This official account of the crisis in the Persian Gulf traces the Canadian Forces commitment to the Gulf region in response to Iraqi aggression in 1990-1991. Written by two officers who served in the Persian Gulf during the period of hostilities in 1991, this official account is the fruit of four years of detailed research. Based upon their personal experiences, numerous interviews, and unrestricted access to official papers, they have produced a candid account of value for both the military professional and the interested civilian. In January 1991, the Chief of Defence Staff authorized the Director of History to post Major Jean Morin as field historian to the staff of the Commander, Canadian Forces Middle East (Commodore Ken Summers). It was the first time since the Korean War that a historical officer had been posted to the staff of a Canadian commander overseas.
Canadian intelligence has moved from the periphery to become increasingly central to the operations of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). Drawing upon a range of documents and interviews with participants in specific operations, this book provides an inside perspective on how the Canadian military intelligence enterprise has supported CAF operations.
Provides an account, from the point of view of the U.S. Army forces employed, of the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to the withdrawal of coalition forces from southeastern Iraq. It focuses on the Army's part in this war, particularly the activities of the Headquarters, Third Army, and the Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT). It looks especially at the activities of the VII Corps, which executed ARCENT's main effort in the theater ground force schwerpunkt -- General Schwarzkopf's "Great Wheel." This is not an official history; the author speaks in his own voice and makes his own judgments. Maps.
For nearly two decades the United States Air Force (USAF) oriented the bulk of its thinking, acquisition, planning, and training on the threat of a Soviet blitzkrieg across the inter German border. The Air Force fielded a powerful conventional arm well rehearsed in the tactics required to operate over a central European battlefield. Then, in a matter of days, the 1990 invasion of Kuwait altered key assumptions that had been developed over the previous decade and a half. The USAF faced a different foe employing a different military doctrine in an unexpected environment. Instead of disrupting a fast paced land offensive, the combat wings of the United States Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) were ordered to attack a large, well fortified, and dispersed Iraqi ground force. The heart of that ground force was the Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC). CENTAF's mission dictated the need to develop an unfamiliar repertoire of tactics and procedures to meet theater objectives. How effectively did CENTAF adjust air operations against the Republican Guard to the changing realities of combat? Answering that question is central to this study, and the answer resides in evaluation of the innovations developed by CENTAF to improve its operational and tactical performance against the Republican Guard. Effectiveness and timeliness are the primary criteria used for evaluating innovations.
After more than ten years of effort by many states to control and redress conflicts in the Balkans, Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere, Canadian political and military leaders are still struggling to adjust defence policies and to build armed forces relevant to the international security situation Canada faces today. But the unending demand of what on the surface seem to be disparate operations and the absence of any overarching description of strategic reality confounds these efforts. Policies drawn from theories appropriate to the cold war era and "classic" peacekeeping missions are out of step with the demands of the past ten years and the future and make it difficult to develop new ways of thinking about defence policy and force development to deal with the world we live in. In Campaigns for International Stability the authors see a new pattern emerging from ten years of experience and seemingly different operations. "The post-cold war era" has been superceded by the stability campaign - a continuous diplomatic and military endeavour by states in various types of coalitions to halt conflicts, disarm belligerents, and police lawless regions around the world to bring "peace, order and good government" to international affairs. Armed force, and sometimes deadly force, is the central and necessary component of this campaign, but what type of force and what type of policies are appropriate to this new era? The authors address this question in a discussion of defence policy and management in Canada since 1989 and their relation to the needs of the stability campaign. They describe policy making in a Canadian context, political and other domestic factors that shape Canada's military capabilities, and the influence of the defence budgeting process on policy choices. Finally, the authors set out a new defence-policy framework for rebuilding and transforming both policy and the Canadian Armed Forces over the next ten years to meet the challenges of the stability campaign.
This official account of the crisis in the Persian Gulf traces the Canadian Forces commitment to the Gulf region in response to Iraqi aggression in 1990-1991. Written by two officers who served in the Persian Gulf during the period of hostilities in 1991, this official account is the fruit of four years of detailed research. Based upon their personal experiences, numerous interviews, and unrestricted access to official papers, they have produced a candid account of value for both the military professional and the interested civilian. In January 1991, the Chief of Defence Staff authorized the Director of History to post Major Jean Morin as field historian to the staff of the Commander, Canadian Forces Middle East (Commodore Ken Summers). It was the first time since the Korean War that a historical officer had been posted to the staff of a Canadian commander overseas.
