Putting Auction Theory to Work

Putting Auction Theory to Work

Author: Paul Milgrom

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2004-01-12

Total Pages: 378

ISBN-13: 1139449168

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This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.


Discovering Prices

Discovering Prices

Author: Paul Milgrom

Publisher: Columbia University Press

Published: 2017-05-23

Total Pages: 222

ISBN-13: 023154457X

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Traditional economic theory studies idealized markets in which prices alone can guide efficient allocation, with no need for central organization. Such models build from Adam Smith’s famous concept of an invisible hand, which guides markets and renders regulation or interference largely unnecessary. Yet for many markets, prices alone are not enough to guide feasible and efficient outcomes, and regulation alone is not enough, either. Consider air traffic control at major airports. While prices could encourage airlines to take off and land at less congested times, prices alone do just part of the job; an air traffic control system is still indispensable to avoid disastrous consequences. With just an air traffic controller, however, limited resources can be wasted or poorly used. What’s needed in this and many other real-world cases is an auction system that can effectively reveal prices while still maintaining enough direct control to ensure that complex constraints are satisfied. In Discovering Prices, Paul Milgrom—the world’s most frequently cited academic expert on auction design—describes how auctions can be used to discover prices and guide efficient resource allocations, even when resources are diverse, constraints are critical, and market-clearing prices may not even exist. Economists have long understood that externalities and market power both necessitate market organization. In this book, Milgrom introduces complex constraints as another reason for market design. Both lively and technical, Milgrom roots his new theories in real-world examples (including the ambitious U.S. incentive auction of radio frequencies, whose design he led) and provides economists with crucial new tools for dealing with the world’s growing complex resource-allocation problems.


Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design

Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design

Author: Martin Bichler

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2017-10-26

Total Pages: 935

ISBN-13: 1107135346

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An international team of experts covers the pros and cons of different auction formats and lessons learned in the field.


Auction Theory

Auction Theory

Author: Vijay Krishna

Publisher: Academic Press

Published: 2009-09-28

Total Pages: 337

ISBN-13: 0080922937

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Auction Theory, Second Edition improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna's ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions. - Focuses on key auction types and serves as the doorway to relevant theory for those doing empirical work on auctions - New chapter on combinatorial auctions and new analyses of theory-informed applications - New chapter-ending exercises and problems of varying difficulties support and reinforce key points


Auctions

Auctions

Author: Paul Klemperer

Publisher: Princeton University Press

Published: 2004-03-28

Total Pages: 262

ISBN-13: 0691119252

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Governments use them to sell everything from oilfields to pollution permits, and to privatize companies; consumers rely on them to buy baseball tickets and hotel rooms, and economic theorists employ them to explain booms and busts. Auctions make up many of the world's most important markets; and this book describes how auction theory has also become an invaluable tool for understanding economics. Auctions: Theory and Practice provides a non-technical introduction to auction theory, and emphasises its practical application. Although there are many extremely successful auction markets, there have also been some notable fiascos, and Klemperer provides many examples. He discusses the successes and failures of the one-hundred-billion dollar "third-generation" mobile-phone license auctions; he, jointly with Ken Binmore, designed the first of these. Klemperer also demonstrates the surprising power of auction theory to explain seemingly unconnected issues such as the intensity of different forms of industrial competition, the costs of litigation, and even stock trading 'frenzies' and financial crashes. Engagingly written, the book makes the subject exciting not only to economics students but to anyone interested in auctions and their role in economics.


Auctioning Public Assets

Auctioning Public Assets

Author: Maarten Janssen

Publisher:

Published: 2004

Total Pages: 344

ISBN-13:

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In many countries all over the world, governments are privatising firms that were previously under public control. This is happening, for example, in public utility sectors such as gas, water and electricity, in transport sectors (such as rail and metro) and in radio and telephony. This book provides an overview of the economic issues that are involved in this transfer of ownership of public assets. Combining a theoretical framework with a set of case studies of recent sales of state-owned assets from Europe and the USA, it asks which sort of allocation mechanism can a government adopt? Which is most suited to a particular sale? And how will the choice of allocation mechanism affect future market outcomes? With contributions from international experts, this book offers an accessible introduction to auction theory and an invaluable, non-technical analysis of existing knowledge. It will be of interest to students, non-specialists and policy-makers alike.


Combinatorial Auctions

Combinatorial Auctions

Author: Peter C. Cramton

Publisher: MIT Press (MA)

Published: 2006

Total Pages: 678

ISBN-13:

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A synthesis of theoretical and practical research on combinatorial auctions from the perspectives of economics, operations research, and computer science.


The Theory of General Economic Equilibrium

The Theory of General Economic Equilibrium

Author: Andreu Mas-Colell

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 1985

Total Pages: 396

ISBN-13: 9780521388702

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This book brings together the author's pioneering work, written over the last twenty years, on the use of differential methods in general equilibrium theory.


Mechanism Design

Mechanism Design

Author: Rakesh V. Vohra

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2011-05-09

Total Pages: 185

ISBN-13: 1139499173

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Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming. Three advantages characterize the approach. The first is simplicity: arguments based on linear programming are both elementary and transparent. The second is unity: the machinery of linear programming provides a way to unify results from disparate areas of mechanism design. The third is reach: the technique offers the ability to solve problems that appear to be beyond solutions offered by traditional methods. No claim is made that the approach advocated should supplant traditional mathematical machinery. Rather, the approach represents an addition to the tools of the economic theorist who proposes to understand economic phenomena through the lens of mechanism design.