In 1950, when he commissioned the first edition of The Armed Forces Officer, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall told its author, S.L.A. Marshall, that "American military officers, of whatever service, should share common ground ethically and morally." In this new edition, the authors methodically explore that common ground, reflecting on the basics of the Profession of Arms, and the officer's special place and distinctive obligations within that profession and especially to the Constitution.
This collection of documents, including many previously unpublished, details the role of the Army engineers in the American Revolution. Lacking trained military engineers, the Americans relied heavily on foreign officers, mostly from France, for sorely needed technical assistance. Native Americans joined the foreign engineer officers to plan and carry out offensive and defensive operations, direct the erection of fortifications, map vital terrain, and lay out encampments. During the war Congress created the Corps of Engineers with three companies of engineer troops as well as a separate geographer's department to assist the engineers with mapping. Both General George Washington and Major General Louis Lebéque Duportail, his third and longest serving Chief Engineer, recognized the disadvantages of relying on foreign powers to fill the Army's crucial need for engineers. America, they contended, must train its own engineers for the future. Accordingly, at the war's end, they suggested maintaining a peacetime engineering establishment and creating a military academy. However, Congress rejected the proposals, and the Corps of Engineers and its companies of sappers and miners mustered out of service. Eleven years passed before Congress authorized a new establishment, the Corps of Artillerists and Engineers.
Huelfer examines the casualty issue in American military thought and practice during the years between the World Wars. He argues that Americans exhibited a distinct aversion to combat casualties duirng the Interwar Period, a phenomenon that visibly influenced the military establishment and helped shape strategic planning, force modernization, and rearmament for World War II. In a broad topical approach, Huelfer's main theme—casualty aversion—is woven into discussions about military strategy and policies, doctrinal and technological development, the military education system, and how the American officer corps emerged from World War I and prepared for World War II. As Huelfer makes clear, aversion to combat casualties is not just a post-Vietnam War phenomenon, but rather has long been embedded within the American national heritage. Conventional wisdom link today's exacerbated aversion to combat casualties as fallout from the Vietnam debacle. In fact, this Vietnam Syndrome has remained at the forefront of contemporary strategic thinking. Huelfer shows that American political and military leaders have held lasting concerns about risking soldiers' lives in combat, even pre-dating U.S. involvement in World War II. The grim experiences of World War I had a profound impact upon the U.S. officer corps and how it viewed potential future conflicts. The casualty issue permeated the officers' strategic culture during the Interwar Period and colored their thinking about improving training, doctrinal evolution, force modernization, and technological development. Even though one cannot find the terms casualty issue, casualty aversion, or sensitivity to casualties directly stated in the speeches and writings of the era, this awareness clearly emerged as a subtext for the entire American effort in preparation for World War II. Huelfer highlights how casualty aversion shaped American strategy for World War II by incorporating ideas about the use of overwhelming force, air power, and mechanization—all designed to minimize losses.
This collection of essays reflects the proceedings of a 1991 conference on "The United States Air Force: Aerospace Challenges and Missions in the 1990s," sponsored by the USAF and Tufts University. The 20 contributors comment on the pivotal role of airpower in the war with Iraq and address issues and choices facing the USAF, such as the factors that are reshaping strategies and missions, the future role and structure of airpower as an element of US power projection, and the aerospace industry's views on what the Air Force of the future will set as its acquisition priorities and strategies. The authors agree that aerospace forces will be an essential and formidable tool in US security policies into the next century. The contributors include academics, high-level military leaders, government officials, journalists, and top executives from aerospace and defense contractors.
This volume seeks to reconstruct the process by which the Kennedy administration decided to sell to Israel Hawk surface-to-air missiles. It argues that both domestic considerations and political calculations were part of a highly complex decision made by members of Washington's high policy elite.
