This is a study of Napoleon Bonaparte and his military strategies. Included in the text is a history of the art of war from the beginning of the Peninsular War to the end of the Russian Campaign. This is the third book in a four-volume series.
Includes over 200 maps, plans, diagrams and uniform prints Lt.-Col. Theodore Ayrault Dodge was a soldier of long and bloody experience, having served with the Union Army of the Potomac during the American Civil War losing one of his legs during the battle of Gettysburg. After the end of the war he settled down in retirement to write, he produced a number of excellent works on the recently ended Civil War and his magnum opus “A History of the Art of War”, tracing the advances, changes and major engagements of Western Europe. His work was split into twelve volumes, richly illustrated with cuts of uniforms, portraits and maps, each focussing on periods of history headed by the most prominent military figure; Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Frederick the Great and finally Napoleon. Napoleon and the period which he dominated received such care and attention that Dodge wrote four excellent, authoritative and detailed volumes on him. This second volume explores the beginning of Napoleon’s ascension to the title of Emperor of the French and his defeat of all of the powers of Europe to his apogee of power in 1807. Napoleon’s thunderous campaign in Italy in 1800, his lightning campaign that culminated at Austerlitz in 1805 see the Emperor in his full pomp scattering his Austrian and Russian foes. Concluding this volume are his campaigns against the Prussians and Russians in 1806 and 1807, despite defeating his enemies roundly in battle his own finely trained Grande Armée was starting to be bled to death. A well written, expansive and excellent classic.
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In the capstone work of his career, distinguished military historian Jay Luvaas brings together in one volume the military genius of Napoleon. Unlike Sun Tzu or Carl von Clausewitz, Napoleon never wrote a unified essay on his military philosophy. Yet, as one of the world's great strategists and tacticians, he sprinkled wisdom throughout his many and varied writings. Jay Luvaas spent over three decades poring through the thirty-two volumes of Napoleon's correspondence, carefully translating and editing all of his writings on the art of war, and arranging them into seamless essays. The resulting book captures the brilliant commander's thoughts on everything from the preparation of his forces to the organization, planning, and execution of his battles -- all buttressing Napoleon's view that "in war there is but one favorable moment; the great art is to seize it." Napoleon on the Art of War will be essential reading for military buffs, students of history, and any business leader looking for timeless insights on strategy.
Some 12 years ago it was estimated that well over 300,000 works existed on this period and since then several thousand more have appeared. Therefore, it might be reasonably argued that there is little room for another volume. Nonetheless, this vast outpouring of literature has usually dealt with major leaders, specific battles or campaigns, and with certain branches of the service. Moreover, at least in English, the literature tends to concentrate primarily on the French or British armies. There appears to be a lack of works combining a description of the major changes and trends in the art of war, especially at the cutting edge of events, with a discussion of the French military establishment and the armies of the major opponents, British as well as continental. And while this book is only a brief survey, I do believe that it may serve as a contribution towards filling this gap in our historical knowledge of military institutions and fighting men.