare, political warfare, hybrid warfare, asymmetric warfare, and unconventional warfare, is a significant concern today, threatening U.S. national security as well as the security of U.S. allies and partners. Despite its population's immense capacity for creativity and innovation, the United States is losing this war. This monograph builds the case for convening a National Security Council/Deputies Committee (NSC/DC) meeting whenever a gray zone solution is needed to ensure a solution is developed from a whole-of-government perspective, and that a standing National Security Council/Policy Coordination Committee (NSC/PCC) for gray zone solutions be established so that subject matter experts from all appropriate government agencies and organizations can be quickly assembled in times of crisis.
Gray zone warfare, also known as irregular warfare, political warfare, hybrid warfare, asymmetric warfare, and unconventional warfare, is a significant concern today, threatening U.S. national security as well as the security of U.S. allies and partners. Despite its population's immense capacity for creativity and innovation, the United States is losing this war. This monograph builds the case for convening a National Security Council/Deputies Committee (NSC/DC) meeting whenever a gray zone solution is needed to ensure a solution is developed from a whole-of-government perspective, and that a standing National Security Council/Policy Coordination Committee (NSC/PCC) for gray zone solutions be established so that subject matter experts from all appropriate government agencies and organizations can be quickly assembled in times of crisis.
What explains differences in soldier participation in violence during irregular war? How do ordinary men become professional wielders of force, and when does this transformation falter or fail? Regular Soldiers, Irregular War presents a theoretical framework for understanding the various forms of behavior in which soldiers engage during counterinsurgency campaigns—compliance and shirking, abuse and restraint, as well as the creation of new violent practices. Through an in-depth study of the Israeli Defense Forces' repression of the Second Palestinian Intifada of 2000–2005, including in-depth interviews with and a survey of former combatants, Devorah Manekin examines how soldiers come both to unleash and to curb violence against civilians in a counterinsurgency campaign. Manekin argues that variation in soldiers' behavior is best explained by the effectiveness of the control mechanisms put in place to ensure combatant violence reflects the strategies and preferences of military elites, primarily at the small-unit level. Furthermore, she develops and analyzes soldier participation in three categories of violence: strategic violence authorized by military elites; opportunistic or unauthorized violence; and "entrepreneurial violence"—violence initiated from below to advance organizational aims when leaders are ambiguous about what will best serve those aims. By going inside military field units and exploring their patterns of command and control, Regular Soldiers, Irregular War, sheds new light on the dynamics of violence and restraint in counterinsurgency.
The United States has failed to achieve strategic objectives in nearly every military campaign since Vietnam. This memoir describes how the United States can begin to build the American way of irregular war needed for success in modern conflict.
Product Description: Since the tragic events of 9/11 and the consequent advent of the Global War on Terrorism, there has been a remarkable surge of interest in counterinsurgency. This anthology presents 27 articles on counterinsurgency and irregular warfare, particularly highlighting and examining the U.S. Marine Corps' roles in conflicts from 1898 through 2007. It also includes an extensive bibliography of works on these conflicts. Continuing discussion and study of these subjects is of critical importance to the ongoing efforts of the United States and its allies in the Global War on Terrorism. The anthology is divided broadly into two halves: the first half presents historical examples of counterinsurgency involving the United States-from the Philippines and the "Banana Wars" up through Vietnam-while the second half addresses the nation's contemporary efforts in this regard. Articles cover the situations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa. The selected bibliography addresses a broad range of subjects: on higher-end operational/strategic level of war considerations, on geopolitical context, and on a varied array of related topics-political theory, historical case studies, failed states, cultural studies and analysis, and many others-that all provide context or play a role in conducting a counterinsurgency and achieving success in the realm of irregular warfare. Colonel Stephen S. Evans, USMCR, researched and compiled this work as a field historian with the Marine Corps History Division. He has experience at various operational levels, both joint and multinational, in CONUS and overseas, and has performed duty with all three MEFs, MARFORLANT, MARFOREUR, and U.S. forces in Korea. He has also held a range of positions in administrative and educational roles at Quantico and the Pentagon. Colonel Evans holds a doctorate in history from Temple University and has published two historical monographs.
The author offers a detailed comparison between the character of irregular warfare, insurgency in particular, and the principal enduring features of "the American way." He concludes that there is a serious mismatch between that "way" and the kind of behavior that is most effective in countering irregular foes. The author poses the question, Can the American way of war adapt to a strategic threat context dominated by irregular enemies? He suggests that the answer is "perhaps, but only with difficulty."
