Presents a risk-based framework for implementing international financial regulation within national economies, in particular in small states. It includes case studies to illustrate how the framework can be integrated with standard setting processes to improve outcomes for small states.
There are demands on central banks and financial regulators to take on new responsibilities for supporting the transition to a low-carbon economy. Regulators can indeed facilitate the reorientation of financial flows necessary for the transition. But their powers should not be overestimated. Their diagnostic and policy toolkits are still in their infancy. They cannot (and should not) expand their mandate unilaterally. Taking on these new responsibilities can also have potential pitfalls and unintended consequences. Ultimately, financial regulators cannot deliver a low-carbon economy by themselves and should not risk being caught again in the role of ‘the only game in town.’
We identify current challenges for creating stable, yet efficient financial systems using lessons from recent and past crises. Reforms need to start from three tenets: adopting a system-wide perspective explicitly aimed at addressing market failures; understanding and incorporating into regulations agents’ incentives so as to align them better with societies’ goals; and acknowledging that risks of crises will always remain, in part due to (unknown) unknowns – be they tipping points, fault lines, or spillovers. Corresponding to these three tenets, specific areas for further reforms are identified. Policy makers need to resist, however, fine-tuning regulations: a “do not harm” approach is often preferable. And as risks will remain, crisis management needs to be made an integral part of system design, not relegated to improvisation after the fact.
This paper seeks to draw lessons for financial sector regulation and supervision and central bank liquidity management from the ongoing crisis, focusing principally on implications for the future rather than on immediate crisis management policies. Inadequacies in macroeconomic policies and the design of the international financial architecture exposed in the crisis will also have to be addressed to make the suggested changes in the regulatory framework effective.
Examining the subject from a holistic and multidisciplinary perspective, Principles of Financial Regulation considers the underlying policies and the objectives of financial regulation.
Developing economies can strengthen their financial systems by implementing the main elements of global regulatory reform. But to build an effective prudential framework, they may need to adapt international standards taking into account the sophistication and size of their financial institutions, the relevance of different financial operations in their market, the granularity of information available and the capacity of their supervisors. Under a proportionate application of the Basel standards, smaller institutions with less complex business models would be subject to a simpler regulatory framework that enhances the resilience of the financial sector without generating disproportionate compliance costs. This paper provides guidance on how non-Basel Committee member countries could incorporate banks’ capital and liquidity standards into their framework. It builds on the experience gained by the authors in the course of their work in providing technical assistance on—and assessing compliance with—international standards in banking supervision.
This paper discusses the impact of the rapid adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) in the financial sector. It highlights the benefits these technologies bring in terms of financial deepening and efficiency, while raising concerns about its potential in widening the digital divide between advanced and developing economies. The paper advances the discussion on the impact of this technology by distilling and categorizing the unique risks that it could pose to the integrity and stability of the financial system, policy challenges, and potential regulatory approaches. The evolving nature of this technology and its application in finance means that the full extent of its strengths and weaknesses is yet to be fully understood. Given the risk of unexpected pitfalls, countries will need to strengthen prudential oversight.
Contents: (1) Recent Developments and Analysis; (2) The Global Financial Crisis and U.S. Interests: Policy; Four Phases of the Global Financial Crisis; (3) New Challenges and Policy in Managing Financial Risk; (4) Origins, Contagion, and Risk; (5) Effects on Emerging Markets: Latin America; Russia and the Financial Crisis; (6) Effects on Europe and The European Response: The ¿European Framework for Action¿; The British Rescue Plan; Collapse of Iceland¿s Banking Sector; (7) Impact on Asia and the Asian Response: Asian Reserves and Their Impact; National Responses; (8) International Policy Issues: Bretton Woods II; G-20 Meetings; The International Monetary Fund; Changes in U.S. Reg¿s. and Regulatory Structure; (9) Legislation.
How has the regulation of business shifted from national to global institutions? What are the mechanisms of globalization? Who are the key actors? What of democratic sovereignty? In which cases has globalization been successfully resisted? These questions are confronted across an amazing sweep of the critical areas of business regulation--from contract, intellectual property and corporations law, to trade, telecommunications, labor standards, drugs, food, transport and environment. This book examines the role played by global institutions such as the World Trade Organization, World Health Organization, the OECD, IMF, Moodys and the World Bank, as well as various NGOs and significant individuals. Incorporating both history and analysis, Global Business Regulation will become the standard reference for readers in business, law, politics, and international relations.
The current financial and economic crisis is a classic bust of a credit boom, the boom having been fueled by policies whose combined effects were to increase the demand for debt to unsustainable levels. U.S. monetary policy, taxation policy, and home ownership promotion policy were so conducive to credit expansion that the idea, understandably popular in Washington and Brussels, that preventing future such crises can be accomplished simply by waking up regulators "asleep at the switch" is dangerously simplistic. The United States in particular, given that it effectively sets monetary and credit conditions for a significant portion of the global economy, needs to put in place policies that can better discourage, recognize, and curtail a credit boom, and ensure that systemically important financial institutions can withstand its unwinding.