This Safety Report supplements Safety Series No. 75-INSAG-4: Safety Culture (1991) in describing practices that have proved valuable in establishing and maintaining a sound safety culture.
"Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Nuclear Security Culture: From National Best Practices to International Standards, Moscow, Russia, 24-25 October 2005."--T.p. verso.
Evolving threats of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) attack make it imperative to find ways to support global efforts against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and terrorism. This book contains papers presented at the NATO Advanced Study Institute (ASI) on CBRN security culture, held in Yerevan, Armenia, in June 2014. The conference was timely in bringing together the various aspects of security culture in the different substantive areas from a CBRN perspective, focusing efforts to advance CBRN security culture in the everyday work of those who must deal with these ever present threats. The primary aim of the conference was to promote the concept of a CBRN security culture which recognizes synergy across the individual disciplines. As a first step in the practical application of this synergistic view, the conference introduced assessment methodologies that could be refined and customized to enhance the role of the human factor in CBRN security. This, we hope, will enable countries to fulfill their international obligations and implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540. The book reflects the presentations and deliberations of workshop participants and will be of interest to governments, international organizations, researchers and practitioners whose work involves the human dimension of the security of CBRN materials.
Nuclear security culture is an important component of an effective nuclear security regime, as it serves as a tool to improve the performance of the human component at nuclear facilities and organizations to counter both insider and outsider threats. Security culture connotes not only the technical proficiency of the people but also their awareness of security risks and motivation to follow established procedures, comply with regulations and take the initiative when unforeseen circumstances arise. A workforce made up of individuals who are vigilant, who question irregularities, execute their work diligently and exhibit high standards of personal and collective behaviour is able to achieve effective nuclear security. Building upon this understanding of the importance of a strong nuclear security culture, this publication provides practical guidance on how to implement a systematic nuclear security culture enhancement programme.
In this book, the leading authority on India's nuclear program offers an informed and thoughtful assessment of India's nuclear strategy. Basrur shows that the country's nuclear culture is generally in accord with the principle of minimum deterrence but sometimes drifts into a more open-ended view.
Author: National Research Council (U.S.). Committee on Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving Safety and Security of U.S. Nuclear Plants
The March 11, 2011, Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami sparked a humanitarian disaster in northeastern Japan. They were responsible for more than 15,900 deaths and 2,600 missing persons as well as physical infrastructure damages exceeding $200 billion. The earthquake and tsunami also initiated a severe nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. Three of the six reactors at the plant sustained severe core damage and released hydrogen and radioactive materials. Explosion of the released hydrogen damaged three reactor buildings and impeded onsite emergency response efforts. The accident prompted widespread evacuations of local populations, large economic losses, and the eventual shutdown of all nuclear power plants in Japan. "Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving Safety and Security of U.S. Nuclear Plants" is a study of the Fukushima Daiichi accident. This report examines the causes of the crisis, the performance of safety systems at the plant, and the responses of its operators following the earthquake and tsunami. The report then considers the lessons that can be learned and their implications for U.S. safety and storage of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste, commercial nuclear reactor safety and security regulations, and design improvements. "Lessons Learned" makes recommendations to improve plant systems, resources, and operator training to enable effective ad hoc responses to severe accidents. This report's recommendations to incorporate modern risk concepts into safety regulations and improve the nuclear safety culture will help the industry prepare for events that could challenge the design of plant structures and lead to a loss of critical safety functions. In providing a broad-scope, high-level examination of the accident, "Lessons Learned" is meant to complement earlier evaluations by industry and regulators. This in-depth review will be an essential resource for the nuclear power industry, policy makers, and anyone interested in the state of U.S. preparedness and response in the face of crisis situations.
Discusses key issues in safety culture and practical matters such as the assessment of personal contributions to the enhancement of safety culture. It complements Safety Series No. 75-INSAG-4, Safety Culture (1991) and INSAG Series No. 13, Management of Operational Safety in Nuclear Power Plants.
This publication provides practical guidance on how to conduct a safety culture self assessment. The focus is on using such assessments as a learning opportunity for organizational growth and development rather than as a fault finding or find and fix exercise. The approach involves considerable engagement with all levels of the organization. Methods applied include document reviews questionnaires interviews observations and focus groups. Besides the complexity and subtleties of safety culture it also describes how to avoid common pitfalls in analyzing results. The information presented in this publication will be of interest to individuals engaged in assessing and improving safety culture.
Accuracy requirements in radiation oncology have been defined in multiple publications; however, these have been based on differing radiation technologies. In the meantime, the uncertainties in radiation dosimetry reference standards have been reduced and more detailed patient outcome data are available. No comprehensive literature on accuracy and uncertainties in radiotherapy has been published so far. The IAEA has therefore developed a new international consensus document on accuracy requirements and uncertainties in radiation therapy, to promote safer and more effective patient treatments. This publication addresses accuracy and uncertainty issues related to the vast majority of radiotherapy departments including both external beam radiotherapy and brachytherapy. It covers clinical, radiobiological, dosimetric, technical and physical aspects.