This account of the complex negotiation process on the final status of Kosovo analyses how the international community ended up with the very result of independence that it had most wanted to avoid at the outbreak of the crisis. It tracks the process from the initial negotiations in Vienna in 2006 to Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008.
This is the first critical analysis of the international attempts to settle the Kosovo crisis, written from first hand insights of the settlement attempts. It covers several strands of analysis, including the tension between state sovereignty and humanitarian concerns, and the role of the threat or use of force in coercive international diplomacy.
The war in Kosovo was a turning point: NATO deployed its armed forces in war for the first time, and placed the controversial doctrine of 'humanitarian intervention' squarely in the world's eye. It was an armed intervention for the purpose of implementing Security Council resolutions-but without Security Council authorization.This report tries to answer a number of burning questions, such as why the international community was unable to act earlier and prevent the escalation of the conflict, as well as focusing on the capacity of the United Nations to act as global peacekeeper.The Commission recommends a new status for Kosovo, 'conditional independence', with the goal of lasting peace and security for Kosovo-and for the Balkan region in general. But many of the conslusions may be beneficially applied to conflicts the world-over.
This report examines the reasons Slobodan Milosevic, the then president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, decided on June 3, 1999, to accept NATO's conditions for terminating the conflict over Kosovo. Drawing in part upon the testimony of Milosevic and other senior Serb and foreign officials who directly interacted with Milosevic, the report analyzes (1) the assumptions and other calculations that underlay Milosevic's initial decision to defy NATO's demands with regard to Kosovo, and (2) the political, economic, and military developments and pressures, and the resulting expectations and concerns that most importantly influenced his subsequent decision to come to terms. While several interrelated factors, including Moscow's eventual endorsement of NATO's terms, helped shape Milosevic's decision to yield, it was the cumulative effect of NATO air power that proved most decisive. The allied bombing of Serbia's infrastructure targets, as it intensified, stimulated a growing interest among both the Servian public and Belgrade officials to end the conflict. Milosevic's belief that the bombing that would follow a rejection of NATO's June 2 peace terms would be massively destructive and threatening to his continued rule made a settlement seem imperative. Also examined are some implications for future U.S. and allied military capabilities and operations.
In February 2008, Kosovo finally declared its independence from Serbia. This book charts the course of the status process from 2005 to the present and analyses how and why it went so very wrong.
This book develops a novel way of thinking about crises in world politics. By building on ontological security theory, this work conceptualises critical situations as radical disjunctions that challenge the ability of collective agents to ‘go on’. These ontological crises bring into the realm of discursive consciousness four fundamental questions related to existence, finitude, relations and autobiography. In times of crisis, collective agents such as states are particularly attached to their ontic spaces, or spatial extensions of the self that cause collective identities to appear more firm and continuous. These theoretical arguments are illustrated in a case study looking at Serbia’s anxiety over the secession of Kosovo. The author argues that Serbia’s seemingly irrational and self-harming policy vis-à-vis Kosovo can be understood as a form of ontological self-help. It is a rational pursuit of biographical continuity and a healthy sense of self in the face of an ontological crisis triggered by the secession of a province that has been constructed as the ontic space of the Serbian nation since the late 19th century.
An incisive and revealing history of how Yugoslavia plunged into violence in the 1990s Over the past two years, the entire world watched in horror as one of Europe's most stable countries plunged into an orgy of violence and bloodshed that has invoked comparisons to the Holocaust. Aside from empty threats and diplomatic hand wringing, the West has done little to stop the ethnic cleansing, the sieges, and the brutality that has characterized the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Contrary to common wisdom, the hyper-violent disintegration of the former Yugoslavia is not simply and exclusively the product of inherent and irrational ethnic animosities and centuries of strife. In this engaging book, journalist Christopher Bennett traces the turning point to the 1987 struggle within the Serbian Communist party which was between adherents of a Serb nationalist ideology -embodied by Slobodan Milosevic- and the other Yugoslavs who clung to the vision of a multinational state. As soon as Milosevic gained the upper hand, he ruthlessly purged his rivals and launched a massive campaign of media indoctrination to stir up Serb nationalism. This new nationalism, which has repelled the world since 1991, is primarily Milosevic's creation and not merely the result of historical enmity. As a student at two different Yugoslav universities in the 1980's, Bennett witnessed firsthand many if the critical events which contributed to Yugoslavia's destruction. He renders an incisive and accessible history, covering the period from Tito's dictatorship to the present day.
This book makes the case for the independence of Kosova – the former province of 'old-Yugoslavia' and now temporarily a United Nations-led International protectorate – at a time in which international diplomacy is deeply involved in solving the contested issue of its 'Final Status'. The aim of the book is to counteract the anti-Albanian propaganda waged by some parties, but never to propose a counter-propaganda hostile to others or to the goals of a democratic Kosova.