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Thirty-five chapters describe various judgmental heuristics and the biases they produce, not only in laboratory experiments, but in important social, medical, and political situations as well. Most review multiple studies or entire subareas rather than describing single experimental studies.
This classroom-tested textbook is an introduction to probability theory, with the right balance between mathematical precision, probabilistic intuition, and concrete applications. Introduction to Probability covers the material precisely, while avoiding excessive technical details. After introducing the basic vocabulary of randomness, including events, probabilities, and random variables, the text offers the reader a first glimpse of the major theorems of the subject: the law of large numbers and the central limit theorem. The important probability distributions are introduced organically as they arise from applications. The discrete and continuous sides of probability are treated together to emphasize their similarities. Intended for students with a calculus background, the text teaches not only the nuts and bolts of probability theory and how to solve specific problems, but also why the methods of solution work.
In 1992 the National Research Council issued DNA Technology in Forensic Science, a book that documented the state of the art in this emerging field. Recently, this volume was brought to worldwide attention in the murder trial of celebrity O. J. Simpson. The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence reports on developments in population genetics and statistics since the original volume was published. The committee comments on statements in the original book that proved controversial or that have been misapplied in the courts. This volume offers recommendations for handling DNA samples, performing calculations, and other aspects of using DNA as a forensic toolâ€"modifying some recommendations presented in the 1992 volume. The update addresses two major areas: Determination of DNA profiles. The committee considers how laboratory errors (particularly false matches) can arise, how errors might be reduced, and how to take into account the fact that the error rate can never be reduced to zero. Interpretation of a finding that the DNA profile of a suspect or victim matches the evidence DNA. The committee addresses controversies in population genetics, exploring the problems that arise from the mixture of groups and subgroups in the American population and how this substructure can be accounted for in calculating frequencies. This volume examines statistical issues in interpreting frequencies as probabilities, including adjustments when a suspect is found through a database search. The committee includes a detailed discussion of what its recommendations would mean in the courtroom, with numerous case citations. By resolving several remaining issues in the evaluation of this increasingly important area of forensic evidence, this technical update will be important to forensic scientists and population geneticistsâ€"and helpful to attorneys, judges, and others who need to understand DNA and the law. Anyone working in laboratories and in the courts or anyone studying this issue should own this book.
Both in science and in practical affairs we reason by combining facts only inconclusively supported by evidence. Building on an abstract understanding of this process of combination, this book constructs a new theory of epistemic probability. The theory draws on the work of A. P. Dempster but diverges from Depster's viewpoint by identifying his "lower probabilities" as epistemic probabilities and taking his rule for combining "upper and lower probabilities" as fundamental. The book opens with a critique of the well-known Bayesian theory of epistemic probability. It then proceeds to develop an alternative to the additive set functions and the rule of conditioning of the Bayesian theory: set functions that need only be what Choquet called "monotone of order of infinity." and Dempster's rule for combining such set functions. This rule, together with the idea of "weights of evidence," leads to both an extensive new theory and a better understanding of the Bayesian theory. The book concludes with a brief treatment of statistical inference and a discussion of the limitations of epistemic probability. Appendices contain mathematical proofs, which are relatively elementary and seldom depend on mathematics more advanced that the binomial theorem.
At least since plato and Aristotle, thinkers have pondered the relationship between philosophical arguments and the "sophistical" arguments offered by the Sophists -- who were the first professional lawyers. Judges wield substantial political power, and the justifications they offer for their decisions are a vital means by which citizens can assess the legitimacy of how that power is exercised. However, to evaluate judicial justifications requires close attention to the method of reasoning behind decisions. This new collection illuminates and explains the political and moral importance in justifying the exercise of judicial power.
1. BACKGROUND The last twenty-five years have seen a large amount of psychological research in the area of behavioral decision theory. It followed the major breakthrough of decision theory that came with von Neumann and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior in 1944. The key concepts are probability as a measure of uncertainty and utility as a measure of value and risk. The theory prescribes, given some behavioral axioms, that alternatives should be ranked in accordance with their expected utilities. Psychologists became interested in studying how people's decision behavior agreed with what was prescribed by the theory. Three broad areas for research developed, i. e. , research relating to each of the two concepts of probability and utility, and research relating to the interaction of the two in decision stituations. The papers in this book have been selected to illustrate various aspects of how the concept of probability has been used in psychological ex perimentation. The early experiments were generated, as mentioned above, by an interest among psychologists to see how people evaluate uncertainty and quantify it in probabilistic terms. Many of these experiments set out to evaluate subjects' estimates of relative frequencies; these were situations where one had access to 'objective' answers. In the 1960's psychologists changed the focus of their studies to how people revise probabilistic judgments when they receive new information. In recent years there has been a growing interest in the cognitive processes by which people express their judgment in probabilistic terms.
