Nine chapters on diverse topics that include: an analysis of whether sociobiology has killed ethology or revitalized it; aims, limitations, and the future of ethology and comparative ethology; the tyranny of anthropocentrism; psychoimmunology; gender differences in behavior; behavioral development.
Nine chapters on diverse topics that include: an analysis of whether sociobiology has killed ethology or revitalized it; aims, limitations, and the future of ethology and comparative ethology; the tyranny of anthropocentrism; psychoimmunology; gender differences in behavior; behavioral development.
This book is a contribution to the history of ethology-not a definitive history, but the personal view of a major figure in that story. It is all the more welcome because such a grand theme as ethology calls for a range of perspectives. One reason is the overarching scope of the subject. Two great questions about life that constitute much of biology are "How does it work (structure and function)?" and "How did it get that way (evolu tion and ontogeny)?" Ethology addresses the antecedent of "it. " Of what are we trying to explain the mechanism and development? Surely behav ior, in all its wealth of detail, variation, causation, and control, is the main achievement of animal evolution, the essential consequence of animal structure and function, the raison d' etre of all the rest. Ethology thus spans between and overlaps with the ever-widening circles of ecol ogy over the eons and the ever-narrowing focus of physiology of the neurons. Another reason why the history of ethology needs perspectives is the recency of its acceptance. For such an obviously major aspect of animal biology, it is curious how short a time-less than three decades-has seen the excitement of an active field and a substantial fraternity of work ers, the addition of professors and courses to departments and curricula in biology (still far from universal}, and the normal complement of spe cial journals, symposia, and sessions at congresses.
This work contains both contemporary research findings and historical experimental evidence. It includes the topic animal awareness, and there is requisite background material on genetics and other basic molecular topics.
The fifty-seven original essays in this book provide a comprehensive overview of the interdisciplinary field of animal cognition. The contributors include cognitive ethologists, behavioral ecologists, experimental and developmental psychologists, behaviorists, philosophers, neuroscientists, computer scientists and modelers, field biologists, and others. The diversity of approaches is both philosophical and methodological, with contributors demonstrating various degrees of acceptance or disdain for such terms as "consciousness" and varying degrees of concern for laboratory experimentation versus naturalistic research. In addition to primates, particularly the nonhuman great apes, the animals discussed include antelopes, bees, dogs, dolphins, earthworms, fish, hyenas, parrots, prairie dogs, rats, ravens, sea lions, snakes, spiders, and squirrels. The topics include (but are not limited to) definitions of cognition, the role of anecdotes in the study of animal cognition, anthropomorphism, attention, perception, learning, memory, thinking, consciousness, intentionality, communication, planning, play, aggression, dominance, predation, recognition, assessment of self and others, social knowledge, empathy, conflict resolution, reproduction, parent-young interactions and caregiving, ecology, evolution, kin selection, and neuroethology.
The heart of this book is the reciprocal relationship between philosophical theories of mind and empirical studies of animal cognition. Colin Allen (a philosopher) and Marc Bekoff (a cognitive ethologist) approach their work from a perspective that considers arguments about evolutionary continuity to be as applicable to the study of animal minds and brains as they are to comparative studies of kidneys, stomachs, and hearts. Cognitive ethologists study the comparative, evolutionary, and ecological aspects of the mental phenomena of animals. Philosophy can provide cognitive ethology with an analytical basis for attributing cognition to nonhuman animals and for studying it, and cognitive ethology can help philosophy to explain mentality in naturalistic terms by providing data on the evolution of cognition. This interdiscipinary approach reveals flaws in common objections to the view that animals have minds. The heart of the book is this reciprocal relationship between philosophical theories of mind and empirical studies of animal cognition. All theoretical discussion is carefully tied to case studies, particularly in the areas of antipredatory vigilance and social play, where there are many points of contact with philosophical discussions of intentionality and representation. Allen and Bekoff make specific suggestions about how to use philosophical theories of intentionality as starting points for empirical investigation of animal minds, and they stress the importance of studying animals other than nonhuman primates.
Dozens of real-life applications and examples of this framework currently in use are examined, including three in-depth cases studies: work with marine fisheries in Hawai'i, strategies of eco-activists to protect Canada's Great Bear Rainforest, and a study of community development in El Salvador. In addition, eighteen personal practices of transformation are provided for you to increase your own integral ecological awareness."--Jacket.